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The central argument of this thesis is that accom¬
modation in the field of human rights between the United
States and Soviet Union is improbable due to fundamentally
incongruous conceptions of the substance and exercise of
human rights. The focus of this study is on the human
rights provisions in the Helsinki Final Act and in the
resultant "Helsinki process" since July 1975. Disagree¬
ments on the purpose and content of the Final Act stretch
back to 1954 when the first Soviet call for a conference
was delivered in order to solidify the territorial
and ideological borders in Europe rather than to expand human
rights. The lack of consensus on the role of human rights
in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
has been an inherent weakness in the "Helsinki process."
Despite the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev, the current
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, has fuelled optimism in the West concerning Soviet
conduct in the sphere of human rights, the ongoing changes
associated with "restructuring" fperestroika) and
"openness" (glasnost') do not exemplify an adjustment in
the Soviet view of human rights to conform with Western
ii
definitions of the term. Because these changes have been
initiated for specifically Soviet circumstances, human
rights will continue to be a major stumbling block in
Soviet-American relations into the foreseeable future.
Regardless of American desires to reach a grandiose
European accommodation on human rights through the
"Helsinki process" and despite American attempts to
circumvent specific differences between the Soviet Union
and the United States, the issue of human rights is more
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INTRODUCTION
On 1 August 1985, the 35 nations of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) commemorated
the Tenth Anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final
Act. This was not a celebration of the tremendous accom¬
plishments of the Helsinki process. Indeed, according to
most Western accounts, the Helsinki process has been
largely a failure; it has not succeeded in defining or
perpetuating detente, nor has it established a stable
system of cooperation which would enhance security in
Europe. The aspects of the Final Act that have aroused
the most condemnation, without receiving a corresponding
amount of scholarly analysis, have been the sections
concerned with cooperation in humanitarian affairs or
"human rights." The objective of this study is to fill
part of this gap by presenting and analyzing the different
perceptions of human rights held by Soviet and American
leaders before, during and after the negotiations which
culminated in the Helsinki Final Act.
The central argument of this thesis is that accom¬
modation in the field of human rights between the super¬
powers is improbable due to fundamentally incongruous
conceptions of the substance and exercise of human rights.
Since the beginning of the CSCE process, there has been
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ample evidence to support the proposition that the pros¬
pects for either side modifying its view are extremely
slim. Despite the fact that Mikhail Gorbachev, the
current General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU), has fuelled optimism in the West
concerning Soviet conduct in the sphere of human rights,
each superpower is faced with strong domestic and
international pressures to remain intransigent in its
interpretation and public expression of human rights.
Gorbachev has initiated a series of much needed domestic
reforms within the Soviet Union, but these changes
associated with "openness" (glasnost') and "restructur¬
ing" (perestroika) do not exemplify an adjustment in the
Soviet view of human rights to conform with Western
definitions of the term. Because these changes have been
initiated for specifically Soviet circumstances, human
rights will continue to be a major stumbling block in
Soviet-American relations into the foreseeable future,
barring a sudden change in the international environment.
This study, by exploring the significance of dif¬
ferent interpretations of human rights, may help to limit
unexpected confrontations over human rights or point to
the inadvisability of deliberate ones and thereby reduce
the likelihood that such conflicts could spill over into
other more destabilizing aspects of Soviet-American rela-
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tions. Similarly, the evidence presented here should
serve to moderate any great expectations concerning a
grandiose international accommodation on human rights.
The Helsinki Final Act is chosen for this study
because of the intensity of the public debate over that
document between the official and unofficial representa¬
tives of the United States and Soviet Union. Vigorous
debate stemmed, in part, from the ambitious attempts of
the Carter administration to interject concerns about
human rights into foreign policy-making, specifically into
US-Soviet relations. Further controversy was generated by
the formation of unofficial "Helsinki Monitoring Groups"
in the Soviet Union. The Soviet citizens who formed these
organizations provided an interpretation of the provisions
on human rights which reiterated the views of the Carter
administration and forced the Brezhnev leadership to take
an unusually public stand on its view of the content of
the human rights clauses.
Since the Helsinki process has become a protracted
one which develops through biennial follow-up confer¬
ences, this study is also a background case study for
future conduct in this sphere. Even if the Helsinki
process ultimately fails (most notably, if follow-up
meetings are discontinued), the human rights issue will
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remain as an ongoing point of contention between the US
and Soviet leaders.
The contribution made by this thesis is original in
two ways. Firstly, the preponderance of literature on
this subject analyzes the human rights debate after 1
August 1975. A fundamental claim of this study is that
the evolution of the Soviet-US human rights debate began
before the CSCE was actually convened, and that Soviet and
American perspectives have remained consistent since early
1965 even though the genre of the debate became more
specifically defined thereafter. The main reason why
scholars have concentrated on the later years is because
the American delegation to the CSCE was rather taciturn on
the human rights issue. This, it must be stressed, was
due more to the American preoccupation with arms control
than to a more conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet
interpretation of human rights. Since the debates in the
conference revealed more information about the Soviet
interpretations of human rights than the American ones,
the views of representatives of the United States will be
discussed in greater detail here in the context of the
post-Helsinki period, but without ignoring the prelimi¬
nary discussion leading up to the CSCE or the behind-
the-scenes support of the American delegation during the
early months of the Conference.
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Secondly, this thesis aims to move away from the
exclusive emphasis on post-Helsinki analysis, because
study of the negotiations over human rights in the CSCE
itself has been neglected. The fact that these negotia¬
tions were largely an extension of positions already
revealed before the CSCE is not disclosed in most of the
existing literature. For the sake of accuracy and
rigour, a more historical approach is used here.
The chronology of the Helsinki process can be broken
down as follows: the ground breaking years, 1954-1972;
the negotiations and the Final Act of the CSCE, 1972-1975;
the period since the culmination of the Final Act leading
up to the first CSCE review conference, 1975-1977; and the
further follow-up and specialized conferences which have
grown out of the CSCE.
Here it should be noted that in method this thesis
conforms to the historical-interpretive or "classical"
model.1 It is concerned to explore the sequence of
events in the Helsinki process, to suggest why particular
negotiating positions of the USSR and USA were formulated
the way they were, and to identify the domestic and
international pressures behind these positions. To pursue
further inquiry, an historical-interpretative account aims
to examine an historical problem through a critical and
unbiased method of research. This definition does not
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isolate history as unique in the social sciences. Rather,
it emphasizes that the political historian is reliant on
all the social science disciplines when participating in
an historical-interpretive study. This monograph is
therefore intended to generate interest and debate rather
than to act as a definitive account.
Advocates of a stricter so-called "scientific" ap¬
proach may find this thesis troubling for there is no
determined attempt to test hypotheses about behaviour in
international affairs or to present statistical-quantita¬
tive data to support a "scientific model" for the human
rights debate in the CSCE. But the decision to examine
the CSCE through "classical" methods, which have been
attacked with much vigour by some political scientists
since the 1950s, should not be perceived as an assault
launched by a humanist against the supporters of the
scientific approach. Rather, the "classical" method was
used for this thesis for reasons which made the study
imminently more practical.
Many of the questions which arise in international
relations cannot be neatly tested with precision, es¬
pecially if historical information is lacking.2 The
majority of controversial issues stemming from the Final
Act are not easily amenable to scientific modelling. These
issues include: What is the relationship between indivi-
7
dual rights and security in Europe? Is the Final Act
legally binding? What are the origins of varied inter¬
pretations of the Final Act and have these views changed?
Are follow-up conferences useful? These questions require
a scrutiny of historical events, negotiating positions and
responses of citizens in different countries. As will be
discussed throughout this manuscript, the Helsinki process
is evolving and constant observation and interpretation
are vital to the process. This thesis traces the matura¬
tion of the Helsinki process, which is still in its infan¬
cy, with the aim of providing a historical foundation that
future studies may build upon. It would have been hazard¬
ous to use a tight conceptual framework to study an
international event only in its early stages. In using an
approach that J. David Singer has characterized as an
"amalgamation of insight with evidence,"3 this inquiry
into the controversy over human rights in the CSCE may
assist game theorists, systems theorists, rational choice
theorists, conflict theorists or others to probe more
deeply into the issues discussed here.
The emphasis on quantitative methods in political
studies has come on the heels of decades of the "classi¬
cal" approach, which provided a historical background and
pool of information for further political inquiry. The
Helsinki process may soon be ripe for more "scientific"
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analysis as the amount of data multiplies, as our under¬
standing of historical developments deepens, and the
likelihood of making more reasonable predictions in¬
creases. Ultimately, this work may prove useful as a case
study for scholars who are attempting to formulate an
integrated theory of international relations.
However, scientific political analysts may reject
much of the information presented here on the grounds
that it is insignificant, loaded with value judgements,
or too interpretive to be useful in hypothesis testing or
in generating generalisations about policitical behaviour
in the international arena. Not all the information in
this thesis will be suitable for statistical analysis or
the substantiation of propositions. But it would be inap¬
propriate to criticize this historical-interpretive study
on these grounds. In political science, the complemen¬
tarity of the two major approaches is beneficial and the
more useful question will be how this study can aid future
"scientific" analysis.
The historical-interpretive approach has been open
to criticism because some of its advocates have often
failed to define terms or make assumptions explicit in
their initial studies. The allegation can be levelled at
this thesis, but it should be noted that the Final Act
itself is, by necessity, extremely vague. Although the
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adoption of general definitions could evolve in the long-
term, it is possible in the short-term to outline the
disagreements over content and to consider the potential
for the amalgamation of the varied interpretations. While
speculation on future views on the Final Act is emphati¬
cally "unscientific," it is nonetheless necessary due to
the nature of the CSCE.
Self-criticism is a vital component in the Helsinki
process. The signatories to the Final Act agreed to
monitor their own compliance but, in order to fulfill that
obligation, many political leaders will have to challenge
and criticize the earlier negotiating positions of their
governments. This is especially true in the case of the
Soviet leaders who have admitted only recently their lack
of open, critical introspection and have actually en¬
couraged more forums to discuss human rights. The his¬
torical-interpretive model is well suited to anticipate
potential changes and it is useful also for analyzing
unexpected policy shifts.
Moving to the specific sections of the thesis, Chap¬
ter One examines "The Road to Helsinki" and is intended to
provide an understanding of the objectives of both the
United States and Soviet Union in the future security
conference. It also points out that there were early
disagreements on the purpose of the conference.
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Chapter Two concentrates on the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), following the
negotiations from Helsinki to Geneva and back to Helsinki
and examines the ongoing discussions about the need to
include humanitarian provisions. This chapter draws on,
but attempts to go beyond four monographs published
previously. They are: Luigi Vittorio Ferraris's Report on
a Negotiation: Helsinki-Geneva-Helsinki, 1972-1975;
Kavass, Granier and Dominick1s Human Rights, European
Politics and the Helsinki Accord; John J. Maresca's To
Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, 1973-1975; and Vojtech Mastny's Helsinki. Human
Rights and European Security.^ The texts by Ferraris and
Maresca, who were delegates to the CSCE, offer valuable
information on the secret negotiations and diplomatic
manoeuvring during the Conference. Mastny and Kavass et
al. have reprinted documents produced during the meetings.
This thesis examines the debate over human rights
during the CSCE by utilizing these historical monographs.
Through matching the personal accounts of Maresca and
Ferraris with the previously unpublished documents of the
proceedings, it is possible to present a more thorough,
although by no means a comprehensive, account of the
proceedings and their significance for the resultant
Soviet-American debate over human rights. This effort is
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further enhanced by the utilization of newspaper reports
in the American, British and Soviet press during the CSCE.
These articles, essays and interviews shed light on the
perceptions and misrepresentations of what was occurring
during the Conference.
Chapter Three backs up a pivotal argument in this
study that the Soviet view of human rights remained con¬
sistent before, during and after the CSCE. It discusses
the foundations of the Soviet doctrine on human rights as
represented in Soviet theories, policy statements and the
1977 Soviet Constitution.
While the prospects for a change in the official
interpretation of human rights in the Soviet Union are
minimal, Chapter Four illustrates how, during the
Brezhnev years, unofficial groups were active in pro¬
moting views which coincided with Western interpretations
of the Helsinki Final Act. These groups distributed
underground "self-published" (samizdat) material which
provided an unofficial translation of the human rights
provisions. Specific writings from the "Helsinki Monitor¬
ing Groups" will be examined here, but this section also
reveals the reactions of Soviet governmental officials to
the actions of the dissident organizations.
In Chapter Five, one of the most ambitious attempts
by an American president to incorporate ideas of human
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rights into foreign policy is outlined. President Carter
sought to increase awareness of the growing abuses of
human rights in many countries and he alleged that the
Soviet Union specifically, was a regular violator of
internationally accepted standards of human rights. The
CSCE was placed high on the agenda of US-Soviet relations
by President Carter who, during his presidential campaign,
verbally assaulted President Ford for his complacency on
the Soviet record in fulfilling the pledges made in Hel¬
sinki. Carter's crusade in the name of human rights was
often justified on the grounds that it exemplified an en¬
thusiastic compliance with the Final Act.
Chapter Six on "The Helsinki Final Act into the
Gorbachev Era," discusses the vitality of the "Helsinki
process," especially through the follow-up procedures and
the expansion of specialized conferences which have grown
out of the original CSCE. It argues that while fundamental
Soviet interpretations have not been modified, in some
specific areas (such as in the least ideological category
of cultural relations) the Soviet leaders have demonstrat¬
ed unprecedented flexibility in responding to the requests
of Western leaders.
Since Gorbachev has initiated policies which may
call past Soviet statements on human rights into ques¬
tion, brief comments on the significance of perestroika
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and crlasnost' are called for. As recently as the Nine¬
teenth Party Conference in Moscow in June 1988, Gorbachev
revealed that restructuring necessitates broader partici¬
pation by Soviet citizens in administration and politics.
He stated:
as conceived by the founders of Marxism-
Leninism, management functions should be
expanded not by strengthening power resting upon
high-handed administration and compulsion, but
above all increasing the role of the democratic
factor and involving broad sections of the
people in administration.5
But he also added:
there must be a strict demarcation of the
functions of party and state bodies, in
conformity with Lenin's conception of the
vanguard of society and the role of the Soviet
state as an instrument of government by the
people.6
Other recent statements provide further insight into
Gorbachev's "new thinking" on human rights and should
temper expectations for a general revision of Soviet
human rights policy that would satisfy completely gov¬
ernmental and non-governmental observers in the West.
Also relevant for our purposes here are recent at¬
tempts by the United States and West European governments
to circumvent the Soviet policy towards activists for
human rights. One tactic has been to exchange convicted
spies for dissidents. Current policy-makers in the West
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appear receptive to this approach, but the long-term
consequences of such trade-offs must be explored further.
It should be noted that a detailed examination of
the Reagan administration is omitted while specific
attention is given to Carter and Gorbachev. As already
mentioned, Carted added human rights to his list of
foreign policy priorities with more vigor then any other
American head of state. This may have been due in part to
personal religious convictions. Gorbachev has frequently
addressed human rights in his speeches and discussions and
he has generated high expectations in the West for major
changes in the Soviet human rights doctrine. The Reagan
years, however, have not witnessed significant innovations
in US human rights policy. President Reagan has supported
the "Helsinki process" and he has been outspoken about the
energetic role of the US in humanitarian affairs, but US
involvement in the CSCE was cemented before 1982 so it
would have been politically unfeasible to leave the
"Helsinki process" anyway. As will be discussed in Chapter
Six, he has sent very vocal delegations to follow-up
meetings. He has also kept in place governmental machinery
for assessing and promoting a human rights policy. Thus,
Reagan's policy on human rights within the CSCE is
essentially a continuation of his predecessor's —in some
instances, he has even maintained the same personnel. In
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his general strategy on human rights, Reagan has placed
more emphasis on Central America, especially in his second
term, such that further research would more properly be
concentrated on this development.
Chapters Four, Five and Six illustrate how, since
the mid 1970s human rights have been on the international
political agenda in Europe and North America largely due
to the Helsinki Final Act. Various spokespersons for the
thirty-five participating nations have at least accepted
the rhetoric of human rights if they have not incorporated
the Helsinki provisions into foreign and domestic policy.
Clearly, human rights have became a vital component in
East-West relations. Thus it is necessary to explore
beyond the negotiations in the original CSCE, as discussed
in Chapter Two, and follow the debates as they have evolv¬
ed since 1975.
The CSCE has acted as a springboard for legitimizing
the discussion of human rights, formerly considered an
inherently sovereign domestic issue, in a multilateral
framework. Because the terminology of the Final Act is so
broad, virtually any humanitarian issue may be discussed
within the "Helsinki process."
To epitomize the "Helsinki spirit" many nations have
gone a step further and have put into place domestic
institutional machinery which allegedly assures concrete
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compliance with the humanitarian provisions of the Final
Act. No nation is legally bound to take these actions, but
the political prestige of the document is such that it
behooves all the signatories to implement, or appear to
apply its provisions. Official institutions in the Soviet
Union have addressed humanitarian issues with increasing
frequency (official publications have increased twofold
since the mid 1970s) and in the United States, the issue
of human rights has often taken on a bipartisan guality in
Congress. Presidential candidates have felt compelled to
include the promotion of the Helsinki principles for human
rights on their domestic and foreign policy agendas. Even
though President Carter may have accentuated human rights
in his administration regardless, the "Helsinki process"
assured that he would consider the issue and it did allow
him to deflect part of the criticism from Soviet leaders
that he was motivated primarily by resentment on ideologi¬
cal grounds. And because of the Helsinki Final Act, Carter
was able to argue that human rights were a vital component
in detente.
The CSCE itself has established an international
forum for examining human rights which has captured
public attention far more than other organizations such
as the United Nations. This is due, in large part, to the
intensity of the public debate in various meetings
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centred on human rights within and among the participating
nations. Fewer nations (than in the United Nations) are
involved in what have became biennial human rights confer¬
ences, favouring a more thorough dialogue. And to
exemplify truly the "Helsinki spirit," many of the
participating nations have applied the provisions to
relations with states that have not signed the Final Act
and the practice has not been resisted.
The CSCE has set up international structures in
international relations for examining human rights and
has guaranteed that human rights issues will receive a
higher status on the international agenda. The enhanced
role of human rights in interstate and intrastate affairs
is a major change in international politics. In direct
response to the Helsinki Final Act, many governmental
officials have established new bureaus and officers in
departments concerned with foreign and domestic policy¬
making and assessment. The "Helsinki process," thus
institutionalized, maintains elaborate machinery to fuel
the discussion on human rights.
The nature of the link between the "Helsinki pro¬
cess" and the formulation of foreign policies is complex
and evades simplistic measurement due to a large number of
interacting factors. What can be stressed with confidence
is that the Final Act resulted in human rights issues
18
coming more firmly onto political agendas and with much
higher salience than ever before. This heightened exposure
was perpetuated through new political fora such as follow-
up meetings and specialized conferences. This thesis
demonstrates that the "Helsinki process" broadened during
the late stages of the original CSCE and in subsequent
meetings sanctioned by the Final Act. The foreign policies
of Brezhnev, Carter, Reagan and Gorbachev were formulated
taking account of this international concern. Chapters
Four, Five and Six trace the unanticipated expansion of
human rights in foreign policy.
Foreign and domestic policy have been influenced
further in the US and Soviet Union by the unprecedented
emergence of unofficial monitoring bodies (such as the
Helsinki Monitoring Groups in USSR and Helsinki Watch in
the US). While primarily concerned with domestic implemen¬
tation, they have at times stepped into the international
limelight to present their data at follow-up meetings. In
fact, unofficial monitoring groups in Eastern Europe have
recently demanded that they be permitted to attend all
follow-up meetings.
However, attempts to place the issue of human rights
at the forefront of Soviet-American relations are unwise,
especially if linked to other more critical substantive
issues. The debate over the human rights provisions of the
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Helsinki Final Act has suggested that the Soviet Union and
United States have antithetical interpretations of their
meaning. There have not, as yet, been significant indica¬
tions that either side is willing to adapt its view to
suit the other. For this reason, the success of the Hel¬
sinki Final Act has been limited to generating discussion,
debate and argument, not accord.
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"classics" of international relations, the
writings of Hobbes, Grotius, Kant, and other
great thinkers of the past who have turned
their attention to international affairs. Such
study does indeed exemplify the classical
approach, and it provides a method that is
particularly fruitful and important. What I
have in mind, however, is something much wider
than this: the approach to theorizing that
derives from philosophy, history, and law, and
that is characterized above all by explicit
reliance upon the exercise of judgement and by
assumptions that if we confine ourselves to
strict standards of verification and proof there
is very little of significance that can be said
about international relations, that general
propositions about this subject must therefore
derive from a scientifically imperfect process
of perception or intuition, and that these
general propositions cannot be accorded anything
more than the tentative and inconclusive status
appropriate to their doubtful origin.
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2. Bull, p. 27. Hedley Bull is extremely critical of
the "scientific approach." He writes,
In abstaining from what Morton Kaplan calls
"intuitive guesses" or what William Riker calls
"wisdom literature" they [the practitioners of
the scientific approach] are committing them¬
selves to a course of intellectual puritanism
that keeps them (or would keep them if they
really adhered to it) as remote from the
substance of international politics as the
inmates of a Victorian nunnery were from the
study of sex.
Ibid, p. 26. Bull was roundly criticized however, for,
amongst other inadequacies, not really understanding what
science was all about. See, Levy, Marion J., Jr., "Does
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Chapter 1
THE ROAD TO HELSINKI
The purpose of this chapter is to recount the events
leading up to the preparatory meetings of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe in November 1972. A
recollection of these occurrences is essential because
many of the negotiating positions in the CSCE were shaped
well before the Conference began. Since the original call
for a European security conference came from the Soviet
Union in 1954, the first section will examine the
objectives underlying repeated Soviet calls for the
Conference. These included: the priority of confirming
the territorial status quo; the desire to clarify the role
the United States should play in a European security con¬
ference; and the need to expand economic cooperation with
the West while minimizing the influence of Western ideals
and values that would accompany such cooperation.
The second section of this chapter outlines the
pressing foreign policy concerns of the Nixon administra¬
tion on the eve of the CSCE. These were to build upon the
gradual improvement in US-Soviet relations; to expand upon
an ambitious diplomatic initiative toward the People's
Republic of China (PRC); and to end the war in Vietnam.
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This section also shows how the Agreement on the Basic
Principles of United States-Soviet Relations foretold the
initial negotiating positions of the American and Soviet
delegations to the first section (The Declaration of
Principles) of the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, it
points out that Soviet-American relations in the early
1970s were influenced by the priorities of enhancing
regional stability and initiating arms control—issues
that impacted on attitudes toward the CSCE, either
directly or indirectly.
Finally, the last section offers answers to why the
American delegation preferred a "low profile" position in
the early stages of the Conference. American leaders were
reluctant to participate in a European security conference
and they certainly were not nearly as enthusiastic as many
West European politicians about the benefits of such a
meeting. As American and European interests became
increasingly disparate, American policy-makers were forced
to reevaluate the United States' role in Europe. The
issues of American troop reductions in Europe and failure
to agree on a new Atlantic Charter exposed the need to
redefine the trans-Atlantic relationship.
An outline of Soviet proposals for a European
security conference, as well as a presentation of the
pressing issues on the eve of the CSCE, provides valuable
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understanding of the negotiating positions of the
delegations at the Conference. As discussed below, the
foundations for both the Soviet and American negotiating
strategies were built in this early period.
SOVIET PROPOSALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR A EUROPEAN
SECURITY CONFERENCE, 1958-1972
Although the idea of a pan-European security
conference can be traced back to the interwar period, the
debate over what eventually became the CSCE really began
with a proposal by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav
Molotov at the Berlin Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 10
February 1954.1 At that time, the primary Soviet concern
was the prospect of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
entering the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
It was feared that this would intensify the cold war and
sink East-West relations even deeper into the abyss of the
problem of a divided Germany. When the FRG entered NATO in
1955, the Soviet leadership sought to prevent the next
dangerous escalation, i.e. the FRG's access to, or
control of, nuclear weapons. The issue of West Berlin was
stirred up again in November 1958 when First Secretary
Khrushchev insisted on the suspension of Allied Occupation
rights and the institution of a demilitarized "free"
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Berlin under the control of the German Democratic Republic
(GDR). By August 1961, disagreements over West Berlin
resulted in the building of the Berlin Wall by the GDR
People's Police and National People's Army. The German
Problem became the focal point of insecurity in Europe and
the primary cause of Soviet interest in a security con¬
ference. Soviet proposals for such a conference were
dominated by this issue.
An examination of five proposals, issued between 1958
and 1972, illustrates the early Soviet views on the format
and content of a pan-European security conference. These
include the Draft Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
Among European States (July 1958), the Bucharest Statement
(July 1966), the Karlovy Vary Statement (April 1967), the
Budapest Appeal (March 1969), and the Prague Declaration
(January 1972). The five statements display a continuity
in the pursuit of the following objectives: firstly, the
Soviet leaders wanted an agreement with the West European
governments that a status quo existed and that the post-
World War II territorial borders and ideological boun¬
daries in Europe were permanent; secondly, they hoped that
a security conference of exclusively European nations
might loosen NATO unity and reduce the American military
and political influence in Europe—although this objective
was recognized as idealistic rather than imperative; and
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thirdly, Soviet leaders reasoned that a security agreement
could open the way for improved economic and technological
exchange between the countries of Eastern and Western
Europe.
Most significant as an indication of future Soviet
attitudes toward the inclusion of humanitarian issues in
the Helsinki Final Act, was the total absence of a desire
to include a principle of freer flows of information and
people into a conference for security and cooperation.
This would became a serious dilemma for the Soviet
leadership because an increase in economic and technologi¬
cal exchange between East and West would inevitably
increase exposure to political beliefs and, in Soviet
eyes, open Eastern Europe to the subversive ideology of
the capitalist countries. Soviet concern over this issue
intensified after the Soviet suppression of the Dubcek
government in Czechoslovakia in August 1968.2 It was also
aggravated by Romanian intransigence toward the Warsaw
Treaty Organization (WTO), and general instability in
Eastern Europe as expectations of a better standard of
living increased.3 All of these factors contributed to the
Soviet drive for confirmation of the territorial status
quo and the ancillary objective of confirmation of the
ideological division in Europe.
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The Priority of Confirming the Territorial Status Quo
While Molotov's call for a European security
conference in 1954 reflected the immediate Soviet concern
over entry of the ERG into NATO, later pronouncements by
the Soviet leadership,and the Warsaw Pact, spelled out
Soviet longterm objectives more clearly. The Draft Treaty
of Friendship and Cooperation Among European States of
July 1958, authored by the Soviet Union and sent to all
European nations plus the United States, included a number
of principles which nations could agree to adopt in their
mutual relations.4 According to the Draft Treaty, all
nations should respect the principles of non-aggression,
territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs
and settlement of controversial issues in a peaceful
manner. They would also attempt to initiate negotiations
leading to arms limitations.
The Draft Treaty also proposed the establishment of a
nuclear free zone in Central Europe and intensification of
economic, scientific and cultural collaboration. This
proposal was especially significant because it hinted at
two strategies through which the Soviet leadership would
try to cement the post-World War II geographic arrangement
in Europe: firstly, by attaining multilateral acceptance
of a set of principles governing relations between states,
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many of which were included in this draft; and secondly,
by ensuring a favourable solution to the German Problem.5
But the Draft Treaty was ignored by the West as
tension continued to mount in Berlin. In November 1958,
Khrushchev issued a virtual ultimatum to the nations
occupying West Berlin (the United States, Great Britain
and France) to withdraw from that sector of the city.
Khrushchev's brashness certainly tarnished Soviet hopes
for a security conference, but he did recognize that
tensions over Berlin blocked the road to any future
European security arrangement. In his own words, Berlin
was "a sort of barometer. The slightest fluctuation in
the pressure of the world political atmosphere naturally
registered at that point where the forces of the two sides
were squared off against one another."6 More proposals
for a European security conference were forthcoming, and
Western receptiveness to these initiatives depended, in
large part, on a lessening of East-West tension over
Berlin.
After Khrushchev was removed from power in October
1964, the idea of a security conference was revived
through an East European ally viewed in a more favourable
light by West European nations. In a speech to the
Nineteenth Session of the United National General Assembly
in December 1964, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki re-
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emphasized the interest of the East European nations in
such a conference.7 The Rapacki Plan (actually the second
Rapacki Plan as the first was issued by Rapacki in 1958),
and similar statements by First Secretary Wladyslaw
Gamulka, stemmed from the longstanding determination of
the Poles to receive recognition of the permanence of the
Oder-Neisse border.8 The special significance of this
proposal was that it was the first East European initia¬
tive to sanction the participation of the United States
and it indicated that overall, the leaders of the Warsaw
Pact were in agreement on the primary purpose for
convening a conference.9
By the summer of 1966, the Soviet drive for multi¬
lateral recognition of the territorial status quo was well
known. In July of that year the Political Consultative
Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in Bucharest and issued a
statement overflowing with territorial demands, including:
recognition of the existence of two German states with the
option of eventual integration of the FRG into the GDR;
renunciation of the FRG's claims to represent all of the
German people; renunciation of the Munich diktat;10
discontinuance of pressure on states that recognize the
GDR;11 renunciation of claims to redraw the map of Europe;
and recognition of the Polish frontier along the Oder-
Neisse rivers. This statement rejected the territorial
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demands of West German "revanchists" by insisting that
"the question of frontiers in Europe has been solved
finally and irrevocably....1,12
The Bucharest Statement outlined the principles of
relations between states as in the 1958 Draft Treaty,
except for a few interesting additions, such as compliance
with independence and national sovereignty, mutual
advantage and renunciation of discrimination and pressure
against other nations in economic or political relations.
Shulman claims that the Romanian delegation in Bucharest
was insistent on these principles, and even encouraged
diplomatic recognition of the ERG, much to the dismay of
the Soviet leadership.13 But since the Soviet Union had
established diplomatic relations with the ERG in 1955, it
is possible that the Romanians considered their action as
consistent with Soviet policy. From this point on, much
of the focus of the Warsaw Pact would be on its growing
internal fissures. In the case of Romania, party chief
Nicolae Ceausescu would, in these turbulent years for the
Warsaw Pact, issue a "Declaration of Independence"
(independence from Soviet suzerainty), refuse to accept
Warsaw Pact troops on Romanian soil, and defend staunchly
the Czechoslovak Party's right to contemplate and initiate
internal reforms in 1968. Also, Romania was responsive to
the Ostpolitik campaign which the Soviet leadership
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viewed, at least initially, as an attempt to increase the
FRG's influence in Eastern Europe, thus undermining the
position of the GDR. There is no doubt that all of the
above influenced detrimentally the strength of Soviet
bargaining positions before and during the CSCE.
Certainly, Romania's subsequent absence from the Communist
Party Conference in Karlovy Vary in April 1967, the next
major initiative for a European security conference, was
symptomatic of the eventual discord between the Soviet
Union and Romania over the path to European security.14
Finally, the Bucharest statement sought to legitimize
the status quo through the principles included in the
United Nations Charter.15 The West European nations could
have exploited this tactical error by alleging that the
existence of these principles in the United Nations
Charter questioned the need for another conference and
document to reiterate them. Were the nations of the
Warsaw Pact dismissing the legality or authority of the
Charter?16 Probably not, since Soviet spokespersons would
later cite the Final Act's reiteration of the Charter as
one of its most significant aspects.17 But West European
representatives could have used this opportunity to force
a discussion of the necessity of reaffirming the prin¬
ciples of the Charter, and to probe deeper to find or
publicize the actual objectives of the East Europeans.
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Was the European security conference to apply the Charter
specifically to Europe? If so, then what was so unique
about Europe to necessite a specific, regional document?
Of course, the Soviet response would be that the post-
World War II boundaries had not been recognized. At that
point, Western commentators could have responded that the
United Nations was well equipped to host such a con¬
ference. Perhaps the most sensible Western position would
have been to seek a statement of compliance with the
Charter with a specific reference to Europe. Such an
approach would have been advantageous to West European
leaders for it would have prevented possible allegations
that they were agreeing to a delayed World War II peace
conference to confirm controversial acquisitions of
territory by the Soviet political and military leaders.
While the Communist Party Conference in Karlovy Vary
(24-26 April 1967) echoed the Bucharest Statement, a
meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the
Warsaw Pact held in March 1969 indicated a new sense of
urgency regarding the issue of territorial confirmation.18
This conference issued a document entitled the Budapest
Appeal that was clearly influenced by the breakdown in
relations between Prague and Moscow and the resultant
Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The
Soviet leadership was most concerned about the domestic
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reform movement in Czechoslovakia (which officially
amounted to replacing democratic centralism with fac¬
tionalism) and with Dubcek's political and economic
bridge-building with the FRG, as well as the possibility
of further instability in Eastern Europe. But Soviet
armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, even when cloaked
under the concept of comradely assistance, appeared to
contradict the very principles which the Soviet Union
sought to include in a European security conference.
Thus, a logical accusation was that the Soviet leadership
now desired the conference merely to legitimize what
Western analysts called the "Brezhnev Doctrine," which
pledged assistance to fraternal socialist nations when
threatened by subversive ideologies.19 In other words,
the socialist nations existed in a state of "limited
sovereignty" with the Soviet Union. To counter this
Western accusation, the Budapest Appeal returned to the
Bucharest principles of respect for the independence and
sovereignty of states, probably to calm the other East
European nations, Romania in particular (in attendance at
Budapest) .20 Romania would later defend vigorously the
principles of sovereignty and national self-determination
in the Helsinki Final Act.
A second reason for the urgency of a formal confirma¬
tion of the status quo in Europe was the intensification
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of border disputes in the Far East and Central Asia, with
Japan and China respectively. The territorial aspects of
these disputes appeared at first glance to have little to
do with the controversy over the borders in Europe. But
Western analysts have failed to appreciate that Russian
and Soviet leaders have, for centuries, been sensitive to
the need to secure their borders in all directions from
invasion. In other words, the objective has been and
still is to defend a "circular frontier."21 Thus, Soviet
concern over border areas in the Far East and Central Asia
did influence their actions in Europe because of growing
anxiety that the Soviet Union was, as has been the
historical pattern, fully encircled by hostile or
potentially antagonistic neighbours.
In the Far East, for example, Soviet spokespersons
continually rejected Japanese claims to the Kurile Islands
which the Soviet Union had annexed in 1945.22 The issue
was not only a territorial one, for Soviet commentators
recognized openly that Japan was second only to the United
States in economic power and that the application of the
economic resources of Japan to the Japanese military could
at some point in the future pose a threat to the defense
of the Soviet Union.23 This concern was exacerbated by
the close military links between the United States and
Japan and the possibility that Japan might enter into a
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trade agreement with China.24 But any future compromise
with Japan was ruled out because in the words of Viktor
Maevskii:
If any sign appears that the Soviet Union
would make concessions to Japan regarding the
"northern territories," [Kurile Islands] this
would naturally have an impact on the
fundamental European problem in the period
following the Second World War, namely the
territorial questions.25
Thus, Soviet representatives did not interpret border
controversies solely on a case-by-case basis. Rather, the
Soviet border was, in Soviet eyes, continuous and controver¬
sies in one area were bound to affect the resolution of
disputes in another.
The most serious of the border quarrels with the Soviet
Union was initiated by China. In this case, the potential
for a major military confrontation was increasing rapidly. A
thorough discussion of the events which led up to the Sino-
Soviet division is beyond the scope of this study, but it is
relevant to note that the break was solidified by June 1969
when China boycotted the Conference of Communist Parties in
Moscow. During one of Brezhnev's speeches to the conference
he lashed out at the Chinese leaders for disrupting the unity
of the communist movement, for increasing the dangers of
nuclear war (China had detonated a nuclear device in October
1964) and for making unjustified claims to Soviet ter¬
ritory.26 There had already been a major Soviet-Chinese
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military clash in March 1969, known as the Ussuri River
Crisis. On 9 March, Krasnaia Zvezda devoted most of its
front page to describing the aggressiveness of the Chinese in
the exchange which resulted in the death of a number of
Soviet soldiers.
The specific Chinese claims were unclear and are still
difficult to determine. Of major interest to the Chinese
leaders was the People's Republic of Mongolia, Vladivostok
and the Soviet Maritime Province.27 But the Soviet position
was reiterated by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in July
1969 when he stated that:
Chinese leaders are advancing territorial
claims against the Soviet Union. They allege
that the treaties concluded in the past
between Russia and China, which clearly
established the boundary between the two
countries, are unequal. But these are false
allegations.... The borders of the Soviet
Union are inviolable throughout their whole
length, including the frontiers in Central
Asia and in the Far East.28
Such statements revealed that the Soviet leaders were
unlikely to accommodate the Chinese and the possibility of a
larger military engagement between the two nations could not
be ruled out completely. This reality must have intensified
the desire to make the borders of Eastern Europe more secure.
Then the Soviet leaders could concentrate on the 4,500 mile
border with China.
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The third major factor in the renewed Soviet drive for
confirmation of the territorial status quo was the poor
performance of the Soviet economy. The conclusion of the
Eighth Five Year Plan (1970) confirmed that the 1965 economic
reforms were a failure. From 1950 to 1958, the gross
national product (GNP) grew by 6.4 percent; but from 1958 to
1967, it slowed to 5.3 percent; and from 1967 to 1973, it
slumped to 3.7 percent.29 But how could the Soviet leaders
increase economic exchange without expansion of cultural and
personal contacts? Recognition of the territorial status quo
was, in Soviet eyes, tantamount to acceptance of the
ideological status quo—an interpretation continually
overlooked in the West. This would, it was hoped by the
Soviet leadership, allow expansion of trade with the West
without increasing the flow of information about the customs,
values or standard of living in the West.
By January 1972, when the Political Consultative
Committee of the Warsaw Pact met in Prague, the Quadripartite
Agreement on Berlin had been completed (3 September 1971).30
Since the United States would not take part in a European
security conference before a German settlement, this was an
important breakthrough.31 The Prague Declaration supported
the "broad peace program" outlined in the Bucharest Declara¬
tion and Budapest Appeal, especially the principle of
inviolability of frontiers.32 The Soviet position on this
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issue would remain consistent up to the preparatory talks in
Helsinki in October 1972.
Finally, and ironically, the issue of territorial
recognition of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania) was rarely mentioned before the preparatory talks
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Soviet leaders must have realized that a document which
recognized the inviolability of borders would apply to the
Baltic states as well as to the nations of Eastern Europe.
Perhaps the best indication of the importance of the Baltic
states to the Soviet leaders comes from Khrushchev's
memories. He stated:
We were all very glad that the Lithuanians,
Latvians, and Estonians would again be part of
the Soviet State [after Russian seizure in
June 1940]. This meant the expansion of our
territory, the augmentation of our population,
the fortification of our borders, and the
acquisition of an extensive coastal frontier
on the Baltic Sea....We were absolutely
certain that the annexation was a great
triumph for the Baltic peoples as well as for
the Soviet Union... [because] progressive
forces began to promote friendship with the
Soviet Union among the masses. After a
certain amount of time, the Baltic peoples
made known their desire to became part of the
Soviet Union. The establishment of Soviet rule
was accomplished by democratic methods and in
observance of the required judicial for¬
malities.33
This statement further illustrated the Soviet notion of a
"circular frontier," but Khrushchev was determined to
emphasize that the annexation was one of mutual consent.
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Numerous accounts of the Soviet takeover in the Baltic states
relate a very different story which accentuates the decep¬
tion, intimidation and brutality of the Soviet Party
officials and the Red Army.34 Such glaring differences in
the interpretation of the historical events assures that the
incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the
Soviet Union will remain a controversial issue.
But, as stated above, this was not an issue in the early
deliberations over a European security conference. Why not?
Most likely, the great emphasis on the borders of Eastern
Europe (specifically between the two Germanies) and the
Ostpolitik of the Brandt government (discussed below), caused
most Europeans to disregard the Baltic states. Moreover,
the Baltic states were not in the "Soviet sphere" of Europe,
but were made into republics of the Soviet Union. By
contrast, the East European nations are genuinely sovereign
in a de jure sense. Western leaders could not have seen much
opportunity for altering the borders or political status of
these countries. Nevertheless, during the CSCE itself, the
issue of post-World War II borders was, in large part, a
question of Baltic independence. Many individuals in the
West who opposed the CSCE claimed that by attending the
Conference, Western leaders were sealing the fate of the
Baltic republics.35 Most of the criticism came from the 1.6
million Americans of Baltic decent who were concerned that
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the official position of non-recognition of the Soviet Baltic
republics by the United States was giving way to de facto,
if not formal, acceptance of the annexation. In an attempt
to calm these anxieties, American Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, Kempton B. Jenkins, later stated that the European
security conference would not acknowledge the incorporation
of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the Soviet Union, but
this issue would be revived once the Final Act had been
signed and publicized.36
The United States and a European Security Conference
Alongside the objective of confirming the territorial
status quo, the Soviet leadership sought, although with less
resolve, to decrease the American presence and influence in
Europe, especially in NATO. Soviet positions on the
participation of the United States in a European security
conference reflected two related, but often contradictory
concerns.
On the one hand, Soviet spokespersons called for a
conference without the United States in order to preserve the
exclusively European nature of detente. They could have
argued that detente began in Europe with an improvement in
bilateral relations with France and the FRG. Since the
United States did not play any major role in these develop-
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merits, Soviet leaders may have seen some opportunity to
disrupt the unity of NATO. Repeated calls for the total
dissolution of NATO, and the WTO, represented the interest of
the Soviet leadership in isolating the United states from
Europe. Also, the exclusively European nature of such a
conference would allow the Soviet leaders to coordinate their
strategy with their sometimes unreliable East European
partners.
On the other hand, Soviet strategists must have come to
the conclusion that a conference to resolve territorial
disputes, that is, a delayed World War II peace conference,
would have to include the "Big Three" from Yalta (the United
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) to enchance its
political grandeur. Withholding American participation in
the conference therefore, may have been a trump card in
Soviet strategy to use as a trade off for other exigencies.
Furthermore, the growing momentum of American-Soviet detente
held out the opportunity of greater economic exchange with
the West, as well as a diminution of the threat of rapproch-
ment between the United States and China. And finally, it is
often overlooked that detente became a domestic power source
for General Secretary Brezhnev who had to contend with inter-
party differences in the early 1970s. By 1971, Brezhnev had
ascended to his predominant position in the Soviet leader¬
ship. He had established an alliance with the military
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establishment by increasing defence spending. He had begun
to depose persons who were inclined to favour an intensifica¬
tion of the ideological struggle over cooperation with the
West (such as A.N. Shelepin and P.E. Shelest). Brezhnev had
hoped that such cooperation would increase the possibility of
using Western technology to rejuvenate the Soviet economy.
To consolidate his political authority further, Brezhnev was
succeeding in his attempts to promote his supporters to full
membership in the Politburo. For example, during the Twenty-
fourth Party Congress of March-April 1971, the Politburo was
enlarged to fourteen members from the former composition of
eleven individuals. Brezhnev supporters such as A.P.
Kirilenko, A.N. Kosygin, N.V. Podgomy and M.A. Suslov had
been in the minority of the ruling body, but they quickly
became the majority faction with the addition of V.V.
Grishin, F.D. Kulakov, D.A. Kunayev arid V.V. Shcherbitsky.
Most important of all, Brezhnev became the prominent
figure in foreign policy and was then in the position to
argue that his domestic policies, especially his increase in
military spending, paved the way for detente and the ability
of the Soviet Union to negotiate on equal terms with the
United States. In this way, detente had became a domestic
power source justifying many of Brezhnev's policies. A
deliberate attempt to exclude the United States from the CSCE
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was bound to damage the emerging, mutually beneficial
relationship between the United States and Soviet Union.37
But the presence of American troops on the continent of
Europe was a troubling matter for the Soviet leaders. In a
speech before the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in March 1966, Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko accused the United States of retreating from
its commitment to evacuate American troops from Europe within
two years after the end of the war. Gromyko declared:
The United States of America believes for some
reason that Europe cannot do without its
presence and guardianship without American
bases on European soil.. .the American army is
still in Europe and, by all signs, claims
permanent status there. But the peoples of
Europe are having and will continue to have
their say on this score.38
Soviet strategy appeared to advocate the withdrawal of
American forces from Europe, dissolution of NATO and the WTO
and finally, neutrality for Western Europe (what Kissinger
called an attempt to expand "Finlandization"). According to
Shulman, the Soviet leadership thought that this format would
appeal to the Scandinavian countries, Yugoslavia and Austria,
and to progressive parties in the FRG and France. But,
unfortunately for the Soviet leaders, it could also appeal to
East European nations such as Romania and Poland.39 However,
Shulman fails to recognize that dissolution of NATO and the
WTO would not be a quid pro quo because a number of separate
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bilateral agreements with East European governments would
still remain in effect. In other words, the military defence
alliances among East European nations would remain in place.
Shulman errs in claiming that the American military
withdrawal from Europe was a consistent Soviet objective up
until the convening of the CSCE in September 1973. Gromyko's
call was less a representation of a long-term policy than a
statement timed to coincide with a proposal by United States'
Senator Mike Mansfield to reduce the American troop commit¬
ment in Europe from 300,000 to 150,000 soldiers. The Soviet
position, however, was reappraised at the Twenty-fourth
Congress. On 14 March, Brezhnev again proposed a security
conference, but also advocated "a reduction of [mutual] armed
forces and armaments in areas where the military confronta¬
tion is especially dangerous, above all in Central Europe."40
This was a clear reversal from the position that only
American military withdrawals should occur, to a more
flexible posture that suggested that there could be mutual
reductions. In other words, it would have been foolish for
the Congress of the United States to enact unilateral
reductions when there was the possibility of using these
troops to reduce the number of Soviet troops in Eastern
Europe. Was Brezhnev's offer genuine? Apparently so,
because less than three months later, he stated, in reference
to force reductions talks, that "you have to muster the
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resolve to try the proposal you are interested in by tasting
it."41 This was a call to attempt negotiations.
According to Kissinger, the reversal in the Soviet
position was brought about by "the Soviets' cumbersome
policymaking machinery.. .from persistence and brute power,
not from strategic vision or even tactical flexibility."42
Kissinger goes on to state that "after having raised the
issue of troop reductions in Europe at a fortuitous moment in
the Mansfield debate, the Soviets as quickly dropped it.
Perhaps they regretted the favor they had done us in helping
to defeat the Mansfield amendment."43 But this was a
calculated shift in Soviet strategy which Kissinger was
insensitive to for a number of reasons. Kissinger was
interpreting Soviet actions only in reference to the United
States. He plainly had difficulty in sensing Soviet concern
over the balance of forces in Europe for he interpreted
virtually all events in a Soviet-American context. More
specifically, Kissinger underestimated the anxiety that the
ERG caused for Brezhnev. This latter worry was best
expressed by Raymond Gartoff:
It seems clear the Soviet leaders were
concerned over the unpredictable consequences
of a sudden massive American military
withdrawal. Such a move could prompt fears
and possibly a turn to militarization in
Western Europe, especially West Germany. It
could lead to a change in policy in West
Germany and the United States about nuclear
weapons for Germany. While it might lead some
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Western Europeans to be more ready to
negotiate on Warsaw Pact terms, it could lead
others not to negotiate at all. In any event
it seems clear the Soviet action was deliber¬
ate, and it was followed by additional
indications of a readiness to negotiate.44
But both Kissinger and Garthoff neglected to recognize that
the Soviet Union was preoccupied with other major problems.
After the Ussuri River Crisis in 1969, Soviet military
deployments along the Eastern frontier were increased and
even though the original diversion did not impinge upon
Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, the eventual necessity of
relocating even more troops could not be ruled out
completely.45 Romania's ties to China were growing ever
closer, in fact, the Chinese allegedly pledged "fraternal
assistance" to Romania in the event of Soviet aggression.46
And from April 1969 to September 1971, Soviet troops were
occupied in military exercises with Czechoslavakian soldiers
as part of a programme of "normalization" of the political
climate there. These additional factors help account for
Brezhnev's seemingly forthcoming attitude toward troop
reductions. And the resultant panic amongst the West
Europeans over American troop cuts could only destabilize the
military balance in Central and Eastern Europe.
The central issue in these early years of detente was
still the German question, with the improving bipolar
relationship between the superpowers riding the wave of
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Brandt's Ostpolitik.47 Detente had begun in Europe and could
not survive without continued relaxation of tension in
Europe. For this reason, the key to unlocking the door to
the CSCE would eventually come down to a resolution between
the four powers over jurisdiction in Berlin. The Brandt
government's strategy was to negotiate first with the Soviet
Union, then with Poland over the Oder-Neisse border and
lastly with East Germany.48 In August 1970, Prime Minister
Aleksei Kosygin and Chancellor Willy Brandt signed a non-
aggression pact in Moscow and in November, the Polish-West
German Treaty was completed (but not signed until 7 Decem¬
ber) . A treaty between the two Germanies entailing mutual
recognition was not concluded until December 1972.
These events were instrumental in the eventual convoca¬
tion of the CSCE for a number of interrelated reasons.
Firstly, the Soviet Union would not sign an agreement on
Berlin without ratification in Bonn of the FRG-Soviet Non-
Aggression Treaty. This treaty was important to the Soviet
representative because it declared that "peace can only be
maintained in Europe if nobody disturbs the present fron¬
tiers."49 After ratification, this treaty would have ample
legal punch to calm Soviet concerns over revanchism in the
ERG. But West German politicians soon made the conclusion of
a Berlin agreement a prerequisite for ratification of the
FRG-Soviet treaty. The agreement on Berlin included the four
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major allied powers and secured transit through the GDR to
West Berlin; it recognized the close ties between the ERG and
West Berlin; and the document asserted that these and other
individual and joint responsibilities would remain un¬
changed.50 For the major Western powers, the agreement
pledged continued access to, and recognition of, an indepen¬
dent West Berlin. This was why the United States would not
participate in a CSCE before an agreement on Berlin.
Thirdly, representatives of the United States (and NATO
generally) would not participate in an European security
conference until the Soviet Union agreed to participate in
talks to reduce conventional forces in Europe.51 NATO
representatives were concerned about Soviet superiority in
this area and stated that mutual and balanced force reduc¬
tions would reduce tensions and decrease the potential for
military confrontations. A complicated arrangement was
eventually concluded in which the FRG's bilateral treaties
and the Final Protocol of the Quadripartite Agreement on
Berlin came into force on the same day, 3 June 1972. Nixon
and Brezhnev had agreed at the summit in Moscow in May to
proceed with both MBFR and CSCE, thus fulfilling all the pre-
CSCE requirements.52
Yet, while the preliminaries for the conference were
resolved to the satisfaction of the Soviet leaders and the
majority of Warsaw Pact governments, there was a clear loser
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in these developments: the GDR. There must have been major
deletions in the pre-CSCE documents from the perspective of
East German politicians. In the case of the non-aggression
treaty between Moscow and Bonn, the territorial integrity of
the ERG was recognized, while the GDR did not receive a
single mention in the document. It appeared as if the Soviet
negotiators were willing to discount the immediate interests
of the GDR in order to improve relations with the ERG. The
Soviet leadership did not even attempt to present a public
image that the leaders of the GDR were involved closely in
the deliberations. This insensitivity to the public image of
the GDR was not evident in earlier negotiations between
Moscow and Bonn, such as in the talks of September 1955.
These established diplomatic relations between the two
nations, thus recognizing the sovereignty of the ERG
(probably in return for closer ties in trade), but Khrushchev
held firm on the independent status of the GDR and the
impossibility of reunification. Yet, West German Chancellor
Adenauer did succeed in obtaining the release of 10,000
German prisoners of war in the USSR. The release was
announced one week after the meeting, but in a display of
loyalty and concern for East Germany, the Soviet leaders
claimed that this decision was reached at the behest of the
East German rulers.53
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Perhaps strategists in Moscow believed that the treaty
of 1970 was necessary as a preliminary to a substantive,
bilateral treaty between the FRG and GDR. This would help to
explain why in a speech to the UN in October 1969, Grornyko
stressed the need for improved relations between Moscow and
Bonn, but did not urge a similar development between Bonn and
East Berlin. Only days later Gromyko and Brandt met to
initiate talks which resulted in the non-aggression treaty.
Finally, in November 1970, representatives from Bonn and
East Berlin met to hold talks. But even then, the East
Germans emphasized that the division between the two
Germanies was permanent and reunification was impossible.
From their perspective, this realization could form the basis
for improving relations between them.
With the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement, the
sovereignty of the GDR was implied, but still not asserted in
strong legal terms. And it included a number of negative
provisions for the GDR. For example, the transit routes
linking West Berlin and the FRG were secured, but this
impinged upon the sovereignty of the GDR by taking the
administration of this territory out of the hands of East
German officials (aside from inconsequential paperwork). But
most problematic of all for the GDR were the humanitarian
provisions of the Berlin Agreement. The pledges to allow
freer travel had profound results. From the beginning of
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1972 to the end of 1973, the number of visitors to the GDR
rose from only dozens annually, to nearly 4 million. Similar
increases in travel occurred between the ERG and West
Berlin.54 While these changes may have lessened the tension
between the two Germanies, they were negotiated by the Soviet
leaders and did not accentuate the sovereignty of the GDR.
This may help to explain why, during the CSCE, the East
German delegation was the most resistant to including
humanitarian provisions and the most insistent on the
principles that confirmed the territorial realities in
Europe.
Most interestingly, part of the problem faced by the
East German leadership was also suffered by the Soviet
delegation to the CSCE. That is, the East Germans, in an
attempt to attain confirmation of the permanence of their
borders, found themselves conceding on humanitarian issues
without receiving significant improvements in trade. This
was not a dilemma of the East Germans• own making; rather,
the Soviet negotiators had imposed this problem on them.
But, less than a year later, this precedent would haunt the
Soviet leaders when they energetically pursued a multilateral
confirmation of the territorial borders. In this sense, the
link between these issues was caused as much by the Soviet
Union as by the West European nations.
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During the controversies surrounding Germany, the
statements of Soviet leaders reflected some uncertainty as
to whether the United States should participate in an all-
European conference on security. According to the Bucharest
Statement, "the countries of other continents as well cannot
be indifferent to the direction in which affairs in Europe
develop."55 The Budapest Appeal was also more conciliatory
on this matter. But Gromyko1s speech to the Twenty-third
Congress of the CPSU and the Karlovy Vary communique rejected
the presence of non-European states. The matter was firmly
resolved by the time that the Prague Declaration invited "the
participation of all the interested European states and also
the United States and Canada.... "56
Ultimately, the Soviet decision to accept the participa¬
tion of the United States in the CSCE was influenced by four
factors. Firstly, the growing momentum of Ostpolitik and
detente in Europe had solidified the role of the United
States in any undertaking designed to improve relations
between Eastern and Western Europe. Brandt, and spokes¬
persons for the government of the Federal Republic, went to
extraordinary lengths to accentuate the central role of the
United States in any long-term improvement in political
relations between the Federal Republic and the nations of the
Warsaw Pact.57 Brandt's treaties with the Soviet Union and
Poland were not independent gestures, but rather, they were
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part of a more general scheme leading to an agreement on
Berlin. If it was recognized that any meaningful resolution
on Berlin would have to include the United States, then by
implication, a European security conference would require the
participation of the United States. Despite concerns over
Brandt's bilateral initiative with the East European regimes,
Kissinger supported them, probably because they tended to
confirm the perpetuity of the presence of the United States
in Europe. Of course, Kissinger could have negotiated and
resolved the German question in the bilateral forum with the
Soviet leaders (and Kosygin had approached him on this), but
this would not have facilitated unity in the Alliance.58
Thus, the fact that the United States would have to parti¬
cipate in the CSCE became realoolitik for the Soviet leaders,
if it had not been a realization much earlier.
A second factor which influenced the Soviet decision to
include the United States in the CSCE centered on China.
Improving relations between China and the United States
strengthened the position of the latter in the debate over
what a CSCE should include. The prospect of a Chinese-
American "alliance" caused considerable anxiety for the
Soviet leadership which was only increased by Chinese links
with Albania (although short-lived), Romania and Yugoslavia.
Romanian President Ceausescu and Yugoslav Foreign Minister
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Tepavac both made state visits to China during the summer of
1971.
The third cause of the Soviet change in attitude was due
to the unity of NATO on the European security conference. In
order to get their conference, the Soviet leaders would have
to concede to a number of NATO demands, including the
participation of the United States and a more thoroughly
prepared agenda for the CSCE. This reality must have been
disheartening to those policy-makers in Moscow who placed the
greatest emphasis on "wedge-driving" in NATO because a
deliberate attempt to isolate the United States from NATO
would certainly spell doom for the European security
conference.
Finally, including the United States did not involve any
concessions in the area of human rights. Rather, only the
West European nations (the West Germans, especially) pressed
for agreements on cultural exchanges and the freer flow of
information and people between East and West. In fact, the
Soviet leaders may have seen the Nixon administration's
rejection of human rights in detente as a potential brake on
any future West European initiatives to include human rights
in the CSCE. During the first summit meeting between Nixon
and Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972, the President addressed
the Soviet people on live television and stated that he
recognized "the right of each nation to chart its own course,
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to choose its own system.. .without interference from other
nations."59 This was a statement, from the highest govern¬
mental representative of the United States, which included a
pledge not to meddle in the domestic affairs of the Soviet
Union. And the day before leaving Moscow, Nixon sealed his
visit by stating to Brezhnev that:
You have ray commitment that privately or
publicly I will take no steps directed against
the interests of the Soviet Union. But you
should rely on what I say in the private
channel, not on what anyone else tells you.
There are not only certain forces in the
world, but also representatives of the press,
who are not interested in better relations
between us.60
Brezhnev must have been at least intrigued if not satiated
with this first summit with Nixon because the President
recognized not only the superpower status of the Soviet
Union, but also the legitimacy of the Soviet political system
and its leadership. Nixon wanted a private and personal
relationship with Brezhnev.
Less than one month after the summit, there were outward
indications that Soviet spokespersons considered Nixon a more
"realistic" politician when it came to human rights and
ideological competition. In Pravda. the United States
Congress was verbally attacked for continuing to support such
"subversive" radio stations as Radio Liberty and Radio Free
Europe. The article contrasted President Nixon's comments on
Soviet television with the broadcasts of these stations which
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it claimed could now be relegated to the "graveyard of cold
war relics."61 Thus, it implied that there was a new policy
in the United States, at least on this issue. But this is
not to say that the Soviet representatives were calling for a
total end to the ideological struggle, either.62
It is possible therefore, that the Soviet leaders were
not concerned about the United States leading a campaign for
principles of human rights in the European security con¬
ference. After May 1972, the most likely scenario was that
the American representatives to the conference would downplay
the need for such provisions. As will be demonstrated in
Chapter 2, the support of the United States for human rights
in the Final Act was lukewarm in the early stages and visible
advocacy of this item on the agenda came very late in the
CSCE.
Ideological Security and Economic Cooperation
A European security conference could provide a forum to
achieve yet another Soviet objective—the expansion of trade
and a harnessing of Western technology. Ideally, the Soviet
leadership wanted a statement pledging expansion of East-West
trade through two measures: by interjecting a nondiscrimin¬
atory most favored nation (MEN) clause into the security
agreement? and by recognizing the European Economic Community
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(EEC) and the Brussels Commission, but with the stipulation
that this gesture of goodwill should be followed by the
creation of a broader European trade arrangement (which would
include the East European nations).63
This section will outline briefly both the positive and
problematic effects of enhanced trade relations between East
and West and the Soviet strategy to downplay the latter.
Human rights, not yet a major issue in the debate over a
security conference, slowly emerged in the context of
improved trade relations as a quid pro quo from the vantage
point of the West.
Virtually every Soviet proposal for a security con¬
ference since the 1958 Draft Treaty included expansion of
economic collaboration as an important component. The
Bucharest Statement called for strengthening of economic and
trade ties and an increase in contacts and exchanges in
science, technology, culture and art. Three years later, the
Warsaw Pact nations sought to increase economic ties on the
basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of
states (influenced by Romania). By the time of the Prague
Declaration this had been extended to include the cultural
field, tourism and environmental protection. Soviet
bilateral treaties with France and the FRG, both in 1970,
included many of these provisions.64
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A wider range of economic cooperation would benefit the
Soviet Union by enabling it to take advantage of Western
advances in technology and consumer goods and, when applied
to industry and agriculture, the new technology could help
reduce the economic hardships in East European countries.
The severity of the economic problems in Eastern Europe was
revealed with increasing clarity in Poland in 1970. Despite
the fact that workers' strikes were not permitted, shipyard
workers in Gdansk stopped working to protest increases in
food prices. When the strikes escalated to violent demon¬
stration, on 17 December 1970, a national state of emergency
was declared. The political ramifications were severe as the
head of the Polish Workers' Party, Wladyslaw Gornulka, was
forced to resign in favour of Edward Gierek. But the official
explanation for the price increases provided by Premier
Cyrankiewicz, was most revealing for he stated that they were
necessary if Poland was to advance economically and tech¬
nologically.65 Given the events of 1970, a broadening of
trade with the West may have been an appealing alternative to
further price increases. Other possible positive effects of
an agreement to increase economic exchange were the lessening
of East-West tension and a slowing of the pace of the
expensive arms race. And if these did not come about, then
at least the technology would contribute to less expenditure
on domestic research costs, especially in military research
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and development. Brezhnev had also called for agreements on
collaborative peaceful nuclear research during the Karlovy
Vary Conference.
Richard Davy has argued that the Soviet leadership
wanted gradually to disengage from its economic contribution
to its East European allies and that this was one method of
lessening the burden.66 Romania and Hungary, areas of much
economic dissatisfaction, but with closer trade ties to the
West than the other Warsaw Pact nations, could extend these
bonds very quickly. Thus, according to Davy, it was quite
likely that the Soviet Union would encourage an increase in
trade between its East European allies and the West.
But Davy overestimated the Soviet leadership's flexi¬
bility on this issue. The Soviet leaders have not, and will
not, strive for improved trade relations under any condi¬
tions. Rather, trade agreements must conform to the founda¬
tion principles of Soviet foreign policy. Edwina Moreton
outlines these as follows:
First, the present communist regimes will
oppose any development—internal or external—
which in their view threatens to jeopardize
the leading role of the party. Second,
decisions taken at the domestic level,
attempting to resolve the pressures of
modernization and adaptation, must not be
allowed to threaten the continued existence of
the wider ideological community, however
loosely defined, of Warsaw Pact states.
Finally, any foreign policy decision by other
states, including the Soviet Union, that
threaten to undermine the pillars of regime
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security as defined by the indigenous regimes
will be resisted.67
In other words, the need to maintain internal doctrine and
authority outweighed the desire to increase economic
exchange.
Economic improvements in Eastern Europe could merely add
to rising expectations, and not just in the economic field.
Many East Europeans have desired greater opportunities for
travel, as suggested in the Budapest Appeal, and expanded
cultural contacts with the West. If these were permitted,
then East European resentment of Soviet interference in
social and economic reform would probably spark incidents
throughout the communist bloc. Disenchantment has frequently
spread from one East European country to another—Polish
demonstrations in 1956 fueled Hungarian protests and then
contributed to the Czechoslovak movement in the late 1960s,
which in turn influenced the Polish students' uprising in
1968. These events must have alerted the post-Khrushchev
leadership to the dangers of nonconformist ideas on economic
as well as political issues. The Soviet Union, faced with a
rather unstable Eastern Europe during this period, was
especially cautious.68
Moreover, the Soviet leadership has not, and cannot,
rule by fiat the foreign policies of the East European
governments. This should not come as a startling revelation,
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especially in the area of economic policymaking, where the
Soviet leadership has had to contend with dissent within the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). East European
members of CMEA have resisted Soviet campaigns to expand
economic support to fraternal developing nations, with clear
ideological connotations, in favour of self-centered policies
focused on national economic concerns. A growing need for
Western technology to improve productivity has led many East
European governments to look West rather than East.69
But augmentation of trade with Western nations would, by
necessity, increase communication, at least for the purposes
of organization. Thus, there would be the potential for a
freer flow of information about life in Western nations. The
countervailing Soviet strategy was to limit contacts to the
governmental or institutional level, rather than permit
inter-personal contacts that could lead to more thorough
discussions of the inadequacies of the East European
economies when compared to those in the West. This was not
just a preference, but a major objective and stumbling block
in the CSCE. Also, any cultural or economic cooperation
would have to correspond to existing domestic legislation.
At this stage, well before the Helsinki Consultations of
November 1972, these were standard precautionary measures
used by the Soviet leaders, not unique ideas generated by
concerns over the human rights aspects of the CSCE.
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Had the Soviet leadership been able to predict that
virtually one-third of the future security conference would
involve humanitarian concerns (exchange of information,
reunification of, and contacts between families, travel for
personal or professional reasons), what came to be called
"Basket III" provisions, they may have balked at convening
such a conference. But drawing away from the idea of a
European security conference would not have been an easy
matter since the Soviet Union had initially called for a such
a conference, attached much propaganda value to it, and had
already made it a virtual precondition for enhancing detente.
The Soviet leadership must have felt that the matter was
still controllable, for the bilateral treaty with France in
October 1970 stated that both parties pledged to cooperate
actively in United Nations activities for the defense of
human rights.70 Even the bilateral treaty between the FRG
and the GDR, and the Quadripartite Agreement can be viewed as
having significant humanitarian provisions as well as
political ones. Such token gestures towards human rights
were intended to satisfy the most critical human rights
advocates in Europe and put the issue to rest.
Finally, by presenting the United Nations provisions as
the basis for improving human rights, the Soviet-French
bilateral treaty evoked a number of UN documents, especially
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN
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Charter.71 However, from the Soviet vantage point, the
humanitarian provisions were to be implemented by each
government domestically. Any outspoken assessment of another
government' s record of adherence is regarded as interference
in the sovereign internal affairs of that targeted nation.
As will be discussed in Chapter 3, Soviet spokespersons view
the principle of non-interference in internal affairs as the
basis for international conduct, at least in theory, and
overt external concern about human rights in the Soviet
Union violates that principle. Ultimately, this led to a
major clash during the preparatory conference for the CSCE in
October 1972, where it became obvious that the Soviet
leadership would oppose any liberalization in the humanitar¬
ian field.
UNITED STATES' POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION ON THE EVE
OF THE CSCE
The convocation of the CSCE was made possible due to an
unprecedented period of East-West cooperation. This new era,
eventually called detente, was an outgrowth of the momentum
created by Ostpolitik. But for the United States, specifi¬
cally the Nixon administration, detente eventually became
more of a bilateral relationship with the Soviet leadership
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based on the prerogative of settling longstanding differences
in Soviet-American relations. President Nixon and National
Security Advisor (later Secretary of State) Kissinger
accurately perceived that the pressing concerns of American
foreign policy involved the Soviet Union, directly or
indirectly. In the forefront of the administration's
foreign policy where the need to meet with the Soviet
leaders, through summit meetings, in order to establish
guidelines for detente and to conclude mutually beneficial
bilateral agreements; and the need to end the war in Vietnam,
build upon the growing relationship with the People's
Republic of China and to conclude the Strategic Arms
Limitations talks.
All of these foreign policy objectives had been
successfully initiated or concluded on the eve of the CSCE.
While the CSCE benefited from the emerging detente, the Nixon
administration definitely discounted the CSCE as a major
foreign policy objective, or even as a desirable one. Rather,
it was decided that the growing cooperative relationship
between the superpowers meant that it would be prudent to
grant to Brezhnev "his" security conference (it became more
and more his personal obsession) while exacting concessions
from the Soviet leaders for specific American concerns.
Finally, an understanding of the minor role of the CSCE in
American foreign policy will help to explain why the American
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delegation to the CSCE initially opted for a low-profile
position, both in supporting Western negotiating positions
and in opposing Soviet and East European proposals.
The Agreement on the Basic Principles of Soviet-American
Relations
The first Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting resulted in ten
bilateral agreements.72 While all of these agreements were
significant for Soviet-American relations, one agreement was
of special relevance to the upcoming CSCE: the Agreement on
the Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations (or the "Basic
Principles Agreement"). The Basic Principles Agreement can be
viewed as a direct precursor to the Principles Guiding
Relations Between States in the CSCE.
At the culmination of the first Nixon-Brezhnev summit,
on 29 May 1972, the two leaders signed a document which
emphasized "the common determination that in the nuclear age
there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations
on the basis of peaceful coexistence."73 This attempt to
codify the rules of behaviour in the improving Soviet-
American relationship, although tenuous, was important for
the CSCE in four related ways. Firstly, the agreement, with
its twelve "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations" did appear
to accept the Soviet version of peaceful coexistence (as
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presented in the Peace Program launched at the Twenty-fourth
Congress of the CPSU in March 1971). American and Soviet
negotiators, who had completed the document in Moscow before
the summit, committed the two nations to "normal relations
based on the principle of sovereignty, equality, non¬
interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage." The
parties also agreed "to promote conditions in which all
countries will live in peace and security and will not be
subject to outside interference in their internal affairs."
These were precisely the principles sought with much vigor by
the Soviet delegation at the CSCE. It was somewhat prophetic
that given the seemingly lackadaisical acceptance of the
agreement by the United States, the American delegation at
the CSCE would not object vociferously to a restatement of
these principles in a multilateral forum.
Secondly, the especially vibrant presentation of the
Basic Principles Agreement by the Soviet leaders may have
surprised the American policy-makers, who viewed it as of
minimal significance compared to the other bilateral
agreements negotiated that year. While American policy¬
makers did strive for a codification of the rules of detente,
it appears that they did not view the Basic Principles
Agreement as a dramatic breakthrough in this area. Converse¬
ly, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had placed the
Basic Principles Agreement high on its list of priorities.
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The Foreign Ministry had directed the newly created Depart¬
ment for Planning Foreign Policy Measures (UPVM), and within
it the USA Division, to formulate the substance of the
principles.74 Following the successful conclusion of the
summit, half the members of the USA Division received special
merit promotions. But much more significant, the members of
the UPVM's USA Division were later given a leading role in
formulating Soviet policy in the CSCE and the director of
UPVM, Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Kdvalev, would head the
Soviet delegation to the CSCE. Kovalev would supervise both
the principles in the CSCE, as well as the human rights
debate in Basket III of the Final Act.75
Thirdly, it is clear the Basic Principles Agreement
meant something quite different to the Soviet and American
leaders respectively. For the Soviet Union, it confirmed
their superpower status and their right to negotiate on equal
terms with the United States. The agreement meant that
guidelines for future Soviet-American cooperation were
established, but it was still very unclear what sort of
cooperation would take place. For this reason, it was less a
rulebook for detente than a statement of the way detente
might proceed. Perhaps the most frequently overlooked aspect
of the Basic Principles Agreement for the Soviet leadership
is that it was, in large part, a legitimizing agent for the
Brezhnev government. On 2 June 1972, Pravda printed a joint
statement by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
CPSU and Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the
Council of Ministers, which noted the special significance of
this agreement:
The document.. .adopted in Moscow, creates
prerequisites in international law making it
possible to build ties and cooperation between
the two countries in all fields of mutual
interest on a firm, long-term basis, without
in any way harming the interests of third
countries. The consistent realization of
these principles in the political practice of
the two states will promote the further
normalization of Soviet-American relations and
the improvement of the international situation
as a whole.^6
Why was this so important for the CSCE? Because the Basic
Principles Agreement must be viewed as the first step in the
drive for recognition of the political and territorial status
quo, a drive which culminated in the Helsinki Final Act.
With bilateral recognition of the legitimacy of Soviet claims
to superpower status, the next step would be to achieve
recognition, in a multilateral forum (which would have to
include the United States) of the East European regimes, with
the ancillary confirmation of the legitimate interests of the
Soviet Union in that sector of Europe.77
Fourthly, the amission of principles directly related to
human rights in the Basic Principles Agreement reflected the
views of the Soviet Union, and early on, the United States,
on the exclusion of such provisions from the CSCE. When
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pressed on this issue later in the CSCE, the Soviet leaders
nostalgically referred to the Basic Principles Agreement as a
solid foundation for a similar agreement in the CSCE's
multilateral forum.78 Similarly, it was clear that the Nixon
administration did not consider human rights a realistic
priority issue in interstate relations.79 Numerous authors
have alleged that the lack of a firm human rights policy was
a basic weakness in Kissinger's foreign policy.80 But, with
regard to the CSCE, the lack of a public human rights effort
probably facilitated the smooth interjection of human rights
issues into the CSCE by other Western and neutral nations,
later supported by the United States. Obviously, the Soviet
leaders did not expect the human rights issue to take on such
significance. For this reason, it may have been the very
"crackpot realism and machismo of the Nixon administra¬
tion,"8! so criticized by one cynic, that facilitated the
formulation of some of the most influential human rights
principles in diplomatic history.
In conclusion, while it may be true that:
of the Soviet-American bilateral agreements
concluded in 1972, by far the most important
were the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, the interim
agreement...on certain measures with respect
to the limitation of strategic offensive
arms...and the three-year grain
agreement...,82
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the Basic Principles Agreement was one of the most signi¬
ficant for the CSCE. Having been completed only six months
before the preparatory meetings for the CSCE, it served as an
indication of Soviet objectives in the upcoming conference.
The agreement was also a partial blueprint for the Declara¬
tion of Principles in the Helsinki Final Act. Since the
negotiators for the United States had not shown interest in
principles such as broader exchanges of information or freer
travel between Eastern and Western Europe, the Soviet
representatives to the CSCE certainly would not expect the
American delegation to push for them there. And, as Soviet
statements suggested, the two countries had entered a new era
in relations and, if the Basic Principles Agreement was the
new code of conduct, then the Soviet leadership may have
concluded, quite logically, that the United States would
support a reaffirmation of these guidelines in the multi¬
lateral forum of the CSCE. In these various ways, the CSCE
was an extension of the discussion that had resulted in the
Basic Principles Agreement, or so it seemed to Soviet
strategists. Conversely, Nixon and Kissinger were far more
concerned with other domestic and foreign policy matters to
attach such significance to this aspect of the first summit.
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The Pressing Foreign Policy Concerns of the Nixon Administra¬
tion
Throughout 1972 and 1973, the Nixon administration was
too busy with ongoing foreign policy matters to have much
interest in, or time for, a thorough discussion of the
potential of a European security conference. During this
active period of American foreign policy, Nixon and Kissinger
dealt with three overriding concerns: firstly, the growing
need, for domestic as well as foreign policy reasons, to
attain "peace with honor" in Vietnam; secondly, related to
the American drive for peace in Vietnam, to strike an accord
for productive relations between the United States and PRC;
and finally to complete the ongoing round of arms talks with
the Soviet Union with signed SAIT agreements. The Nixon
administration's ability to satisfy these three objectives
produced an atmosphere conducive to American participation in
the CSCE.
President Nixon's principle foreign policy preoccupation
from 1969-1972 was ending the war in Vietnam. The American
strategy had undergone a metamorphosis beginning with
overambitious attempts to apply linkage (with arms control,
trade and detente in general) to the Soviet Union to
influence Soviet restraint during the slow American with¬
drawal from Vietnam. This early policy gave way to a more
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pragmatic approach based upon the belief that neither the
Soviet Union nor China could directly control the decisions
made by the North Vietnamese, but could exert some influ¬
ence.83
What influence the Soviet leaders could use on the North
Vietnamese was tested in 1972, again with a deliberate
linkage policy. In March, two months before the Nixon-
Brezhnev summit, the United States and North Vietnam
escalated their conflict following a North Vietnamese
offensive into South Vietnam. Kissinger, alleging Soviet
complicity in the offensive, began a diplomatic counterattack
designed to strike back in the Soviet Union's own backyard.
He informed the Soviet leaders that such actions would damage
detente in Europe. Kissinger then wrote to Egor Bahr,
advisor to West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, stating that
he "doubted the value of a policy of detente in these
circumstances." More importantly, Kissinger was convinced
that:
Bahr, with the ratification of Brandt's
Eastern treaties hanging in the balance, was
certain to convey these sentiments to the
Soviet Ambassador in Bonn. And Moscow would
be reminded that we were not without means of
pressure.84
As stated earlier, without ratification of the treaty between
Moscow and Bonn and the Quadripartite Agreement, the CSCE
would never get off the ground.
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Kissinger, in defiance of Nixon's instructions, also
expressed doubts about the possibility of holding a summit in
such circumstances. Here again, the CSCE would be in
jeopardy for the summit was a vital transitional step toward
American agreement to attend the CSCE. While Brezhnev
claimed to have had no part in the North Vietnamese offen¬
sive, he did send a senior official specializing in affairs
with communist countries, Konstantin Katushev, to Hanoi.
Even though these gestures did not lessen the intensity of
the fighting in Vietnam, they did hint at Soviet willingness
to moderate its support for the North Vietnamese.85 Just
before the May summit, President Nixon felt it was necessary
to increase substantially the bombing attacks on Vietnam and
to mine Haiphong harbour. The Soviet leaders did not cancel
the summit, Nixon and Brezhnev reiterated their positions on
Vietnam, and the immediate Impediments to European detente,
and more specifically the CSCE, were removed.86
Was it Brezhnev's primary concern to make concessions in
order to obtain a European security conference? Probably
not. While it is impossible to determine precisely his
motives, it seems likely that Brezhnev wanted a summit to
expand Soviet-American relations on a broad scale. Aside
from the aforementioned agreements facilitated by the summit,
Brezhnev may have seen two other pressing reasons to show
Soviet flexibility before the summit. Firstly, 1972 would be
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a re-election year for President Nixon, and no doubt,
Kissinger's announcement that peace was at hand (October
1972) aided Nixon's popularity. Brezhnev viewed Nixon as
someone with whom he could negotiate, so another term for the
American president must have appealed to him.87 And
secondly, Soviet disengagement from North Vietnam was liable
to have a positive influence on attitudes within the United
States, especially in the Senate, where any future Soviet-
American arms control or trade treaties would be sent for
ratification. Whatever Brezhnev's motives, events in Vietnam
after Summit I would no longer have a detrimental influence
on preparations for the CSCE.
Another possible motive for Brezhnev's conciliatory
actions in the spring of 1972, was his concern over the
growing rapprochement between the United States and the PRC.
Nixon had just returned from his first trip to Peking, in
February 1972, before the Kremlin revealed a more con¬
ciliatory attitude toward the United States in the months of
March and April.
President Nixon had listed initiation of relations with
the PRC as a primary goal of his foreign policy.88 The
Chinese had been interested in improvement of Sino-American
relations since the Twelfth Plenum of the Chinese Communist
Party in October 1968, although Chinese support for the North
Vietnamese had postponed this process until Kissinger's
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secret trip to Peking in July 1971. Nixon's first visit to
China (before visiting the Soviet Union) from 21-28 February
1972 came after an agreement to ease trade restrictions on
China and began an American commitment to withdraw American
forces from Taiwan. With the Soviet and Chinese leaders
still divided by an ideological schism, that was re-enforced
by a controversy over territory, the United States became the
arbiter of triangular diplomacy.
Despite the adversarial relationship between the PRC and
the Soviet Union, American policy toward both nations was
based on a common objective—to facilitate regional stabil¬
ity. Nixon presented his concern as follows:
The principles underlying our relations with
Communist China are similar to those governing
our policies toward the USSR. United States
policy is not likely soon to have much impact
on Chinese behavior, let alone its ideological
outlook. But it is certainly in our interest,
and in the interest of peace and stability in
Asia and the world, that we take what steps we
can toward improved practical relations with
Peking.89
The Soviet leadership was especially concerned about Chinese
gestures toward the United States and this apprehension
indirectly accelerated detente in Europe. To begin with,
discussions between Kissinger and Chinese representatives had
been held in secret and the extent of their understandings
was unknown. Was a Sino-American military alliance possible?
Soviet spokespersons were in fact uneasy about this and
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repeatedly warned Nixon and Kissinger of the dangers that
would result from such a development.90 The outbreak of
hostilities between India and Pakistan in November 1971 had
simply added to these anxieties. Additional Soviet forces
were moved to the border with China, ostensibly to occupy
Chinese troops that otherwise could be used to intervene on
the side of Pakistan. Ultimately, the dispute was resolved
due largely to an improvement in relations between Moscow and
New Delhi, but the region could not be considered stable and
American interests there were still not clearly defined.
In terms of ideology, Soviet commentators emphasized the
potential dangers of China's "leftist" interpretation of
Marxism-Leninism, which was actually labeled "anti-Soviet,"
and they stressed that imperialists in the West were simply
using Soviet-Chinese differences "to vilify the socialist
social system and the ideals of communism."91 This was an
attempt to show that closer ties between the United States
and China would hinder the development of world socialism
much more than they would damage Soviet national interests.
Then in one of the most blatant examples of disagreement over
territorial borders, the Chinese leaders printed a new atlas
of China in July 1972 which simply incorporated disputed
territory into the PRC.92 The prospects for achieving a
confirmation of borders in Eastern Europe must have appeared
much more favourable than the liklihood that the Soviet and
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Chinese leaders could quickly resolve their differences. In
fact, the Chinese were even accused of trying to disrupt the
relaxation of tension in Europe and planning to sabotage the
security conference.93
But were Soviet strategists worried that the Chinese
would use their closer ties to the United States to sour the
American desire to attend a European security conference?
Soviet statements did not reflect this apprehension outward¬
ly, but it is plausible that this was at least a considera¬
tion. Overall, the improvement in Sino-American relations,
in tandem with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations,
led to an intensification of Soviet efforts to solve the
pressing problems in Europe and to convene the CSCE.94 One
way of making the CSCE more palatable to the American leaders
was to make headway in arms limitations talks.
The arms limitations process, begun in earnest in
November 1969, occupied a central role in both the initiation
and continuation of detente up to the convocation of the
CSCE. Since the Nixon administration wanted arms limita¬
tions, it had formally recognized that the Soviet Union had
attained parity with the United States in the size of its
nuclear arsenal. This acknowledgment was important for there
was no longer any doubt that the Soviet Union was a co-equal
superpower and that it possessed the political and military
clout to press for initiatives like a European security
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conference. Hie American and West European leaders would
always have to weigh the possible negative consequences of
rejecting Soviet proposals against the potentially detrimen¬
tal results of accepting Soviet overtures. The successful
conclusion of the first phase of the SALT negotiations,
culminating in the SALT I agreements (the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement), put into motion
the last series of events that led up to the first official
CSCE meeting in Helsinki in November 1972. During the summit
in May, when the SALT agreements were signed, the leaders of
the two superpowers agreed to proceed with preparations for
the CSCE "without undue delay."95
This is not a study of the plethora of arms limitations
proposals dealt with during this active period of Soviet-
American negotiation. Such analysis is not necessary as both
the United States and the Soviet Union were in full agreement
that a future CSCE should not include any elements of nuclear
arms control. Rather, the objective here is to illustrate
that the CSCE was very low on the Nixon administration's list
of foreign policy priorities. With the SALT process in full
swing, Kissinger was very reluctant to grant the Soviet
leaders their "pet project of the European Security Con¬
ference."96 Still, it was, in part, the very momentum of the
SALT process that eventually led the American leadership to
view the CSCE as a necessary concession to the Soviet Union.
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The indifference toward the CSCE, compared to the
publicity over SALT, is described by one career diplomat as
follows:
When Nixon reported to Congress that the
United States and the USSR had agreed to
proceed "later this year" with multilateral
consultations leading to a CSCE, no one
appeared to notice—the other aspects of the
developing relationship between the two
superpowers completely overshadowed this
relatively minor announcement.97
In describing the successful development of Soviet-American
relations in 1972, Kissinger placed SALT second on the list
of accomplishments, preceded by the Berlin Agreement and
followed by Soviet restraint in the Middle East and Vietnam,
and the wide range of technical and other bilateral agree¬
ments.98 But even though Kissinger believed that the Berlin
Agreement was the Administration's most important achieve¬
ment, he did not consider it valuable in paving the way for
the CSCE. Unlike the SALT negotiations, the European
security conference would be held in a multilateral forum and
Kissinger seemingly preferred to keep discussions on major
issues in East-West relations in the bilateral or "four-
power" context. The most significant agreements, according
to Kissinger's assessment above, were similar in a way that
Kissinger did not reveal; they were all accomplished with an
absolute minimum of participating nations. Thus,
Kissinger's view of the CSCE, which would include over thirty
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nations, was largely negative. It is also clear that
Kissinger regarded the CSCE as the result of Soviet persis¬
tence. He stated:
Like drops of water on a stone, Soviet
repetitiveness has the tendency sooner or
later to erode the resistence of the restless
democracies...the desire for agreement
encourages constant pressures to find at least
something in the Soviet position to accept.
So it was to some extent with the idea of the
European Security Conference. Disparaged in
the Fifties, rejected in the Sixties, it
finally began to gain acceptance with the
passing years by default, as it were."
The firmly held belief in the United States that a European
security conference would benefit only the Soviet Union led
Nixon and Kissinger to downplay the agreement to begin
preparations for convening the conference. Whether deliber¬
ate or coincidental, the upstaging of SALT facilitated this
task. Soviet spokespersons added their own commentary on the
"special significance" of the disarmament negotiations and
they claimed that, given goodwill and a "realistic" approach,
further arms limitations could be concluded.100 In stating
that the American leadership should be more realistic, Soviet
commentators meant that the Nixon administration had received
a large portion of what it truly wanted and it should
therefore have supported other negotiations, such as the
CSCE, which were of special interest to the Soviet Union.
The matter-of-fact assessment from the Soviet perspective was
that the discussion was no longer about the idea of a
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security conference because it was obviously a quintessential
part of detente. The only controversial negotiation was over
the suitable dates.101
Finally, the successful SALT negotiations, conducted in
Helsinki, as well as in Vienna, presented Helsinki in a
favourable light in the selection process for the site of the
CSCE. This important symbolic precedent was influential in
the unanimous decision to hold the two ceremonial sessions of
the CSCE in Helsinki as well.
THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE
ON THE EVE OF THE CSCE
While Soviet-American relations continued to improve
during the period leading up to the CSCE, relations between
the United States and the West European governments suffered
through a phase of mutual suspicion and introspection. On
the one hand, the growth of detente led some European leaders
(especially Pompidou and Heath and to a lesser extent Brandt)
to fear that Europe was being sacrificed by Soviet-American
accommodation. On the other hand, the Nixon administration
had long been concerned about unilateral initiatives by
European governments towards Moscow, especially since
Brandt's Ostopolitik campaign. Kissinger argued that
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independent gestures could only damage the Atlantic alliance
and its ability to present a unified front in the face of
Soviet challenges.102 In his estimation, the United States
should have spoken for the Alliance.
The increasingly strained relationship between the
Americans and Europeans was displayed through two major
controversies; firstly, through the growing pressures in
Washington, represented by the views of Senator Mike
Mansfield, to reduce the number of American troops in Europe
by fifty percent, which ultimately hastened the convening of
the MBFR talks; and secondly, through the suspicion,
defensiveness and animosity brought on by Kissinger's
allegedly good-natured "Year of Europe" initiative. Even
though many authors have been unable to explain why the
delegation from the United States presented a "low-profile"
position at the CSCE, the answer must rest in the events
leading up to, and resulting from, this period of difficult
relations among the allies.
The Alliance Under Strain; Troop Reductions and MBFR
From 1970, the United States' strong position on the
eventual convocation of a European security conference was
that such a conference could occur only after a Berlin
agreement and at the same time as negotiations aimed at the
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reduction of Warsaw Pact and NATO forces in Europe. Calls
for the beginning of these negotiations, which became the
Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, emerged from
Soviet-American bilateral meetings and from meetings of the
NATO Foreign Ministers in the North Atlantic Council.103
Pressures arising from American domestic sources to reduce
the American military commitment in Europe strained Alliance
relations in two major ways: firstly, by sending a signal
that the European members of NATO should increase expenditure
on defense at a time that European economies could least
absorb the additional expense (regardless of European
Community cooperation); and secondly, by unearthing the
traditional suspicions of Alliance and non-Alliance members
of the alleged selfish national interests of their fellow
European governments.
Ironically, the sensitivity of European governments to
the political, economic and military aims of their fellow
Europeans dovetailed with similar concerns in Moscow. While
the bilateral treaties between France and the Soviet Union,
and between the FRG and Soviet Union served to build more
trust betwixt the nations, they also tended to generate
suspicions about the devotion of these governments to their
respective formal, or informal alliances. And if the leaders
of the United States decided to reduce the number of troops
stationed in Europe, these suspicions could have prevented
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the governments of the Alliance from agreeing on a general
response to compensate for the loss. This may have cul¬
minated with military build-ups in individual West European
nations, thus making reductions even more difficult for the
Soviet leaders. For this reason, the MBFR talks were viewed
as a necessary brake on the momentum for unilateral American
troop reductions by both the Soviet and West European
governments. This view extended to the CSCE where the
territorial and military situation in Europe would be
solidified.
In February 1969, President Nixon embarked upon his
first foreign trip as President. It took him to Brussels (to
address the North Atlantic Council), London, Bonn, Rome and
Paris and was generally successful in building upon the
longstanding Alliance relationship. According to Kissinger:
He [President Nixon] had set out to establish
a new relationship of confidence with the
European leaders. He had succeeded within the
limits of what was possible in one trip. He
had sought to get the United States out of
intra-European quarrels. Progress had been
made in all these respects. He had to some
extent calmed European fears of US-Soviet
collusion at their expense [in fact, he had
not, as the "Year of Europe" initiative would
display]; he had warned against detente for
its own sake as raising the danger of
complacency. He had emphasized the need for
equitable burden-sharing in the NATO and for
adapting Alliance doctrine to new realities.
A start had been made toward a new spirit of
consultation.104
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Kissinger's optimism about a "new spirit of consultation" was
entirely premature, especially regarding the debate over
sharing the burden of defence in NATO. The idea of a
security conference was much more appealing to the European
governments than a proposed four percent increase in defence
expenditure for the members of NATO. The Warsaw Pact
leaders, aware of European hesitancy to increase defense
spending, rejuvenated the idea of a European security
conference at a meeting of the Political Consultative
Committee in Budapest on 17 March (the "Budapest Appeal").
On 3 April, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States,
Anatoly Dorbrynin, submitted the proposal to the White House
directly, through a confidential channel, in which he
emphasized that the Soviet Union would not object to the
participation of the United States.105
The most significant aspect of this early exchange was
that it revealed the different objectives of the European
governments and the United States. Kissinger, rather
annoyed, wrote:
Brandt favored a European Security Conference
for the strange reason that it would legitim¬
ize the American presence in Europe. Pompidou
embraced it as a means of avoiding separate
German overtures toward the East and absorbing
them in a multilateral framework. British
leaders advocated it as a means to transcend
the Cold War.106
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But it is difficult to comprehend why Kissinger would not be
supportive of these objectives. After all, Brandt's
determination to maintain US troops in the FRG proved that
Ostoolitik was not a policy contrary to the interests of the
Alliance. In the case of Pompidou, a renewed French interest
in participating in any multilateral framework in Europe,
regardless of the cause of the change in attitude, should
have been welcomed. And the fact that British leaders were
optimistic about the possibility of lessening the intensity
of the Cold War could hardly have been problematic.
On the more negative side for the United States, a
common European perception was that a lessening of tensions
in Europe could have the desired effect of lowering the
required ceiling of defence spending on conventional arms,
while relying ever more on the American nuclear umbrella.
These views were common even though they did not confront the
dilemma of how nuclear retaliation could be threatened in
response to potential Soviet aggression when the Soviet Union
had, by this point, reached nuclear parity with the United
States. For the Nixon administration, faced with pressure to
reduce the American military commitment in Europe, a European
security conference could serve as a bargaining chip for MBFR
talks, or at least as a foundation on which detente could be
strengthened, bringing the possibility of such negotiations a
step closer.107
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These issues were revived with more controversy in May
1971, when US Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield unearthed
his proposal to reduce the number of American forces in
Europe by fifty percent to 150,000. Support for what the
administration considered an attempt to apply "the Viet-
namization process" to Europe, stemmed from a determination
to reduce overseas expenditure in response to a massive
balance of payments deficit (as well as the political clout
carried by Mansfield himself). After a week of political
maneuvering, the Mansfield Amendment was defeated, due in
part to Brezhnev's indication, as discussed earlier, that the
Soviet Union would consider multilateral troop reduction
talks.
Kissinger emphasizes that the debate on the Mansfield
Amendment added impetus to MBFR negotiations, but also
exposed the difficulty of enhancing West European security
through troop reductions. Reductions would have to be
asymmetrical to be truly balanced given the Warsaw Pact's
numerical advantage and the Soviet ability to reinforce the
Pact at short notice.108 Soviet commentators complained
about calls for unequal reductions at ratios of 1:3, 1:4 or
even 1:6. From their perspective, the reductions should have
been based upon the principle of parity. In an attempt to
deflect momentum for MBFR talks, the proper forum for these
negotiations, according to one Soviet spokesperson, was the
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upcoming European security conference.109 Obviously, this
was simply an effort to focus more attention on the CSCE
because, once the security conference had begun, the Soviet
press complained about "certain Western countries" that
wanted the conference to take up the military aspects of
security. Representatives from NATO were chided for trying to
establish a connection "between two important but assuredly
independent questions [MBFR and CSCE]."110 Essentially, this
was one way ultimately to prevent the Western nations from
making progress in MBFR a pre-requisite for progress in CSCE.
In the context of West European relations, any substan¬
tial American troop reduction was sure to arouse French
suspicions of the FRG's allegedly independent rapprochement
with Moscow, especially since the French were insistent that
they should play the leading role in coordinating European
unity. NATO foreign ministers, meeting in Lisbon, advocated
MBFR, which was tied to the convocation of the "Soviet
sponsored" CSCE, despite Soviet efforts to prevent linkage.
MBFR talks finally began on 31 January 1973. The Nixon
administration had defeated the Mansfield Amendment for
unilateral troop reductions and initiated multilateral troop
reduction talks. Had the Mansfield Amendment been approved
by Congress, it would have spelled doom for the CSCE and
possibly SALT and the Berlin talks. The sequence of events
that would have resulted due to a partial American military
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withdrawal would have led to a period of destabilizing
military adjustments in the West European countries. Only
after these changes had occurred could there have been
negotiations on military and political issues in Europe. And
the consequences for Alliance unity in such circumstances
would have been overwhelmingly negative. For these reasons,
the Nixon administration correctly viewed the issue of troop
reductions as a much more immediate challenge to the cohesion
of the Alliance and of far greater significance for military
stability in Europe than the CSCE.
The Alliance Under Strain: The Year of Europe Initiative
While the Nixon administration's concern for the
Mansfield Amendment explains its active role in advocating
MBFR rather than the CSCE, a far less understood issue
revolves around the "low profile" position adopted by the
American delegation at the CSCE in its early stages. A
member of the Italian delegation to the CSCE noted his
surprise over the following:
the attitude of the United States, namely, the
tendency of Kissinger to consider the CSCE as
an exercise, at best significant for public
opinion, but certainly not as an essential
component of the substantial makeup of the
process of detente. This attitude of
detachment which was ostentatiously displayed
by the American delegation for the entire
duration of the Helsinki Consultations [22
November 1972 to 8 June 1873], instead of
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favouring the maneuvering [sic] of the
negotiations, inevitably became an incentive
for the smaller countries of Western Europe to
consider themselves as the real balancing
factor of the Conference with regard to the
firm position of the Soviets... .1;L1
Soviet writers also commented on the larger role played by
the smaller nations of Europe.112 This function would become
especially important in the latter stages of the Conference.
The attitude of detachment, which typified the American
role in the CSCE during its first two years, has never been
fully explained in any study of the CSCE. But the answer
lies in the ambitious overture, launched by Kissinger in
April 1972, which went entirely sour; namely the "Year of
Europe" initiative. In the view of this author, the American
delegation to the CSCE was suffering from the total failure
of the initiative to solidify the moral and political common
interests of the United States and the West European
governments.
Furthermore, Kissinger's failed "Year of Europe"
initiative appears to have left him with three conclusions
about the CSCE: firstly, the United States could not act as
the motivator or coordinator of European unity; secondly, the
CSCE, favoured more by West Europeans than Americans, could
possibly serve to solidify the Alliance, with the United
States participating, but playing a much more indirect role;
and thirdly, the United States' function as the second
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superpower in the conference should be to act as a "behind
the scenes" force (through bilateral negotiations) to
guarantee that the Soviet Union did not bully the smaller
European nations into accepting an essentially Soviet-
tailored agreement. Although Kissinger himself has never
outlined the negotiating position of the American delegation
to the CSCE in these early stages, these three working
principles intertwine with Kissinger's preference for the
back door channel of communication to Moscow, and they help
to explain why the American delegation to the CSCE arrived
without any instructions of any kind and was generally headed
by lower level officials.113
According to Nixon and Kissinger, 1973 was to be the
"Year of Europe." The dramatic initiative to begin a new era
in Alliance relations was launched (insensitively) from New
York by Kissinger in a speech to the Associated Press on 23
April 1973. Kissinger called for a new Atlantic Charter and
a reaffirmation of the bonds between the United States,
Western Europe and, ironically enough, Japan (unquestionably,
a non-European nation). The "Year of Europe" would, it was
hoped, prepare the nations of Western Europe and the United
States for an era of coordinated policy of mutual benefit
reminiscent of the European recovery program launched by the
US Secretary of State George Marshall twenty-six years
earlier.
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Outwardly, Kissinger's concern fell into two major
areas. First of all the unilateral gestures by European
governments toward the East threatened to undermine the
ability of the West, with the United States as spokesperson,
to present a unified front (politically and militarily) to
the Soviet leadership. Nixon, as well as Pompidou and Heath,
was especially disturbed over the policies of Willy Brandt.
In his view, a Germany, freewheeling between East and West,
posed a classic challenge to equilibrium in Europe.114
Kissinger writes:
We sought to discourage the Europeans from
unilateral initiatives to Moscow by demonstra¬
ting that in any competition for better
relations with Moscow, America had the
stronger hand.115
This was Kissinger's version of Jean Monnet's call for a more
aggressive American role in tearing down traditional European
nationalistic tendencies in favour of a unified Europe
(Monnet had established the Action Committee for the United
States of Europe in 1955). But it is unlikely that Kissinger
would have seen the CSCE as facilitating the guiding role of
the United States in Europe.
Secondly, Kissinger was concerned with a growing
tendency toward "Europeanism" at the expense of "Atlan¬
ticism," reflected in the apparent inclination of European
leaders to favour political stability in Europe over improved
ties with the United States whenever a conflict between the
two objectives emerged.116 Again, this was especially true
in the case of the ERG, but Kissinger also implied that this
reasoning was used in the West European interest in a
security conference. In fact, this was the most controver¬
sial area of the "Year of Europe" speech in which Kissinger
stated that the:
United States has global interests and
responsibilities. Our European allies have
regional interests. These are not necessarily
in conflict, but in the new era neither are
they automatically identical.117
European leaders interpreted these words as confirming the
minor role that the European governments could play in
superpower relations.
The same attitude was presented one year earlier in a
speech by Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
Martin Hillenbrand, to Congress on 25 April 1972:
The [European security] conference can
constitute a modest step forward within the
broader and long range process of negotiation
intended to lead toward more stable East-West
relations—even though representatives of some
thirty states of diverse interests and regimes
cannot directly address the central problems
of European security.118
This statement can be read as implying that such problems can
only be addressed in the superpower forum. Indeed, Hillen¬
brand could have cited the ten agreements reached at the May
1972 meeting of the superpowers as evidence of the most
efficient way to settle longstanding differences in East-West
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relations. Using this reasoning, which was quite sound, the
significant negotiation would have to occur after the CSCE
between individual governments.
But the most important motivation for Kissinger's
speech, and one that he does not readily admit to, was
economic. This was the concern over the growing strength of
the European Economic Community and the blossoming economic
growth of Japan. The Japanese were making inroads into the
market place in Europe and the United States which resulted
in lobbies of various domestic industries pressuring their
respective governments to initiate restrictions or to
complete more beneficial trade agreements. European leaders
were well aware of the ongoing economic difficulties in the
United States and many viewed the initiative as purely
selfish. The pro-American Raymond Aron wrote in Le Figaro in
February 1973: "Never have the Americans imposed on their
allies and partners with so much brutality and good con¬
science...."119 Aron's comments proved that this sentiment
was broadly based and that it was inevitable that at times
American national interests would conflict with the desires
of individual European governments. This was yet another
reason for the US delegation to play a lesser role in the
CSCE where the concerns of many other nations would be at
stake.
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The "Year of Europe" initiative did not elicit an
organized European response, or a forum for further discus¬
sion, let alone a draft document on a new Atlantic Charter.
There were primarily three reasons why it failed and these
same problems plagued trans-Atlantic relations on the eve of
the CSCE. Firstly, European leaders, especially Pompidou,
never overcame the suspicion of a Soviet-American condominium
in Europe. Nixon was even accused of merely adding a card to
his hand (a united Europe card) to use against Brezhnev in
their next summit.120 Combined with Pompidou's vigorous
defense of French national sovereignty, as well as his
foreign minister's drive to establish a leadership role in
Europe for France, and Heath's anxiety about being labeled as
America's Trojan horse in Europe, the distance between
European and American perceptions of the new trans-Atlantic
priority was widening rather than narrowing.
Secondly, a new leadership role in Europe for the United
States was impossible given the cancer of the Watergate
affair. On the day following Kissinger's speech, Nixon's two
top advisors, John Ehrlidhman and H.R. Haldeman, were forced
to resign. To European leaders, a closer relationship with
Nixon was becoming more a political liability than a
diplomatic asset. In fact, Nixon's planned trip to Europe in
1973 was cancelled as the heads of the European governments
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refused to meet with him. He could have met with foreign
ministers only.
And finally, it became obvious that the interests of the
United States were not identical with the interests of one,
let alone all, of the European governments. Trans-Atlantic
unity under the banner of the Marshall Plan had given way to
the protectionism and domestic priorities of the ten member
European Economic Community.
In conclusion, the failure of the "Year of Europe"
initiative had a profound influence on the American negotia¬
ting position at the CSCE. The United States would not be
able to act as the spokesperson for European interests.
Rather, the United States' early function in the CSCE would
be to act as the second superpower and to defend very general
Western interests from a Soviet onslaught. In this way, the
American delegation to the CSCE would adopt a "low-profile"
negotiating position.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has presented three central arguments about
the period leading up to the CSCE. Firstly, the Soviet
objectives for the conference remained consistent from 1954
up until the Helsinki Consultations in November 1972. Soviet
spokespersons were very open about their desire to confirm
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the territorial status quo (which, in their view, also
legitimized the ideological and political division) in
Europe. Improved political relations would, it was hoped,
facilitate broader economic and technological exchange. And
the desire to maintain the status quo in Europe led the
Soviet leadership to downplay an earlier objective—isolating
the United States from a European security conference. Also,
it was felt that any attempt to decrease the American role in
NATO might possibly have the side effect of rekindling the
national self-assertiveness of many of the European nations,
especially in the ERG.
Secondly, as the United States and the Soviet Union were
enjoying an unprecedented era of fruitful negotiation,
President Nixon and National Security Advisor Kissinger
placed greater emphasis on the bilateral superpower relation¬
ship. The American leaders attempted to link this emerging
relationship with Soviet restraint in regional conflicts
where the United States had a political or military concern.
The European security conference was extremely low on the
Nixon administration's list of foreign policy prerogatives.
Human rights played no part in the administration's foreign
policy decisions. The only human rights debate to come out
of this period revolved around the Trade Act of 1972
(discussed in Chapter V), but even this debate involved the
narrowest of human rights issues—Jewish emigration.
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Thirdly, the indifference of the Nixon administration to
a European security conference was complemented by a
difficult period in trans-Atlantic relations. Tension over
potential American troop withdrawals and the need to redefine
NATO defense strategy, mutual trade protectionism, and the
difficulty of intermeshing national concerns with a united
Alliance policy, caused the American leadership to balk at
proposing another initiative like the "Year of Europe." In
any case, the Watergate affair could only damage the
administration's ability to conduct a consistent foreign
policy. All of these factors accounted for the inactivity of
the American delegation in the early stages of the CSCE.
In conclusion, this brief examination of American and
Soviet priorities in the period leading up to the CSCE
displays the absence of human rights from the agenda of
either nation. Neither superpower could have predicted the
dramatic human rights debate that would take place in the
CSCE. The Soviet leaders would get "their" security
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CHAPTER 2
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
officially commenced in the ornate surroundings of the
Finlandia Hall in Helsinki, Finland on 3 July 1973. Most
authors begin their analysis of the "Helsinki process"
with an examination of the speeches presented by the
thirty-five foreign ministers present in Helsinki for this
first formal meeting from 3-7 July. In fact, the existing
literature on the CSCE unanimously labels the July
meetings as "Stage I."
This study of the CSCE, with its special emphasis on
the aspects relating to human rights, contends that the
Helsinki process was, and still remains, one aspect of an
unresolvable debate between the representatives of two
diametrically opposed ideological systems. Despite
optimism in the West over a so-called new policy of
"openness" (glasnost1) in the Soviet Union, contradictions
remain between the East and West European interpretations
of the provisions of human rights in the Helsinki Final
Act. These differences are longstanding,
since well before the CSCE, and will remain into the
foreseeable future. Because of the limitations of space,
this chapter merely acknowledges the earlier human rights
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debates, which have been conducted frequently in the
United Nations, and emphasizes that the humanitarian
aspects of the CSCE began long before the generally
recognized Stage I. In reality, the CSCE's human rights
debate began in the preliminary discussions on the format
and content of a future security conference. These talks
lasted from 22 November 1972 to 8 June 1973 and are often
referred to as the Helsinki Consultations.
Therefore, this chapter differs from the literature
on the CSCE in that it divides the Conference into four,
rather than three major stages: the unofficial Stage I,
that is, the Helsinki Consultations; the official Stage I,
the formal opening, in Helsinki from 3-7 July 1973; Stage
II in Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975; and
Stage III in Helsinki from 30 July to 1 August 1975. A
new organizational approach to the CSCE is necessary in
order to examine more thoroughly the controversy over
human rights.
This approach is intended to expedite analysis of the
human rights aspects of the CSCE in three interrelated
ways. Firstly, this system allows for the clear delinea¬
tion of Western positions on human rights very early on in
the Helsinki process. Secondly, the four stage organiza¬
tional structure facilitates the objective of revealing
that from the outset of the Helsinki Consultations, the
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Soviet delegation was concerned about the growing
humanitarian aspects of the Helsinki process. And
thirdly, this approach presents the CSCE as a series of
conferences which gathered momentum and became much
broader than the Soviet and, at least initially, the
American leaders had intended.
One of the most overlooked aspects of Western
participation in the early stages of the CSCE is that the
American delegation was a latecomer in outwardly support¬
ing the humanitarian provisions. American officials were
more interested in creating unity among the allies and
less outspoken about including humanitarian clauses.
Furthermore, domestic discontent in the United States in
the wake of the Watergate scandal and the unceremonial
withdrawal from Vietnam (which was accentuated by the
North Vietnamese violation of the Paris Peace Treaty),
spread to the CSCE, which was frequently referred to as an
unjustified concession to the Soviet Union. Ultimately,
concerns about the ability of President Nixon to articu¬
late and implement a foreign policy that defended American
interests, influenced the American delegation in the CSCE
to adopt a much firmer stand on the humanitarian provi¬
sions. By supporting outwardly these proposed terms for
the accord, the administration also appeared to adopt more
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moral principles than had been used hitherto in the case
of the bombing of Cambodia.
The resolve of the Western delegations to insert
humanitarian provisions into the CSCE was a great concern
for the Soviet delegation. Soviet negotiators began
immediately to incorporate safeguard clauses into the
various texts—a tactic that would continue throughout
nearly three years of negotiation. A generally accepted
assertion that the Soviet delegation was "surprised" by
the strong Western emphasis on human rights is therefore
contestable.1 Soviet resistance to such provisions
actually began early on in the CSCE because it was clear
that West European governments wanted them to be included.
One of the goals of this chapter is to reveal more
accurately the predictably defensive measures which the
Soviet negotiators were ultimately able to incorporate
into the Helsinki Final Act.
While the Soviet leaders were not surprised about the
emphasis on human rights, they were clearly disenchanted
over the widening agenda of the CSCE. In fact, the Soviet
negotiators considered the Helsinki Consultations as Stage
I, which would be followed by a minimum of further
negotiations, and signing of the final document by the
heads of state in May 1973. Instead, the Helsinki Final
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Act was not signed until 1 August 1975 and had undergone a
metamorphosis well beyond Soviet intent.
For all of these reasons, an examination of the CSCE
negotiations is central to this study of the Soviet and
American conflict over human rights. In order to disclose
the assymetrical and unresolvable interpretations of human
rights as presented in the Helsinki Final Act, it is
crucial to examine the debate over the provisions during
the negotiations themselves. Study of this debate will
add credence to the view that accommodation between the
superpowers on human rights issues is improbable and a
foreign policy centred around the protection of a human
rights interpretation poses unavoidable dilemmas.
THE UNOFFICIAL STAGE I: THE HELSINKI CONSULTATIONS
On 5 May 1969, in an aide-memoire issued from
Helsinki, the Finnish government emphasized the need to
consider convening a thoroughly prepared European security
conference. The memorandum, sent to the governments of all
the European states, the United States and Canada,
expressed the willingness of the government of Finland "to
act as the host of the security conference as well as for
the preparatory meeting provided that the Governments
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concerned consider this as appropriate.1,2 As presented in
Chapter 1, the prerequisites for such a conference were
not fulfilled until late in 1972 and during diplomatic
contacts in October and November of that year, thirty-four
nations decided to accept the Finnish invitation and to
convene preliminary discussions on 22 November.3
The Helsinki Consultations will be examined here in
greater detail than in earlier studies on the CSCE. This
is due to the fact that the seven months of negotiations
in this early stage firmly laid the foundation for the
rest of the Conference. During the unofficial first
stage, the Soviet representatives exposed their objectives
both in their proposals and in their responses to counter¬
proposals. These early discussions were about both the
content and structure of the subsequent stages of the
CSCE. Also, this period witnessed the beginning of
differences between Eastern and Western delegations over
the role that human rights should play in improving
European cooperation and security. And perhaps most
significant of all, the Helsinki Consultations played a




A fundamental problem in examining the Helsinki
Consultations is that the negotiations were held in closed
session and very few truly insightful documents from this
stage have ever been published. Hence, it is necessary to
rely heavily on Luigi Ferraris' Report on a Negotiation
(1979) which provides a diplomatic chronicle of these
early negotiations, but without documentation. Ferraris'
work allows the reader to glean Soviet objectives in the
CSCE which can then be confirmed by documentary evidence
from the prolonged negotiations in Geneva during Stage II.
His study helps to confirm that Soviet objectives remained
consistent throughout the CSCE. Analysis of the Soviet
press adds credence to Ferraris' comments. Newspaper
articles which appeared between 1972 and 1975 were
especially relevant for this chapter, as well as a smaller
number of articles from Soviet journals such as Kommunist
and Mezhdunarodnve otnosheniia. The former journal was
consulted because of its significance for Soviet domestic
politics while the latter periodical is an important
source of writings on international affairs.
From the information available about the Helsinki
Consultations, it is possible to discern primarily three
Soviet objectives. In order of priority, the Soviet
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leadership strived to formulate a general statement of
principles to confirm the territorial and ideological
status quo in Europe; to achieve a non-discriminatory
trade arrangement in the CSCE; and finally, through a much
more defensive strategy, to prevent any connection between
the CSCE and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks
(MBFR), or with any of the other arms control forums.
This would establish the political, rather than military
nature of the CSCE. The exposure of these objectives was
quite predictable given the wealth of pre-CSCE statements,
emanating from the Eastern camp, which continually
reiterated the necessity of adopting such measures for the
benefit of detente. Soviet methods to achieve these
objectives, and to block proposals arising frcom countries
outside the communist bloc, unfolded during the Helsinki
Consultations and remained consistent throughout the CSCE.
Within weeks of the initiation of the Helsinki
Consultations, it became apparent that the head of the
Soviet delegation, Ambassador Vladimir Aleksandrovich
Zorin, viewed the CSCE as a mechanism to confirm and
stabilize the then existing political situation in
Europe.4 In the debates over the agenda for the CSCE, the
Soviet delegation first put forward a proposal limited to
three parts: "guarantee of security in Europe; coopera¬
tion in all sectors; [and] a special organ to exist for
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all matters dealing with security and cooperation."5
While this agenda placed political security in the
forefront of the debate, a proposal submitted by Belgium
and Denmark suggested a broader agenda to include:
"political security, commercial economic and technical
cooperation; [and] freer human contacts and cultural
relations."6 Ultimately, the Soviet delegation would not
be able to block the creation of an agenda divided into
four main sections or "baskets:" provisions to enhance
political, and to a lesser extent, military security;
cooperation in the economic and technological sphere;
cooperation in the humanitarian category; and the creation
of some type of follow-up mechanism to monitor compliance
with the accord.
As presented in earlier Soviet calls for a European
security conference, from the Bucharest Statement (1966)
to the Prague Declaration (1972), the first basket of the
agenda reflected the primary Soviet objective. In these
earlier documents, Soviet spokespersons proposed the
creation of a number of principles to guarantee security
in Europe. During the Helsinki Consultations, the Soviet
delegation employed various tactics in order to satisfy
the goal of achieving recognition of the status quo.
The first of these efforts began on 1 March 1973 in
the working group created to formulate the principles
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governing relations among the participating states.
Curing this early session, Poland, on behalf of the Warsaw
Pact, proposed that the principles reaffirm the Charter of
the United Nations, and the Declaration of the United
Nations on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations Between States (1970). The Polish
proposal also suggested that the principles should reflect
the "'appropriate' formulations of the agreements made
between states in view of a lessening of international
tensions and to ensure security in Europe"—a clear
reference to the bilateral treaties which resulted from
both the West German Ostpolitik and the French rapproche¬
ment with the Soviet leaders.7
Curing this same session of the working group, the
delegate from the GDR presented a working document of
seven principles for Basket I that was supported by the
Soviet delegation. These were: frontier inviolability,
territorial integrity, refraining from the use of force,
sovereign equality, independence, non-intervention, and
the peaceful settlement of disputes.8 In an effort to
secure these principles, which accentuated the theme of
the confirmation of the territorial status quo in Europe,
the Warsaw Pact delegations suggested immediate approval
of the few principles that were acceptable to most of the
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delegations. Curing the first week of March, one Soviet
newspaper reported fallaciously that:
None of the participants in the consultations
is now expressing doubt that the first task of
the upcoming all-European conference should be
to discuss the question of European security
and the principles of relations among European
states, including certain measures for
strengthening stability and trust.9
The Soviet delegates argued that, since the participants in
the consultations were fully enlightened as to the "true"
objectives of the upcoming CSCE, it was necessary to convene
the conference "no later than the middle of 1973...."10
These efforts to rush the negotiations were intended to
prevent the inclusion of principles desired by the neutral
and Western nations, especially in the case of self-deter¬
mination, peaceful change and respect for human rights.
These principles were inimical to Soviet objectives because,
instead of solidifying the political and territorial order in
Europe, they represented the West European notion that the
structure of Europe was not yet permanent and could not be
ossified until well after the CSCE was over. In other words,
the European security conference was, to many delegations
outside of the Eastern bloc, the beginning of a process to
resolve these questions, rather than an end in itself.
Because this was to be long-term process, Ferraris noted
that:
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the majority, and the neutral countries in
particular, (and the Maltese delegation with
particular clarity and wisdom), hurriedly
[sic] pointed out that they had no intention
of working against the clock as what mattered
was obtaining positive results.11
A primary Soviet concern in the working group on the
principles was to head off Western attempts to include,
within the inviolability of frontiers principle, a clause
about refraining from the threat or use of force. This
assault on the "Brezhnev Doctrine" was led by the Italian
delegation, which argued that this connection was well
established in international law.12 To complicate matters
further for the Soviet negotiators, other Western delega¬
tions, and Romania, emphasized the unacceptability of a
declaration of principles without clauses guaranteeing the
right to peaceful changes of frontiers (interestingly, during
Stage II, the Soviet leaders would feel compelled to accept
both the concept of peaceful change and some Basket III
provisions in order to register the inviolability prin¬
ciples) . And after the inclusion of principles prohibiting
the threat or use of force and safeguarding the sovereign
right to peaceful change, the neutral and West European
delegations later argued that there would have to be a clear
statement that all the principles were of equal importance.13
This would have prevented the East European delegations from
arguing that the principles on the inviolability of borders
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were predominant. But one must conclude that the Soviet
delegation had a clear advantage because they were campaign¬
ing for principles which could be implemented immediately,
while the West European and neutral delegations articulated
clauses that could only be enacted in the future. For
example, the principle of territorial integrity could be
respected simply by restraint or inaction by the partici¬
pating nations. They could agree to avoid "aggression" as
soon as the document was signed. But the concept of peaceful
change could only be realized after persistent action by the
relevant governments.
Throughout the Helsinki Consultations, and eventually in
the Geneva stage of the CSCE, the Soviet delegation continued
to pursue a number of related strategies to confirm the
territorial status quo: firstly, by obtaining a very general
statement of principles that were already accepted in
international documents, but restated to have special
regional application for Europe; secondly, by placing the
greatest emphasis on the inviolability of frontiers principle
as the foundation for building security in Europe; thirdly,
by resisting any efforts to introduce fresh principles into
Basket I; and finally, by achieving not only early acceptance
of the principles, but also by presenting the work on the
principles as the most significant aspect of the conference.
According to Soviet design, the first section would became
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the dominant section of the final document and would
eventually be signed by the heads of state of the signatory
nations. The Soviet delegation, as well as other Warsaw Pact
delegations, put much effort into limiting the agenda to
these issues that would do little more than confirm the
territorial and ideological status quo.
The second major Soviet objective revealed during the
Helsinki Consultations was the achievement of a non-dis¬
criminatory trade agreement. On 21 March 1973, the Soviet
delegation proposed a European programme of nondiscrimination
in trade relations with an explicit most-favoured-nation
clause.14 This, and further statements, reiterated earlier
calls for improved economic and technological exchange and,
as the conference proceeded, the Soviet delegation began to
appeal directly to the member states of the European Economic
Community.15 These early ambitious proposals in the economic
sphere also revealed, quite openly, that the Soviet leader¬
ship was concerned about the possibility of the EEC becoming
a military alliance, or linked with NATO. As the EEC was
about to grow from six to nine members, Soviet anxiety over
this possibility increased.16 But if there was to be an
increase in trade, the Soviet method was to limit contacts to
the institutional level (EEC and CMEA) rather than to allow
closer personal exchanges. And in order to facilitate ever
closer governmental supervision, Soviet representatives
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preferred to negotiate bilateral agreements with each
individual country of the EEC.17 Although the debates in the
second basket go well beyond the scope of this study, it
should be noted that the Soviet desire to achieve a favour¬
able agreement in this category continued throughout the
CSCE. Such measures were intended to give a boost to the
sluggish Soviet economy.
A third Soviet concern in the Helsinki Consultations was
largely defensive—to prevent the neutral and nonaligned
nations from interjecting military and arms control issues
into the CSCE. While the immediate Soviet concern was to
prevent linkage between the CSCE and MBER, other attempts to
expand the CSCE agenda into the military and arms control
spheres were also resisted. The initial attempt to establish
these connections occurred early on in the Helsinki Consulta¬
tions in a proposal by Sweden. The Swedish attempt to link
the CSCE and MBFR was rejected not only by the Soviet Union,
but also by France, Italy and the United States, in other
words, by both NATO and the WTO.18 But a much more compli¬
cated debate was initiated over what would became the
confidence-building measures (CBMs) of the CSCE. These fell
into three major categories: prior notification of major
military maneuvers (i.e. war games); notification before
major military movements (i.e. reorganization) ; and exchange
of military observers. Curing Stage II, the neutral and
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nonaligned nations would stand firm on CBMs, in part because
of the rare chance of influencing the defense policies of the
military blocs of Eastern and Western Europe.
Curing the Helsinki Consultations, the Soviet delegation
confirmed its objectives as indicated in earlier Soviet calls
for a European security conference. In these preparatory
discussions, it became clear that the Soviet leaders would
attempt to gain acceptance of a general statement of
principles, with emphasis on the concept of the inviolability
of frontiers, in order to confirm the territorial status quo.
Also, faced with a troubled Ninth Five Year Plan (1971-75),
favourable economic and technological exchange clauses were
desirable, although not imperative.19 Finally, as will be
revealed with more clarity in the following section, the
Soviet leaders would resist any expansion of the agenda into
other areas, including the military sector.
The Role of Human Rights in the Helsinki Consultations
During the Helsinki Consultations, it became apparent
that the delegations from Eastern Europe would resist any
efforts to expand the CSCE agenda to include issues involving
the political, social and in some cases, even the cultural
rights of citizens in the participating nations. Earlier
Soviet negotiating behavior had built a foundation for these
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attitudes. But American indifference to the humanitarian
aspects of the CSCE was unexpected by West Europeans and it
was left to the smaller NATO member nations, and to the
neutral and non-aligned countries, to defend the inclusion of
these principles in the CSCE.
As stated in Chapter I, the American negotiating
position did not result from a lack of concern over human
rights issues as much as from a calculated strategy to play a
behind-the-scene supporting role for the United States'
allies in the CSCE. The objective was to let the West
European governments take the lead in the Conference. This
was, in part, a matter of necessity due to ongoing diffi¬
culties in the trans-Atlantic relationship. Many European
governments had outwardly resisted Kissinger's inquires into
American sponsorship of the Year of Europe initiative.
Furthermore, Kissinger and Nixon viewed the CSCE as a Soviet-
sponsored project which did not deserve the publicity that a
firm and public American position would elicit.
Therefore, the human rights debate in the early months
of 1973 was carried out between the representatives of the
East and West European governments. This early disagreement
over the role of issues of human rights in the Helsinki
process revealed two broad approaches that the Soviet
delegation would use in order to prevent the CSCE from
becoming a forum for a debate over human rights. Soviet
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delegates argued that questions of human rights were not
admissable in the CSCE format. Also, recognizing that the
support for such provisions was too strong to counter
entirely, Soviet delegates attempted to incorporate within
the humanitarian provisions general safety clauses that could
be used to limit the responsibility of the participating
states in this sphere. While these tactics will be mentioned
here as part of the Helsinki Consultations, a much more
thorough debate over these issues took place during Stage II
in Geneva, which will be discussed later.
Soviet attempts to illustrate that human rights issues
were not applicable to the CSCE really began in the early
debates over the content of the agenda. Thus, differences
over human rights began even before unanimous agreement that
there would be three sections to the negotiated document. As
illustrated above, the Soviet proposal for the agenda of the
first basket of the document did not include a human rights
principle.20 Soviet spokespersons also resisted the creation
of a third basket which would deal, in more specific terms,
with an expansion of contacts and a freer flow of information
between individuals in the participating states.
The initial Soviet reasoning behind the inadmissability
of human rights provisions, at least as presented formally,
involved the assertion that human rights are not a legitimate
subject of discussion between governments.21 In official
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Soviet eyes, the rights of citizens are defined and protected
by their respective governments, which makes the issue a
purely internal matter. Hence, the CSCE, as a negotiation
among states, should include only those issues in state-to-
state, or external relations. Soviet commentators claimed
that reactionary circles in the United States intended to
ensure the free movement of people and ideas across the
ideological border simply to restore the old bourgeois
order.22 In an attempt to show some flexibility, Brezhnev
stated that humanitarian cooperation was possible as long as
there was respect for:
the sovereignty, laws and customs of each
country and serves the mutual spiritual
enrichment of the peoples, the growth of
confidence among them and the affirmation of
the ideas of peace and good-neighbourliness.23
He continued:
We are for the expansion of tourist exchanges.
We are for broad contacts between the public
of various countries, for meetings between
young people and representatives of related
occupations, for trips by citizens on a
collective or individual basis. In short,
there are considerable possibilities, provided
that the countries involved act in a spirit of
mutual respect and non-interference in one
another's affairs....24
The "considerable possibilities" that Brezhnev mentioned
would be assessed and coordinated by the Soviet authorities,
thus giving the government and Party the ability to curtail
such exchanges. In another so-called concession, Soviet
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representatives to the Helsinki Consultations did state that
these issues could be mentioned in bilateral negotiations
during and after the CSCE.
In contrast, Western delegates underlined the central
role of the human rights issue in the security-building
process. For example, the Italian delegation "emphasized the
main relevance of the individual even in the relations
between the States...."25 During the heated discussions of
the first week of February 1973, the ambassador from the
Netherlands noted the difference in approach to human rights
by the East and West. While the Eastern nations put the
state at the centre of the relationship between individuals
of different nations, the Western democracies viewed state
intervention as too restrictive and an impediment to building
upon detente further.26 In the words of a Swiss delegate,
"to create good feeling between each other, we must first
understand each other."27 To this delegate, personal
contacts and exchange of information between individuals
outside of governmental restrictions, was a prerequisite for
improving the political climate in Europe. This view
conflicted with the Soviet notion that expansion in this area
could occur only after an amelioration in the political
climate in Europe. The resolution of these problems was in
the Soviet view, the responsibility of the various states.
Once the representatives of the nations participating in the
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CSCE recognized the realities of post-World War II Europe, as
the Soviet side saw these actualities, then the Soviet
authorities could distribute the benefits of detente in
Europe to individual citizens. Similarly, an increase in
tension in Europe could therefore cause the Soviet leaders to
restrict personal contacts and exchanges of information
between individuals. In other words, the state was to
oversee all contacts between individuals in Eastern and
Western Europe. Because of these divergent positions between
East and West, the problem that the CSCE did not resolve was
that of the status of the individual in inter-state rela¬
tions.
Recognizing the broad Western support for humanitarian
principles in the CSCE, the Soviet delegation initiated
efforts to include measures in the Helsinki Recommendations
(or the "Blue Book" as it was often called due to its light
blue cover) that would safeguard the right of the state to
intervene to restrict individual rights. On 7 February,
Polish ambassador Willmann stated that:
all activity in the field of information of
cultures and contacts between people must
respect the principles of the sovereignty of
States, of noninterference in internal
affairs, and the respect for the laws and
customs [and the] responsibility of States fin
defining the] general trends of activities.^8
Since Basket III was emerging as a hotbed of human rights
provisions, the delegations from Eastern Europe strove to
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formulate a preamble to that section which applied restric¬
tive state rights to the provisions.
Soviet attempts to formulate a restrictive preamble were
especially evident on 2 May, when the Soviet delegation
called for acceptance of the principles of non-interference,
respect for rights inherent in sovereignty, and respect for
internal legislation.29 Since the main objective of the
Soviet leaders was merely to confirm the status quo through
Basket I principles, a re-statement of these principles in
the Basket III preamble was intended to neutralize the
humanitarian provisions there. On 7 May, the Bulgarian
delegations resisted inclusion of all the principles from
Basket I into the premable, because this would have incor¬
porated the principles concerning respect for human rights
and self-determination into Basket III.30
On 4 April, Soviet ambassador Zorin argued that human
contacts are a part of cultural cooperation. Since the
Soviet argument was that cultural cooperation necessitates
organization from state bodies, the Soviet leaders would
again have a safety clause providing justification for the
restrictive practices of the state.31 And as stated by
Polish ambassador Willmann in reference to the dissemination
of information, these activities would be curtailed if they
did not conform with the aims of detente as defined by the
Polish government.32
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As will be seen in the following section, the final
version of Basket III in the Helsinki Recommendations was
watered down from what the Western delegations considered
ideal. The basic differences over the role of human rights
in the CSCE remained, and the exploratory debates of these
preparatory discussions indicated that much hard negotiation
would have to take place in Geneva in order to reach a
compromise.
Most significant of all, a brief examination of the
negotiation leading up to the Helsinki Recommendations shows
that, as early as November 1972, the Soviet delegation was
very concerned about the expansion of the agenda for the CSCE
to include issues of human rights. Many of the controversial
aspects of this matter had been mentioned, if not more
thoroughly discussed, during this unofficial first stage.
The Soviet delegation had revealed portions of its strategy
to downplay the humanitarian provisions. These revelations
about the Helsinki Consultations provide a clearer under¬
standing of the evolution of human rights within the Helsinki
Final Act than has been offered in the literature to date.
The Soviet delegation could not have been surprised about the
great interest in human rights during Stage II. Rather, the
Soviet representatives were already on the defensive on this
matter and were determined to endure the controversy over the
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humanitarian aspects in order to achieve confirmation of the
territorial status quo.
The Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations
Two major features of the Final Recommendations will be
mentioned here: procedural rules of special importance for
the negotiations; and provisions within the Recommendations
that dealt with the humanitarian aspects of the conference.
The text of the Final Recommendations set the stage for the
next two years of negotiation and was a remarkable achieve¬
ment in its own right. Nevertheless, the nations of Eastern
and Western Europe had created a very general set of
guidelines that would necessitate much negotiation over
specifics.33
Procedural Rules in the Final Recommendations
The Final Recommendations outlined a number of organiza¬
tional and procedural matters. Firstly, negotiations would
take place according to an agenda divided into four major
sections: Basket I, Questions Relating to Security in
Europe; Basket II, Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of
Science and Technology and of the Environment; Basket III,
Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields; and Follow-
up (s) to the Conference. This more thoroughly prepared
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agenda was a success for the West European delegations from
limiting the CSCE to a short, general statement formulated
and approved in only a few weeks of negotiation.
Secondly, the CSCE was formally divided into three
future stages (paragraphs 6-12 of the Final Recommendations).
Stage I would take place in Helsinki and would consist of a
meeting of foreign ministers representing the participating
states, who would "adopt the rules of procedure, the agenda
and the instructions of the working bodies of the Conference,
together with the other arrangements relating to the conduct
of the Conference" (paragraph 7 of the Final Recommenda¬
tions) . The foreign ministers would present speeches
outlining each government's official view of the most
significant issues of the Conference. But the bulk of the
negotiation would occur during Stage II when committees and
subcommittees within each basket would formulate the various
provisions based upon proposals from the delegations.34 The
representatives at Stage III would ratify the document and
present speeches on its significance. The Soviet leaders
were insistent that representation at this stage occur at the
highest level, which would enhance the political significance
of the document.35 However, the Final Recommendations left
this issue unresolved until more was known about the progress
of the negotiations. As would be revealed later, the three-
Stage procedure was of special benefit to the Western
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delegations for it allowed them to introduce more proposals,
based on their view of how to improve detente, as opposed to
East European proposals which were bland and merely confirmed
the existing political and geographical divisions in Europe.
According to Ferraris, the three-stage procedure made the
CSCE "condemned to succeed" as each stage was dependent on
success in the stage which preceded it.36 During the
Helsinki Consultations, the Soviet and East European
delegations were anxious to move on to Stage I and were
forced to accept a broader agenda so that the CSCE could
officially begin. As will be seen later in this chapter, a
similar situation resulted during Stage II when the Soviet
negotiators wanted to move on to the ceremonial signing at
the end of Stage III.
The three-stage procedure was beneficial for yet another
reason. Since the negotiations were an outgrowth of detente
and possibly a blueprint for future East-West rapprochement,
each delegation must have been sensitive to the danger of
being viewed as an impediment to the development of a new era
of relations in Europe. If a nation was singled out for
infelicitously delaying the conference over a peripheral or
marginally tangential issue, as was Malta in Stage II, that
nation would incur the wrath of delegations from both Eastern
and Western Europe. The unavoidable consequence of this fear
was an even greater desire by each nation to solidify its
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position in an alliance of negotiators. This would prevent a
single nation from being blamed for delays in the Conference
because a larger alliance of representatives would be
responsible for a proposal or objection. Therefore, while it
may have appeared that the CSCE would be saddled with thirty-
five nations representing a plethora of desires, in
actuality, objectives were tempered by concessions within
alliances and the desire to proceed to the next stage of
negotiation.
Yet another procedural rule was, in fact, intended to
prevent the debilitating effects of bloc negotiations. The
Final Recommendations expressly stated that "the Conference
shall take place outside military alliances" (paragraph 65).
In reality, the participants in the Conference gravitated
toward their traditional allies, making this more a statement
of intent than an inflexible rule. Since the political,
economic and military alliances operated in the CSCE
(especially NATO, the WTO and the EEC), proposals were often
presented by one nation on behalf of an alliance. Early on,
Soviet commentators complained about noncompliance with
paragraph 65, referring specifically to the members of the
Common Market.37 But this criticism was potentially counter¬
productive because, without the unofficial functioning of
alliances, the CSCE would have lasted much longer than two
years. While the Soviet leaders may have wanted to disrupt
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the military and economic organizations that were allegedly
hostile to the Soviet Union, they also wanted to finish the
European security conference as soon as possible and to
confirm the political organization of Eastern Europe. Since
the blocs did function during the CSCE, Soviet-approved
proposals were frequently submitted by East Germany, Poland
and Bulgaria, especially in the case of Basket III issues.38
Nevertheless, even the smallest of the delegations could
still block progress in the negotiations because the
procedural rule of vote by consensus was outlined in the
"Blue Book" (paragraph 69 of the Final Recommendations).
This gave each delegation a veto over decisions taken in the
Conference. Yet the threat of using the veto would always
wield more influence than ultimately refusing consensus over
any matter, since a desperate veto would signal a serious
breakdown in negotiations. Any lengthy delay in Stage II
would, of course, prevent the initiation of Stage III. In
any case, in reference to issues in Basket III, differences
usually occurred between the Eastern and Western nations
which meant that, at times, even a simple majority was
impossible. But combined with the rule of consensus voting,
the idea that the Conference should have taken place outside
of military alliances allowed the neutral and non-aligned
nations to play a much more influential role than would
otherwise have been possible. During Stage II, the smaller
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neutral nations would seize upon Basket III issues as their
area of special interest, thereby constituting a negotiating
"alliance."
Finally, the Final recommendations (paragraph 70-96)
outlined the procedures of a rotating chairmanship of
committees and subcommittees; establishment of an Executive
Secretary from the host country; collection and distribution
of proposals; the closed or private nature of the negotia¬
tions during the second stage; and the distribution of
expenses for the Conference. Once again, these procedural
rules accentuated a more thoroughly prepared agenda with a
more influential role for the smaller nations of Europe.
This meant that the CSCE would consider more issues than
those revealed in the Soviet proposal of 22 January 1973. A
greater amount of negotiation would be necessary, thus
prolonging the Conference well beyond the stated deadline
desired by the Soviet leadership.39 Since it was apparent
that the smaller nations in Europe could, according to the
Final Recommendations, negotiate on equal strength with the
superpowers, any Soviet chances of merely confirming spheres
of influence in Europe were crippled, if not decimated. In
fact, Soviet commentators felt compelled to issue a statement
on the importance of the small and medium sized states in
Europe. This declaration emphasized that the Soviet Union
did not desire the CSCE simply to secure its hegemony in
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Eastern Europe.40 As will be discussed later in this
chapter, the smaller neutral and West European nations
countered by arguing that, if this were true, then the Soviet
Union should have been willing to accept the possibility of
peaceful changes and broader contacts between people in
Europe. These were developments which the Soviet delegation
had resisted unsuccessfully.
The Humanitarian Provisions in the Final Recommendations
The human rights issue was incorporated into the Final
Recommendations through a principle in Basket I within the
section entitled, "Questions Relating to Security in Europe,"
in which the participating states reaffirmed the primary
significance of "respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience,
religion or belief" (paragraph 19). The Final Recommenda¬
tions also confirmed that an entire basket would deal
specifically with "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other
Fields" (paragraphs 42-52). The fact that these provisions
were included in the Final Recommendations assured that the
human rights issue would play a major role in further
negotiations on the formulation of the Final Act.
The "respect for human rights" principle, or "Principle
Seven" as it became known, was lodged within the most
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important section of the Final Recommendations for the Soviet
leaders. Therefore, at this point in the negotiations, the
significance of this particular human rights principle lay in
its location rather than in its content. During the Helsinki
Consultations, many West European delegations had insisted on
a statement to the effect that all of the principles were of
equal value. These delegations had succeeded in defending the
proposition that, in any attempt to enhance stability in
Europe, the rights of the individual, however they were
defined, must be considered and such issues could be raised
during negotiations between the representatives of states.
Even though Soviet negotiators would later use tactics to
circumvent this reality, the inclusion of this principle was
a significant achievement in the face of resistance from the
East European delegations. Moreover, the principle was a
prominent feature of Basket I because, like the rest of the
principles, respect for human rights was to be carried out
"in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations," reminding the participants of their already
existing obligations in this area.
By contrast, all of the Basket III agenda contained
humanitarian provisions. While the Final Recommendations
were very vague regarding this category—the debates over
human rights would continue in Stage II—an ambitious attempt
was made by numerous Western delegations to cement the role
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of human rights in the overall Helsinki process.41 Paragraph
42 states:
With the aim of contributing to the strength¬
ening of peace and understanding among the
peoples of the participating states and to
the spiritual enrichment of the human
personality, without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion and irrespective of
their political, economic and social systems,
the Committee, assisted by the appropriate
Sub-Committees, shall be charged with
examining all possibilities of cooperation
conducive to creating better conditions for
increased cultural and educational exchanges,
for broader dissemination of information, for
contacts between people, and for the solution
of humanitarian problems. In this connection,
it shall not only draw upon existing forms of
cooperation, but shall also work out new ways
and means appropriate to these aims.
This is a paragraph laced with phrases desirable to many
Western delegations and largely concessionary from the Soviet
standpoint. The Western preferences included: recognition
that expansion in this category would strengthen peace, that
is, security; acknowledgment that broader dissemination of
information generally, and contacts between people specifi¬
cally, should be an essential part of this process; and
finally, paragraph 42 went well beyond a stagnant reiteration
of existing documents on this subject and called for the
formulation of "new ways and means" to achieve humanitarian
cooperation. Despite the important location of Principle
Seven, this was the genesis of the debate over human rights
in the CSCE. Because the unanimous agreement to consider new
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methods to solve humanitarian problems implied that the
delegations could be imaginative beyond the parameters of
precedent, it appeared that virtually any proposal would
receive at least a modicum of attention (as was the case, for
example, with the British proposal for a New International
Magazine with European-wide circulation).42 These manifest
possibilities reflected Western perspectives and would later
cause problems for the East European delegations as they
would attempt to block any human rights proposals tailored by
the delegates of the West European or neutral nations.
Obviously, the Conference was going to be of longer duration,
with a broader agenda in Basket III than the Soviet represen¬
tatives had desired.
While paragraph 42 reflected Western aims, paragraph 43
most accurately represented the objectives of the Warsaw Pact
nations. It stated:
The Committee in its final document will
formulate relevant proposals, based on full
respect for the principles guiding relations
among the participating States enumerated in
the terms of reference for the Committee on
item I of the agenda.
To the Soviet delegation, this paragraph meant that the
principle of non-interference in internal affairs applied to
Basket III in its entirety. The wording of the paragraph,
however, was not nearly as restrictive as originally desired.
The Soviet delegation had campaigned for a paragraph that
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merely restated the principles of sovereignty, non-inter¬
ference and the observance of the laws and customs of other
nations without citing any of the other Basket I prin¬
ciples.43 In this regard, the West European delegations were
successful in attaining a reference to all of the principles,
which then made the respect for human rights principle
equally relevant. This added even more significance to this
third section because Principle Seven was one of the ten
general guidelines for improving detente, but it was
punctuated in Basket III. The principles that the Soviet and
East European delegations desired the most in Basket I, did
not receive this much attention in other sections of the
evolving Final Act.
Paragraphs 42-44 made up the skeleton of the future
preamble to Basket III. The subsequent provisions in the
basket all became subordinate to the directives of the
preamble, so the debates over how to refer to the Basket I
principles were crucial.
The actual humanitarian provisions in Basket III were
divided into four categories: Human Contacts (45-46) ,*
Information (47); Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of
Culture (48-50); and Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field
of Education (51-52). Consisting of well over 700 words, the
four subsections of Basket III were, at least in appearance,
a victory for the persistent Western delegations. But the
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provisions in the Final Recommendations were too general for
early optimism and much of the most difficult negotiation in
the Conference would take place over these subsections.
Human Contacts
The first subsection, Human Contacts, was a concession
from Soviet Ambassador Zorin, who had argued that this issue
did not warrant individual consideration by a subcommittee.
According to Soviet reasoning, human contacts fell into the
category of cultural cooperation and should have received
consideration in that particular subcommittee.44 Ferraris
summarizes the counter-argument presented by the Italian
delegation as follows:
It would not, in fact, be logical to consider
measures to improve the circulation of books
and newspapers or to increase the knowledge of
works of art and cultural achievements of
other countries, if people were not able to
meet more often and more freely...[for] free
discussion and therefore dialogue, debates and
criticism....45
In other words, human contacts were not subordinate to
cultural exchanges. Rather, they facilitated cooperation in
this area and were valuable in their own right. By attaining
a separate formulation of the concept of human contacts, the
Western delegations assured that they would be discussed in
greater detail during the CSCE.
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Nevertheless, the ambiguous formulation of the human
contacts subsection left the Soviet delegation in a strong
negotiating position in the Conference. State control over
any future increase in this category was possible due to the
weak wording of the two paragraphs. Since the subcommittee
was ordered to prepare proposals "to facilitate freer
movement and contacts, individually or collectively,
privately or officially, among persons, institutions and
organizations...," (emphasis added), the issue remained
unclear as to whether or not this meant that individual
contacts would receive as much attention as collective or
institutional contacts. Soviet spokespersons had always
favoured limiting contacts to the institutional level.
In addition, paragraph 46 calls for "favorable
examination.. .by the States concerned under mutually
acceptable conditions" to facilitate:
(a) contacts and regular meetings on a basis of
family ties; reunification of families;
marriage between nationals of different States;
(b) travel for personal or professional reasons;
improvement of conditions for tourism, on an
individual or collective basis;
(c) meetings among young people; expansion of
contacts and competitions, particularly in the
field of sport.
Improvements in this category would necessitate organization
by the various governments. The phrasing at the beginning of
paragraph 46 illustrated that increases in travel and
contacts would have to be examined in bilateral talks
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following the Conference because the multilateral CSCE was
simply too broad in membership and agenda to result in
specific agreements. Soviet representatives made their view
on this issue quite obvious when they later stated that, "we
are not opposed to the expansion of these exchanges, but we
feel that in each case the problems should be resolved on a
bilateral basis depending on interest and possibilities."46
While same Western delegates were concerned that this
extensive governmental involvement would allow the Soviet
leadership to restrict human contacts, the chances of
reaching "mutually acceptable conditions" were far greater in
bilateral, rather than multilateral talks.47 If a government
was later unhappy about the Soviet position in a bilateral
negotiation, it would have a much more adequate forum in
which to complain or to explain the way in which a Soviet
action could influence other aspects of their relations.
Information
In wording similar to that for human contacts, the
subcommittee on information was to formulate proposals "to
facilitate" the freer and wider dissemination of all types of
information. Areas of special concern included:
(a) improving the circulation of, and access to,
oral, printed, filmed and broadcast informa¬
tion and extending the exchange of informa¬
tion;
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(b) encouraging cooperation in these fields of
information on a basis of short or long term
agreements;
(c) improving conditions under which journalists
from one participating State exercise their
profession in another participating State
(paragraph 47)
While these provisions go much further in pledging a freer
flow of all types of information than the other three
subsections of Basket III, an important distinction of
special benefit to the Soviet delegation remained: ulti¬
mately, implementation of these provisions would be left to
the individual government. If interpreted in the broadest
sense, paragraph 47 committed the participating states to
modify their internal practices to allow for a wider
distribution of information. But, as stated by Polish
Ambassador Willmann, the East European governments would
resist any attempts to modify the internal laws or customs of
their political systems. Also, interstate, as opposed to
intrastate expansion in the category of information, was
pledged in a much weaker fashion by use of the term
"encouragement."48
Similarly, Ferraris' earlier sentiment that the
information subsection was "the richest in innovative
terminology," gave way to a more sombre assessment in which
he stated that the subsection:
might seem to offer the best of conditions for
the sparking off of a wider circulation of
news between the countries of Eastern and
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Western Europe [but] the stubborn fashion in
which the Eastern European delegations had
outlawed an Italian amendment on the introduc¬
tion of the spreading of ideas to be placed
near that of information, invites the belief
that the East intended administering the task
of facilitating a freer and wider diffusion of
every kind of information with a cautious and
restrictive spirit.49
As has already been discussed in this chapter, the Soviet
leaders were very insistent that certain kinds of information
would be restricted (i.e. propaganda, slander). While
Ferraris states the obvious, that the Soviet and East
European delegations would not allow a freer distribution of
every kind of information, he does not confront the central
question of whether or not this authority was well within the
providence of the sovereign governments. The Helsinki
Recommendations did encourage a broader dissemination of
information, but implementation was left to the participating
nations who could, quite legally, restrict the flow of
information considered harmful, regardless of the reason.
This legal right to restrict information remained in the
Final Act, vhich left only the possibility of political and
economic measures for "punishment" which will be discussed in
Chapter Five.
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Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture
The subsection on culture, as well as that on education,
is much longer than those concerning human contacts and
information, and would remain equally disproportionate in the
Final Act. Of the issues in Basket III, cultural exchanges
was one of the least controversial, at least in that it
involved far fewer issues of ideological principle that the
delegations from Eastern Europe would have regarded as
offensive. This was a subject that the Soviet leaders had
considered appropriate for the CSCE. After all, the Soviet
Union and United States had been adhering to an agreement on
cultural exchange since 1958. This agreement was renewed and
expanded in April 1972 and promoted exchanges of university
lecturers, performing artists, and cultural exhibitions. It
also pledged to encourage the study of foreign languages.50
While the Helsinki Consultations were in progress, Romania
signed a new cultural exchange agreement with the United
States.51 These precedents indicated that the Soviet delega¬
tion would not resist a subsection on cultural matters in the
Helsinki Final Act.
As stated in the Final Recommendations, the Sub¬
committee on Cultural Exchanges was "to consider" proposals
to extend and improve cooperation. This extremely weak
commitment, as opposed to such terminology as to "facil-
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itate," "formulate," or "prepare," was followed by a list of
objectives:
(a) Extension of relations among competent
government agencies and non-governmental bodies
dealing with matters of culture;
(b) Promotion of fuller mutual knowledge of and
access to achievements in literature, art and
other fields of cultural activity;
(c) Improvement of facilities for contacts and
exchanges in the above-mentioned spheres;
(d) Extension of contacts and cooperation among
creative artists and people engaged in cultural
activities...cooperation and exchange of films
and of radio and television programmes.
(paragraph 49)
Reiteration of the important role of the individual in this
sphere was relegated to point (d), following the assertion of
the role of governmental and non-governmental organizations
in promoting cultural exchange. If one adopts the position
that the location of certain provisions within the Final
Recommendations was significant, then the reiteration of more
control by the government before the assertion of the role of
the individual favoured the Soviet position. The order in
which points were made indicated priorities even though this
was not intended by most delegations. It was apparent during
the Consultations that the Soviet delegation was very
cognizant of the interrelationship among the provisions and
their specific location within the text.52 Even though the
Soviet leaders were more forthcoming on cultural exchanges,
they did not want broader contacts outside of state organiza¬
tion because they believed that the Western nations would use
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these opportunities to spread ethnocentrism, anti-communist
sentiment and that they would attempt ideological subversion
against the Soviet Union.53
The entire realm of cultural exchange was patterned on
the results of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural
Policies in Europe, organized through UNESCO and held in
Helsinki in June 1972. One of the most striking character¬
istics of the document from this earlier conference is that
it explicitly ties cultural cooperation to the independence
and sovereignty of States and does not sanction any exchanges
that could ultimately interfere in the internal affairs of
the signatory nations.54 Furthermore, it stated that only
the expansion of "authentic" cultural values should be con¬
templated, but "authentic" was never defined formally.
These were precisely the principles that the Soviet delega¬
tion wanted in the Basket III preamble, but the West European
delegations had blocked this effort. Instead, these same
principles were incorporated into the work of the Third
Committee through the discussions and drafts in the sub¬
committees . The final formulation of the subsection on
cultural exchange in the Final Act would still retain a
reference to the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural
Policies in Europe.
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Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Education
The subsection on education was less controversial than
the other aspects of Basket III as it reflected a gradual
convergence of views between East and West in earlier
multilateral and bilateral agreements on this issue.
Nonetheless, the phraseology and order of the provisions,
which resembled those of the cultural exchange subsection,
favoured the East European interpretation. The main points
were as follows:
(a) Ejqpansion of links between State institutions
and non-governmental bodies whose activities
are concerned with questions of education and
science.
(b) Improved access, under mutually acceptable
conditions, for students, teachers, and
scholars from the participating States to each
other's educational, cultural and scientific
institutions, and a more exact assessment of
the problems of comparison and equivalence
between academic degrees and diplomas.
(c) Encouragement of the study of the languages
and civilizations of other peoples for the
purpose of promoting wider acquaintance with
the culture of each country.
(d) Exchange of experience in teaching methods in
various fields including those used in adult
educations and exchanges in the field of
teaching materials.
(paragraph 51)
Here it should be noted that institutional exchange received
priority in listing over individual exchange and that
expansion of educational exchanges as in all of the subjects
dealt with in Basket III, would necessitate much state
intervention for organizational reasons. Moreover, imple-
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mentation of the provisions, such as encouraging the study of
languages and civilizations would require implementation by
the governments concerned.
The ambiguous terminology represented in the phrase
"improved access, under mutually acceptable conditions," most
favoured the Warsaw Pact nations which, it appeared from
negotiating positions, considered unrestrained educational
exchange as a prelude to ideological subversion or "phycho-
logical warfare" as Soviet spokespersons would call it
following the CSCE.55 West European delegations did not
register similar complaints and had little use for the phrase
"mutually acceptable conditions," at least in order to
restrict this activity. Given the role played by Marxist-
Leninist ideology in the Soviet Union, the mutually accept¬
able conditions of educational exchange were liable to be
very limited indeed.
In conclusion, the humanitarian provisions of the Final
Recommendations were a success for the West in that the
Warsaw Pact delegations were forced to accept a much broader
agenda than originally envisioned. But the overwhelming
weakness of these provisions, which was advantageous to the
East European delegations, was the preponderance of govern¬
mental involvement in this category, combined with provisions
that were so ambiguous in their terminology as to allow the
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Soviet leaders, in particular, to maintain their own state-
centred interpretations in Geneva during Stage II.
THE OFFICIAL STAGE I IN HELSINKI
The first formal stage of the Helsinki process from 3-7
July 1973, served two purposes. Firstly, the foreign
ministers of the 35 nations represented met to approve the
rules of procedure set out in the Final Recommendations.
Secondly, Stage I offered an early opportunity for each
foreign minister to present the views of his government on
the proper course of the negotiations.
Analysis of the speeches presented by the foreign
ministers in the open and very publicized meetings in
Helsinki contributes to our understanding of the transition
to the difficult negotiations in Stage II in Geneva. The
objective here is to discuss the relevant speeches and
proposals issued by the respective foreign ministers of East
and West European delegations. A brief examination of the
documents from this stage illustrates that the Final
Recommendations did not bridge the differences between East
and West on the purposes of the Conference. This was
especially true in the case of human rights, as it was made
increasingly clear that confirmation of the territorial
status quo also solidified the ideological status quo to the
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Soviet leadership. The Helsinki Consultations had alerted
the East European representatives to the interest of their
West European counterparts in expanding the agenda on
humanitarian issues. The speeches from the East European
foreign ministers reflected this concern.
The East European Delegations
The speeches presented by the Warsaw Pact delegations in
Helsinki during the first week of July, illustrated a clear
division between Eastern and Western Europe on the purpose of
the CSCE. Under different circumstances, Stage I would have
been entirely ceremonial, but because of the secrecy
surrounding the preparatory discussions, the speeches
provided the first documented example of how the Warsaw Pact
delegations were negotiating in the CSCE. The differences in
the speeches between the East and the West resulted, for the
most part, from antithetical perceptions of detente. The
CSCE was an outgrowth of the improving relations in Europe
and, as was realized early on, the multilateral Helsinki
process offered a unique opportunity to define the future
course of detente in Europe.
IXie to an unusual series of events, Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gramyko spoke first at the open session on
July 2.56 In a speech of over one hour in length, he stated:
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As no one else, Europeans learned from bitter
experience that wars started when one State
raised territorial claims against another.
That should be ruled out for the future.
There should be no ambiguity left in this
matter. Territorial integrity is naturally
considered by each State as its primary
prerogative. In order to learn to live
permanently in peace with each other, it is
necessary to proceed from the unconditional
recognition of the principle of the
inviolability of frontiers.57
Having outlined the central role of territorial recognition
in the relaxation of tension in Europe, Gromyko proceeded to
specify what detente, or peaceful coexistence excluded:
It is obvious that cultural cooperation,
development of contacts and exchange of
information should be effected with full
observance of the principles designed to
govern relations between States participating
in this Conference. Above all, this concerns
the question of respect for the principles of
sovereignty and nonintervention. A departure
from this would be rightly considered an
attempt to intervene in the affairs of others.
We should avoid this; we should also abolish
the psychological consequences of the 'cold
war'; and this means strict observance of the
laws, customs and traditions of each other.58
The Soviet argument, as had been presented since the
preparatory discussions, was that the Basket III provisions,
at least as they were formulated by the West European
delegations, did not take into account the sovereignty and
the laws and customs of the East European delegations.
Mich of Gromyko's opening speech was intended to
illustrate that the requirements for improving detente had
already been satisfied through bilateral agreements. Hence,
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the CSCE was simply to confirm these agreements in a
multilateral forum thereby creating a multilateral super¬
structure resting on an already formalized bilateral
foundation. Central to this assertion were the Basic
Principles of Relations Between the Soviet Union and the
United States and the Soviet Union's treaties with France and
the FRG.59
In fact, Gramyko immediately seized the initiative in
outlining the proper formulation of the principles in Basket
I by submitting a proposal on the foundations of European
security and the principles to guide relations among the
states of Europe.60 This document would became the basis for
negotiation on Basket I during Stage II in Geneva.
An outward display of unity by the Warsaw Pact nations
on the priorities of the Conference was projected in speeches
presented by the foreign ministers of Poland, the GDR,
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Hungary and Romania followed
the Soviet line on the need to limit Basket III issues to
those which would improve the international climate as
defined by the respective governments.61 It should be noted
though, that various disagreements may have occurred among
the East European leaders in private, regardless of the
content of the speeches.
Predictably, what emerged from the speeches of the
Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Stage I was little more than
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a confirmation of those views expressed in the preparatory
discussions, but the differences were finally stated in the
forum of the CSCE in a public session. Even though the
representatives at Stage I adopted unanimously the procedures
and organizational structure of the Final Recommendations,
basic differences remained over the measures required to
enhance detente. The negotiations in Geneva during Stage II
would result in numerous stalemates due to this problem.
The West European Delegations
Following the long speech by Gromyko, and speaking as
the representative of the European Economic Community
(despite the fact that bloc negotiation was officially ruled
out), the Danish Foreign Minister, K.B. Anderson, presented
the first West European view of the Conference. He accen¬
tuated the need "to create a new dynamism for further
developments" especially in the area of respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms which were "a prerequisite
for real improvements in the overall political climate in
Europe." In fact, Denmark had earlier submitted a draft of
Basket III which was followed rather closely in formulating
the provisions outlined in the Final Recommendations.62
Anderson's statements were representative of many West
European delegations in that he accentuated the role of human
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rights in the growth of detente. He emphasized "the human
dimension of international relations" and "the recognition of
knowledge as the source of understanding" and the basis of
detente.63 Foreign Minister Scheel of the FRG was much more
explicit when he stated:
Who does not notice everywhere in Europe today
the urge for more contacts, more information,
more meetings? The people wish to partake at
long last in their daily lives of the fruits
of detente, to feel it with their hands.64
And Canadian Foreign Minister Sharp reiterated that the
division of Europe should be overcame rather than solidified
when he asserted the following:
Detente implies not the removal of differences
in systems and ideologies, but their mutual
acceptance and accommodation in the interests
of greater cooperation, freer movement and
more open communications among people as well
as States. Competition yes, antagonism, no.
Only in this way can the division of Europe be
overcome.65
But the inadequacy of Foreign Minister Sharp's statement was
that, in the competition between the two ideological systems,
the activities that were not advantageous to an East or West
European country would be described as "antagonistic." Those
same actions that were beneficial to one side or the other
would be upheld as appropriate for detente. Foreign Minister
Sir Alec Douglas-Home of the United Kingdom referred to the
agenda on humanitarian cooperation as the most important item
in the CSCE. He then quoted one of his predecessors, Mr.
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Ernest Bevin, who had once been asked to summarize his
foreign policy. Bevin responded:
I have only one. It is to be able to go down
to Victoria Station in London, buy a ticket
and go wherever I like without anybody
demanding to see my passport.66
of the first public exchanges over this issue, V.
countered this statement in Izvestiia when he stated
we do not think that the essence of ensuring
security is to be found only in the ability of
an Englishman to go to Victoria Station in
London...and travel anywhere he wants....After
all, what is at stake is not travel for the
sake of travel...we expect from this con¬
ference weighty decisions on the key questions
of consolidating peace and security in Europe
and providing reliable guarantees against a
repetition of the horrors of war.67
Such ambitious objectives would never be realized in the CSCE
without a major shift in the negotiating positions of the
participating nations and the strong words about humanitarian
concerns of different kinds epitomized the great ideological
and political division that was still a dominant feature of
detente.
The neutral and non-aligned nations, which had played
such an important role in the formulation of the agenda for
Basket III, presented an interpretation of detente synonymous
with the Western conception of the term. The position of the
non-aligned states was represented by Sweden's Foreign





divided families must attract the attention of the par¬
ticipants in order to "strengthen confidence in the sincere
intention of governments to bring about a genuine detente."68
And Wickham offered a warning that applied equally to all the
participants:
If this Conference does not lead to a broader
exchange of information and improved human
contacts its value will be greatly
diminished.69
Likewise, Austrian Foreign Minister Kirchschlager pointed out
that "man has to be the aim and centre of our policy" in
order to strengthen peace and understanding in Europe.70
But most importantly, the consistency that the neutral
and non-aligned nations represented in the humanitarian
category was not a feature of the American negotiating
position. As shown in Chapter II, the Nixon administration's
hesitancy to place the United States in the forefront of the
CSCE was influenced by an improving relationship with the
Soviet Union (a direct channel to solve pressing superpower
problems) and also by a troubled period in trans-Atlantic
relations. Thus, the American approach was two-sided:
support for America's allies in Europe along with a continued
effort to enhance superpower cooperation in the most pressing
categories (including arms control, regional conflicts and
economic trade relations). In his speech during Stage I,
Secretary of State William Rogers stated:
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The United States will continue to work
closely with its allies in the Atlantic
Alliance, which not only contributes to the
security and independence of its members but
is also seeking new ways to improve relations
in Europe. With the nations of eastern Europe
the United States has opened a new era of
improved relations. We are dealing with each
country in eastern Europe separately—deter¬
mining our policy in accordance with the
specific polices and actions of each and
looking forward to a wider and more construc¬
tive association with all the nations in the
area.71
Yet, this strategy, which appeared entirely feasible on
paper, was proven unworkable in the CSCE. The most fre¬
quently overlooked aspect of the early American involvement
in the CSCE is that the United States through the necessity
of supporting its allies, was pulled into an open human
rights controversy with the Soviet Union that Nixon and
Kissinger had attempted to avoid. And domestic pressures,
arising from human rights activists in the American Congress,
forced a more public assault on the Soviet Union's human
rights position in the CSCE.72
Hence, it was possible to notice in Rogers' speech a
strong advocacy of humanitarian provisions. He stated:
A fundamental aspect of our commitment is
outlined in Section III of the Final Recommen¬
dations. I refer, of course, to the lowering
of barriers to the freer flow of people,
information and ideas among the participating
States. This aspect of our work stems from
the importance we attach to human rights and
fundamental freedoms. There are few words
that are so filled with meaning, so venerated
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by people everywhere, as the words 'human
rights and fundamental freedoms.'73
Rogers specifically mentioned the reunification of divided
families, the sharing of professional and intellectual
experiences and a facilitation of travel and access to
information.74 This was the first major signal that the
American delegation in the CSCE would begin to play a much
more active role in the humanitarian provisions. Prior to
this it was stated American policy (demonstrated in Nixon's
address to the Soviet people) to avoid public criticism of
the Soviet Union over issues of human rights.
In conclusion, the West European delegations at Stage I
of the CSCE put forward an interpretation of detente that
placed much emphasis on the central role of human rights.
While this sentiment had earlier been limited to the small
NATO nations, and the neutral and non-aligned ones, the
United States emerged from stage I as a greater public
supporter of Basket III issues. Without a consensus between
East and West on how the future negotiations of the CSCE
should proceed, or how to strengthen detente in general, the
negotiations in Geneva during Stage II were sure to be both
protracted and problematic.
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STAGE II: THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA
As displayed in the sections above, the debate over the
role of human rights in the CSCE was well developed by the
time the delegations moved to Geneva for the official
negotiating phase. Earlier studies of the CSCE have failed
to reveal that these earlier debates were substantial and
that scrutiny of them illustrates the continuity of the
controversy.75 These amissions render a thorough study of
the CSCE difficult and hinder the analysis of the Soviet-
American conflict over human rights of the later half of the
1970s.
For the purpose of examining the debates of Stage II,
this section is divided into five sections: firstly, a brief
discussion of why the Soviet leadership forged ahead with the
CSCE even after it had became much broader than they had
desired; secondly, analysis of the period from January to
July 1974, which involved the debate over the Basket III
preamble; thirdly, a study of the phase of negotiations from
September 1974 to March 1975 and progress in the Human
Contacts subsection and the "family package"; fourthly,
examination of the negotiation from March to May 1975, by
which time the American delegation was playing a much more
influential role as agreements were reached on the formula¬
tion of Principle Seven and on the spread of information; and
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finally, a few comments on the last minute concessions in
June of 1975 and the completion of Stage II.
While an in-depth analysis of every aspect of human
rights in the CSCE is beyond the scope of this study, the
issues that are dealt with below are sufficient to outline
the incompatibility of Eastern and Western perceptions of
human rights. Clearly, the CSCE did not in the slightest
bridge these differences. In actuality, the CSCE left the
incongruities intact through the generalities of, and the
relationships between, the words put together in the Final
Act. This was the great failing of Final Act and limited its
value as a human rights document.
The Soviet Leadership Presses Ahead
Before discussing the prolonged negotiation in Stage II,
it will be beneficial to explore the Soviet reasoning for
pressing ahead with the negotiations. This thesis challenges
the argument that the Soviet leaders had no option except to
continue, even in the face of an agenda that was expanding
into politically sensitive issues such as human rights.76
More importantly, was it necessary for the Soviet
leaders to convene a security conference in order to confirm
the territorial status quo in Europe at all? In fact, had
detente progressed by the summer of 1973, to the point where
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confirmation was implicit, if not an openly recognized fact
of interstate relations in Europe?
Certainly, territorial recognition had been achieved
through bilateral agreements before the CSCE, such as in the
Soviet-West German Treaty (August 1970) and reaffirmed in the
Soviet-French Declaration (October 1970) and in the Polish-
West German Treaty (November 1970),77 And it is difficult to
see how a non-legally binding, multilateral statement (as all
agreed that the Final Act would be a political rather than a
legal document) would add to these bilateral agreements,
except in symbolic terms, unless the Soviet delegation could
tailor the document to their liking (which is virtually
impossible in a multilateral negotiation). This is not to
discount the political significance of the Final Act, or to
reject that the Soviet leadership was seeking a broader
political confirmation of the post-war arrangement of Eastern
Europe. Rather, it is quite likely that the Soviet leader¬
ship was far too optimistic about controlling the agenda and
attaining their own objectives without making any conces¬
sions. Finally, if this optimism was based on the pos¬
sibility of the members of NATO negotiating independently,
as earlier Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee
statements suggested, then the Soviet leadership miscalcu¬
lated seriously as the CSCE became a negotiation of blocs
rather than individual states and actually cemented the
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alliances (in many cases, even the neutral nations functioned
as an "alliance").
Of special relevance for human rights in the CSCE, is
the fact that many of the earlier bilateral agreements, which
initiated more cooperative relations in Europe and which
served Soviet purposes by confirming the permanence of
territorial borders, also included humanitarian provisions.
This must have alerted Soviet strategists to the West's
preoccupation with this issue. The Quadripartite Agreement
on Berlin (September 1971) and the subsequent agreements
implementing the Quadripartite Agreement (December 1971 and
May 1972) facilitated greater family and cultural exchanges,
and may be viewed as a direct precursor to the third section
of the Final Act dealing with "Cooperation in Humanitarian
and Other Fields."78
Curing the CSCE negotiations, the West Germans and the
French were two of the most insistent advocates of the
sections concerned with human rights. As the neutral nations
began to seize upon the humanitarian provisions as their
special area of interest, the Soviet delegates found
themselves on the defensive in the very multilateral forum
for which they had campaigned. This must have aroused much
concern on the Soviet side, because the incorporation of
human rights into the CSCE would not be nearly as easy to
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manage, or downplay, as when similar provisions were included
in bilateral agreements with far less publicity.
Since the complexion of the CSCE had changed drama¬
tically by July 1973, should the Soviet delegation have
pulled out of the CSCE altogether? Vacating the Conference
must have been considered, especially since it would have
been far less damaging politically than has been recog¬
nized.79 Soon after the speeches were over in Helsinki
during the official first stage, the CSCE was not a major
issue in the newspapers or in the media. One seasoned
diplomat has commented, in reference to the beginning of
Stage II, that:
the contingent of journalists present on the
first day dwindled rapidly and within a week
had all but dispersed. Making sense out of
what was happening was not easy.80
Had the Soviet delegation decided to abandon the Conference,
they could have manufactured a reason for leaving that would
have limited the criticism in the press, especially since
most journalists were having difficulty "making sense" out of
events anyway. Also, the ceremonial first stage had given
publicity to all the nations participating in the CSCE such
that the perception that it was "Soviet sponsored" was
fading. It was therefore unlikely that the success or
failure of the Conference would be linked so indelibly to the
Soviet Union. In any case, other international events such
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as the Yam Kippur War in October 1973 and the negotiations
for SALIT II, overshadowed the CSCE.
Nevertheless, rather than pulling out of the Conference,
the Soviet leaders favoured another option-restricting the
agenda. Even after making numerous miscalculations in their
ability to control the agenda, the Soviet delegation, with
the support of its East European allies, could limit the
value of the human rights provisions by interjecting
restrictive clauses within the various provisions. Here the
rule of consensus voting worked to the benefit of the Warsaw
Pact nations, which constituted an alliance of at least five
(the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and
Poland) and sometimes seven (Hungary and Romania, although
they were unreliable in the human rights area).81
Also, it was obvious that the CSCE, with thirty-five
participants, could present little more than a collection of
very general clauses on human rights. This would leave much
roam for the Soviet leaders to apply their own interpreta¬
tion.82 And as stated above, the humanitarian provisions
were to be implemented in the long-term, if they were to be
enacted at all, while recognition of the permanence of
borders in Europe would be instantaneous when the Final Act
was signed.
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January to July 1974: The Basket III Preamble
The negotiations in Stage II began in August 1973 in the
newly constructed International Conference Centre in Geneva.
The first few days of meetings, which involved informal
contacts in the midst of a wave of journalists and television
cameras, did not foretell the future course of the negotia¬
tions.83 Soon, the sheer size of the Conference, and the
complexity of the issues under consideration, would overwhelm
the media and those not directly involved in the secret
negotiations of Stage II.
As if to make sure that the Conference did not proceed
too quickly, many of the Western delegations proposed a
period of "general debate" in which positions could be
clarified and the specific agendas for the committees agreed
before actually getting down to work on the specific
provisions. In retrospect, this period of general debate
wasted much time and simply rehashed the work which had
resulted in the Final Recommendations. But it did serve the
purpose of reinforcing a much broader agenda and a longer
time frame for the Conference—both contrary to Soviet
objectives.84
When the actual drafting of provisions finally began in
January 1974, the immediate controversy in Basket III was
centred on the formulation of a preamble. For NATO and the
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nine members of the European Community, the preamble was not
necessary, but the Warsaw Pact caucus insisted on some sort
of preamble in order to qualify the Basket III provisions.
The debate over the preamble is useful to examine,
because it foretold the negotiating strategies and objectives
of the East and West European delegations in the specific
subcommittees of Basket III and displayed an approach
consistent with what had already been observed in the
preparatory discussions. Bulgaria presented the Warsaw Pact
version of the preamble, which was unacceptable to the
Western delegations because of yet another attempt to create
excessive governmental restrictions on humanitarian coopera¬
tion. The Bulgarians proposed that:
the Committee should proceed from the prin¬
ciples guiding relations among the partici¬
pating States and...it should pay particular
attention to the principles of sovereignty and
non-intervention in internal affairs, and also
to observance of the laws and customs of the
participating States.85
In contrast, proposals from Finland and the Netherlands
provided only a general reference to the principles governing
relations between States.86 But the Soviet Basket III
representative, Yuri IXibinin, was insistent that specific
mention of the principles of non-intervention and respect for
the laws and customs of states were necessary before the
specific Basket III provisions could be discussed.87
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Finally, in February 1974, the West European delegations
accepted that there would be a preamble to Basket III, in
return for East European agreement to begin drafting of the
specific provisions of Basket III. On paper, this was a
dramatic blow to the Basket III provisions, because the
Soviet leaders would repeatedly use the preamble to discount
much of Basket III.
The issue of the preamble continued to dominate the
discussion in Basket III until 26 July 1974 when the neutral
nations offered a package of compromises. The complicated
arrangement involved acceptance of a general reference to all
the principles in Basket I, but in wording that made them
apply, ostensibly, to "new ways and means" in the humani¬
tarian area. Restating an earlier Finnish idea, the neutrals
(Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland) recommended
placing the phrase, "laws and customs" in the Basket I
principles, preferably as a feature of sovereign equality.
Ultimately, the phrase was changed slightly and put in Basket
I, paragraph 24 which reads:
The participating States will respect each
other's sovereign equality and individuality
as well as all the rights inherent in and
encompassed by its equality, to territorial
integrity and to freedom and political
independence. They will also respect each
other's right freely to choose and develop its
political, social, economic and cultural
systems as well as its right to determine its
laws and regulations.
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This is the first principle in Basket I and even though
paragraph 70 states that "all the principles set forth above
are of primary significance...," the location of the first
principle tends to overaccentuate its importance. According
to Soviet statements after the Conference (presented in
Chapter III), this principle was one of the aspects of the
Final Act of primary significance. It included respect for
sovereign equality, territorial integrity and the right of
each nation to determine its laws and regulations. These
three concepts formed the foundation for building security,
from the Soviet perspective, and the neutral nations' plan
for Principle One was acceptable to the Soviet delegates.
But in return, the East European delegations were to
accept a clause on the responsibility of States to implement
the provisions of the CSCE. The clause would be entered
within the principle on the fulfillment of international
obligations (which is where it was finally placed in the
Final Act along with another reference to the right of the
participating states to determine their laws and regulations,
paragraph 68). Anticipating that the Soviet delegation would
incorporate further clauses on state control in the mini-
preambles to each specific human rights section of Basket III
(human contacts, information, cultural and educational
exchange), the whole package was tentative until the mini-
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preambles had been negotiated, along with many of the other
provisions of Basket III.
This procedural compromise did not in any way force
Western views on the Soviet delegation, but it did break the
impasse over the preamble and allowed the discussion over
Basket Ill's provisions to get under way.88 Thus, a portion
of the preamble reads:
Convinced that this cooperation should take
place in full respect for the principles
guiding relations among participating States
as set forth in the relevant document...,89
This general reference to the Declaration on Principles
Guiding Relations between Participating States would be
sufficient for the Soviet leaders to evoke the specific
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs above all
others, even though the Final Act emphasized the equality of
all the principles.
Before examining the discussions on human contacts, it
should be noted that the Soviet leadership campaigned for a
conclusion to Stage II in the autumn of 1974. When this
proved impossible, there were Soviet calls for a conclusion
as soon as possible in 1975. This crusade was carried out in
three fora: in meetings with leaders from East European
nations; during visits with West European representatives;
and in talks with Finnish intermediators which Soviet
strategists hoped would encourage concessions from the other
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neutral and non-aligned nations, especially in issues in
Basket III. Brezhnev had hoped that the CSCE would conclude
in 1972 and, by 1975, he was particularly anxious to complete
the Helsinki Final Act.
In April 1974, the Political Consultative Committee of
the Warsaw Pact issued a statement on the CSCE that was seven
paragraphs in length. While the progress toward conclusion
was noted, this declaration reflected discomfort over the
broadened agenda and chastised the following:
attempts to create artificial obstacles, to
drag out the work of the all-European
conference and to divert it from the solution
of the vital tasks with which it is faced run
counter to the lofty goals in the name of
which this conference was convened.90
This opposition to the growing attention paid to issues of
human rights was reemphasized in later statements from
bilateral meetings between countries in Eastern Europe.91
These sessions allowed the governments of Eastern Europe to
coordinate their policy toward the CSCE and to create a
broader consensus on the need to finish as soon as possible.
The Soviet leaders also decided to meet individually
with representatives from West European governments to solve
controversies evolving in the CSCE.92 While these meetings
were intended primarily to influence a specific government,
there were cases when Soviet representatives were successful
in obtaining pledges from West European leaders that they
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would negotiate with others to break deadlocks in Geneva.
For example, Georges Pompidou stated:
In order to move forward with what has begun,
we intend to promote [a successful conclusion
of the CSCE] by influencing the European
Economic Community and our partners. 3
Even if Pompidou could not influence his West European
partners, these diplomatic consultations allowed for more
extensive discussion of the CSCE in a much narrower forum.
But a third negotiating bloc posed special problems for
the Soviet leadership: the neutral and non-aligned countries.
In an effort to temper the enthusiasm of these nations for
the humanitarian provisions, Soviet representatives met on
numerous occasions with officials from Finland.94 While
there are no indications that the Finns were successful, or
even attempted to modify the views of the neutral and non-
aligned delegates in Basket III, it is clear that the Soviet
leaders encouraged them to try. In fact, Soviet officials
even agreed to discuss a Finnish proposal for a nuclear free
zone, but only after the CSCE was completed and perhaps in
return for Finnish action in Basket III.95
By the autumn of 1974, the Soviet effort to finish the
CSCE was apparent not only in Geneva, but also in numerous
bilateral meetings outside the CSCE. These undertakings,
however, did not solve the differences in the Conference
which continued into 1975.
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September 1974 to March 1975: Human Contacts and the "Family
Package"
The negotiations in Subcommittee I on Human Contacts
were especially significant for two reasons. Firstly, since
the issues in Subcommittee I were a priority for the Western
delegations, the Soviet leadership linked progress in this
category with progress on the principle of the inviolability
of frontiers early on in the Conference. Secondly, even
though an enforcement mechanism for the provisions in this
subcommittee were nonexistent, the documentation still
displays a Soviet effort to limit the commitments of the
participants in this category.
Even though it was not clear at the beginning of Stage
II, the human contacts subcommittee was drafting provisions
which fell into eight sections: the mini-preamble; contacts
and regular meetings on the basis of family ties; reunifica¬
tion of families; marriage between citizens of different
states; travel for personal or professional reasons;
improvement of conditions for tourism; meetings among young
people; and expansion of contacts and exchanges in the field
of sport. The first three of these categories (following the
mini-preamble) made up the so-called "family package."
182
Early proposals on the "family package" provisions were
submitted by Denmark, the ERG, Italy, Norway and Canada.96 In
summary, the Western proposals called for provisions to
allow persons "to enter and to leave a participating State
temporarily in order to visit members of their family"
(Denmark); agreement that the "costs of the application and
travel documents [for reuniting families] should not
represent an unduly heavy burden for the applicant" (ERG);
and understanding that "applications in this field should not
have any adverse effects for the individuals concerned"
(Denmark). The Western argument was that unwilling separa¬
tion of families is "an impediment to the strengthening of
peace and understanding among the peoples of the partici¬
pating States...."97 Again, this reflected a different
perspective on the meaning of detente than that presented by
the East European delegations.
In contrast, the original Bulgarian-Polish proposal was
most striking in that it placed "family package" issues in a
strictly bilateral forum to be dealt with after the CSCE.
Also, any changes in then existing policies in this regard
were "subject to mutually agreed conditions" which meant, in
effect, that the East European governments could still limit
contacts between families if they so desired. By retreating
to the position that most of Basket III would have to be
discussed in bilateral talks, the Soviet and East European
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delegations assured themselves that they could better control
the negotiation and implementation of such matters as the
reunification of families. It would force a country-by-
country approach rather than a pledge to alter general
policy. The major positive aspect for the West European
nations was that eventually such matters would have to be
organized in bilateral discussions anyway, but ideally,
these later specific arrangements would be the result of a
general change in policy articulated in the CSCE.
The initial breakthrough in the family package came in
March 1974 caused by a controversy in Basket I over the
principle of the inviolability of frontiers. The delegation
from the ERG had insisted that a clause protecting peaceful
changes (such as the possibility of future German reunifica¬
tion) appear within the inviolability of frontiers prin¬
ciple.98 Conversely, the Soviet delegation refused to accept
a reference to the right of peaceful changes of borders,
arguing that the FRG-Soviet treaty did not contain such a
clause, hence, the Final Act should not either.99
Because of the very high priority attributed to the
principle of the inviolability of frontiers by the Soviet
leadership, a move was made to settle the impasse during the
week of 16 March. The Soviet delegation agreed to early
registration of part of the family package—"Contacts and
Regular Meetings on the Basis of Family Ties," but difficul-
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ties remained because the FRG and other Western delegations
expected more in return for the Soviet leaders' top
priority.100 Again the Soviet delegation agreed to accept a
Basket III text, this time on the dissemination of printed
information. After hints that further compromises over
Basket III were forthcoming after registration of the
principle of the inviolability of frontiers, the Western
delegations agreed to a Spanish compromise which proposed
that the phrase "peaceful change" appear somewhere within the
principles, but not within the inviolability principle
itself. On 5 April, the inviolability of frontiers principle
was provisionally registered after acceptance with reserva¬
tion from the FRG.
The final draft of the first of three sections of the
family package appeared virtually identical to the version of
16 March (Final Act paragraphs 430-433). Yet its wording is
weak as it states that the participating states will
"favourably consider" application from citizens who wish to
leave or enter their country in order to visit family
members. Furthermore, documentation for such travel will be
satisfied within "reasonable" time limits and fees will be
"acceptable." Many of these phrases were imprecise and
extremely open ended which must have assisted the early
agreement in this area.
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This left two other sections of the family package
unresolved—Reunification of Families and Marriage Between
Citizens of Different States. The first was registered on 3
December 1974, after eight months of negotiation.101 Once
again, the provisions, while more extensive than earlier
Soviet and East European formulations, were general and non-
cammital by calling for reunification "as expeditiously as
possible."102 The Western delegations did, nevertheless,
achieve wording that applied directly to Soviet and East
European practices in this area. For example, application
fees would be charged only when applications were accepted
and reunification granted, which it was hoped would modify a
common Soviet practice of charging application fees even in
cases where reunification was denied.103
The final section of the family package was intended to
facilitate marriages between citizens of different states.
It was finally registered in late December of 1974.104 The
text asserts that this aspect of human contacts will be
carried out "in accordance with the provisions accepted for
family reunification" which causes the same problems of
generality. Moreover, these matters still depended entirely
on the individual governments concerned, making marriages
dependent on the goodwill of the participating states
(although this is not to deny that marriages that are paid
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for in order to acquire citizenship in a particular country-
should be subject to strict governmental scrutiny).
The rest of the text on Human Contacts was for the
benefit of tourism, professional exchanges, meetings among
young people and the growth of sport competitions. But even
in these areas, the delegations from Eastern Europe strove to
moderate contacts until detente had developed to the
"appropriate level" and also to limit contacts to those that
benefited detente.105 In March 1973 in an official statement
on the expansion of cultural cooperation, contacts among
organizations and peoples, and the dissemination of informa¬
tion, Soviet representatives argued that a broadening in
these areas should:
serve the mutual spiritual enrichment of the
peoples, the growth of trust among them and
the strengthening of the ideas of peace and
good-neighborliness.106
From the Soviet perspective, detente had been initiated by
the Soviet Union.107 Hence, the Soviet leaders surmised that
they were the best judges of what activities would help to
continue or improve upon detente. Other individual govern¬
ments were also to decide if they approved of specific
measures, but in the end an agreement would have to be
mutually acceptable to governments of antithetical political
systems. The prospects for an upsurge in human contacts
were, therefore, very slim.
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March to May 1975: The US Position Hardens as Principle Seven
and Basket Ill's Information Subsection are Completed
Before discussing the negotiations leading to the
formulation of Principle Seven of Basket I and the informa¬
tion subsection to Basket III, it will be useful to present
the American negotiating position as it began to evolve late
in 1973 through to the resignation of President Nixon and the
succession of Vice-President Ford. As articulated in the
speeches of Secretary of State Rogers during Stage I, the
American role early on in the CSCE was not to lead the
Western delegations as much as to support their negotiating
positions. But the American position became much more firm
due, in large part, to three events.
The first event influencing the American negotiating
position was war in the Middle East in October 1973. Syria
and Egypt attacked Israeli positions on the Golan Heights and
Suez Canal on 6 October. In the ensuing days, the Soviet
leadership, concerned about an ongoing Israeli counter-
offensive, proposed a joint Soviet-American intervention.
The Nixon administration rejected the plea and put US forces
on worldwide alert on 24-25 October, as both sides appeared
to contemplate unilateral intervention. The impending crisis
unravelled quickly as Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy eventual-
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ly led to a peace conference in December and a Middle East
settlement in May 1974. But the October War revealed the
following problems: detente had not solved the difficult
problem of regional conflicts of interest; America'a allies
still did not whole-heartedly agree with the definition of
these regional interests (the NATO allies did not support a
US airlift to Israel, and also feared superpower condomin¬
ium) ; and most important of all, domestic suspicion in the
USA of the Soviet Union was aroused and the success of the
Summit process was called into question. One author has
summarized this dilemma as follows:
The very idea of cooperative US arrangements
with the Soviet Union to moderate rivalry and
avoid dangerous crises triggers suspicions in
other countries of the formation of a
superpower condominium at their expense and
arouses fears of old-fashioned spheres of
influence...[and] There is the ever-present
likelihood that someone in the executive
branch, in Congress, or among vocal interest
groups will be quick to charge that the
administration is insufficiently attentive to
the need to protect American interests
abroad.108
Thus, the October War aroused domestic forces into pressuring
the Nixon administration to take a harder line in dealing
with the Soviet leaders.
The second major influence on the American human rights
position in the CSCE was the domestic quarrel over the 1972
Trade Agreement between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Congressional leaders isolated only one aspect of the
189
human rights issue—Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union—
which would have to increase alongside an escalation in trade
if the US Senate were to ratify the agreement. This meant
that Kissinger, unwillingly, had to press this issue on the
Soviet leaders. In a speech delivered on 8 October 1973 at
the Pacem in Terris Conference, Kissinger had already
realized the complexity of this problem:
Until recently the goals of detente were not
an issue. The necessity of shifting from
confrontation toward negotiation seemed so
overwhelming that goals beyond the settlement
of international disputes were never raised.
But now progress has been made—and already
taken for granted. We are engaged in intense
debate on whether we should make changes in
Soviet society a precondition for further
progress, or indeed for following through on
commitments already made....This is a genuine
moral dilemma.109
The Nixon administration never solved this dilemma. The
Soviet leaders rejected any attempt to link improvement in
trade with emigration practices and the Trade Act of 1972
dissipated, but did not have a direct detrimental effect on
the CSCE.
But the American human rights stance in the CSCE was
boosted by yet another moral dilemma—Watergate. By 7 August
1974, the impeachment proceedings against President Nixon had
gathered too much momentum for him to remain in office. On 8
August, he resigned. In the months immediately preceding his
resignation, the administration was much more active in the
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CSCE on the human rights front. It is plausible that a
stronger stance on human rights was intended to boost the
image of an administration whose ethics were under fire from
the US Senate and the American media. The administration was
also beginning to realize that a Final Act without human
rights provisions would lead to further criticism that the
administration was being too weak in dealing with the Soviet
leadership. Furthermore, as Vice-President Ford succeeded the
former president, he was determined to display a continuity
in American foreign policy. By keeping Henry Kissinger as
Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, and by
maintaining an assertive role for the American delegation in
the CSCE (which would satisfy the allies of the United
States), he had taken positive steps in this direction.
With this short overview of events that influenced the
American negotiating team in Geneva, it is necessary to turn
to two more aspects of the negotiations over human rights in
the CSCE: Principle Seven and Basket Ill's information
subsection. As regards Principle Seven, visible American
involvement was minimal, precisely because the United States
played a lesser role in the early stages of the CSCE. But
many of the issues of Basket III were resolved late in the
CSCE when the American delegation was active for the reasons
mentioned above.
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In retrospect, the most significant human rights
negotiation was actually taking place in Basket I, rather
than in Basket III. This fact, which is frequently over¬
looked by Western commentators, was obvious to the Soviet
delegation. As far as the Soviet representative were
concerned, Basket I was the single most important section of
the CSCE—a point that was proven when the Soviet representa¬
tives campaigned, yet again, for a Basket I signed at the
highest level with the other baskets approved by lower level
representatives.110
Hence, the determination of the Western delegations to
include an extensive human rights principle posed one of the
most difficult problems of the CSCE for the Soviet delega¬
tion. The Western model for the human rights principle, or
Principle Seven, was submitted by the United Kingdom in a
draft which was specific about the need to reaffirm existing
United Nations1 obligations, especially those provisions
outlined by Article 55 of the Charter.111 According to the
delegation of the United Kingdom, respect for the observance
of human rights, as specified in the already existing
obligations of the UN was "clearly central to the purpose of
the CSCE."112 The specific rights and freedoms mentioned
included freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,
but reference to the UN meant inclusion of all the United
Nation's provisions in this regard.
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In contrast, the Soviet proposal for Principle Seven was
short and far less committal. It stated that the partici¬
pating states would agree to have:
respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, in accordance with which the
participating States will respect human rights
and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of
religious belief.113
The United Kingdom's proposal was modified only slightly and
was resubmitted nine months later, which displayed the
intransigence of the Western nations in compromising on
Principle Seven.
After fifty-six negotiating sessions, the West created a
human rights principle that was, in Maresca's words, "a
solidly worded Western achievement.1,114 The major break¬
through came on 20 November 1974 when the East European
delegations agreed provisionally to register Principle
Seven. This text was appealing to the Western delegations
because it went a step further than calling for mere respect
for human rights and expressed encouragement in the actual
exercise of them.115 The Soviet delegation reluctantly
accepted a phrase in the draft sponsored by the Holy See
which called for freedom of thought and conscience
individually, or in community with others. To the Soviet
leaders, this was tantamount to accepting, in principle,
political pluralism because the West European representatives
also had in mind the ability of second and third political
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parties to compete freely in East European nations. Even so,
the Soviet delegation compromised in order to get the
Conference moving in the hope of achieving a signing of the
Accords early in 1975.116 But the Soviet representatives
still had to make concessions, at least cosmetically, in
Basket Ill's information section.
The Basket III negotiations over the dissemination of
information, which were carried out in Subcommittee 9, are
mentioned here for two reasons: firstly, to emphasize the
extent of Western ambitions in this category; and secondly,
because the United States delegation was very insistent on
this issue. Unfortunately, the result in Subcommittee 9 was
a text with great ambitions, but with no enforcement or
implementation mechanism.
Two very ambitious proposals on the dissemination of
information fell by the wayside early on in the negotiations.
Both proposals were submitted by the United Kingdom. The
first, labelled "Linked television discussion programmes on
foreign affairs," did not gain acceptance from the other
Western delegations and, as expected, was rejected by the
East European delegations.117 The second proposal, entitled
"New International Magazine," was also rejected by the
Western nations because of fears that it would simply became
a Soviet propaganda tool.118 Other Western proposals were
ultimately included in the final text, such as the wider
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dissemination of newspapers, periodicals, films, information
broadcast by radio (the American delegation was most active
on this issue), as well as improvement in the working
conditions of journalists. Again, the value of these
provisions could not be determined until after the CSCE
because enactment was left to the individual states.
As was expected, based on the experiences of the
preparatory discussions, the East European delegations
resisted Western attempts to widen the flow of information.
The breakthrough in the information section was initiated by
a NATO effort to draft a final text even though there was
much disagreement.
The proposals, labelled the "Global Initiative," were a
patchwork of provisions including those that were already
agreed on and those that were still under dispute in the
Information and Human Contacts subsections. On 15 May 1975,
the initiative was presented to the Soviet Union and, if it
was accepted, the prospects for an imminent summit conclusion
would be enhanced. When Kissinger and Gromyko met in Vienna
later in May, Kissinger pressed the Soviet Foreign Minister
to accept the "Global Initiative" and displayed a much
stronger stance on human rights than the Soviet leaders had
previously witnessed from the American Secretary of State.119
Kissinger's assertiveness led to a Soviet response to the
initiative which resolved most of the remaining issues and
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after numerous informal meetings in June the Finns made plans
for Stage III to be held at the end of July.
STAGE III: THE CEREMONIAL SIGNING
The heads of state of the thirty-five participating
nations gathered in the Finlandia Hall in Helsinki on 1
August 1975 to sign the Final Act. After nearly three years
of intense negotiation, the results of the CSCE were
finalized in only three days. The leaders of each nation
presented speeches on the significance of the Conference and
on their interpretation of what the final document contained.
Quite predictably, the speeches in Helsinki reiterated
the positions presented in 1973 in Stage I. The Soviet
General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev reaffirmed the stance of
the Warsaw Pact that the territorial status quo was con¬
firmed:
The Soviet Union regards the results of the
Conference not merely as a necessary summing
up of the political outcome of the Second
World War. This, at the same time, is an
insight into the future in terms of the
realities of today and of the age-old
experience of European nations.-1-20
In a different spirit, in a section of his presentation aimed
at the Warsaw Pact nations, American President Gerald R.
Ford stated:
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We will spare no effort to ease tensions and
solve problems between us. But it is im¬
portant that you recognize the deep devotion
of the American people and their Government to
human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus
to the pledges that this Conference has made
regarding the freer movement of people, ideas
and information.121
These two speeches confirmed that the Helsinki Final Act had
not defined the meaning of detente and had not provided a
blueprint for future conduct to build upon the improved
relations in Europe. This would became apparent in the
period following the completion of the CSCE as the Soviet
Union and the United States began to interpret and apply the
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THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
Voting on the wording of the final document of the
CSCE was by consensus, even though the thirty-five nations
often had conflicting interests. Hence, it was remarkable
that the Final Act was completed at all. Moreover,
participants and observers of the CSCE contended that the
Conference would go much further than a stagnant reaffir¬
mation of the political situation in Europe.1 Rather, it
was hoped that the CSCE had created a long-term "Helsinki
process" that would succeed in defining the activities
appropriate for detente, as well as in establishing an
ongoing system to enhance security and cooperation in
Europe.
In reality, the Final Act, the centerpiece of the
CSCE, has failed to fulfill these expectations. The
single greatest cause of the breakdown of the Helsinki
process has been the total absence of any agreement
between the East and West European delegations over the
meaning of the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act.
As presented in Chapter II, the representatives from
Eastern and Western Europe possessed antithetical
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viewpoints on the substance and exercise of human rights.
These differences were revealed early on in the Helsinki
Consultations and continued unabated throughout the CSCE.
The period following the signing of the Final Act through
the first two CSCE follow-up meetings (in Belgrade in 1977
and Madrid in 1979-83) has displayed the futility of
either side attempting to convince the other of the
accuracy of its interpretation of the humanitarian
provisions of the Final Act. The most recent follow-up
meeting of the CSCE (in Vienna in 1986-7) revealed that
the Gorbachev leadership is equally inflexible in its
formal definition of human rights in the Final Act while,
at the same time, Gorbachev has used the Western preoc¬
cupation with alleged human rights violations in the
Soviet Union to attain specific political objectives such
as the release of prominent Soviet spies captured in the
West. Chapter Six will present aspects of the most
current Soviet position on human rights, especially as
they relate to the Helsinki process.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Soviet
interpretation of the humanitarian provisions of the Final
Act in the period immediately following the CSCE. This
task would be much more difficult had the Soviet position
not reiterated earlier Soviet views on human rights. In
the period leading up the ascension of Gorbachev (March
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1985), it is possible to ascertain four general objectives
in the Soviet definition of the humanitarian provisions:
to maintain the State as the primary source of rights and
the Party as the sole body to distribute, monitor and
revoke those rights; to preserve Soviet society as a
"collective of the working people"2 and to prevent
individuals from disrupting the social unity of mature
socialism by disagreeing with the goals and methods of the
Party and State organs; to defend the Soviet Union from
counter-ideological subversion by capitalist states in the
name of human rights; and finally, to convince other
nations that the rights enjoyed by Soviet citizens are far
superior to rights in capitalist countries and that most
rights, primarily in the social and economic category, are
guaranteed in the Soviet Union, but impossible to
implement in the capitalist countries.
Since the Final Act is not a treaty, it is also
necessary to examine its legal status from the Soviet
perspective, especially with reference to the humanitarian
provisions. The legal force of the Final Act, or the lack
thereof, is central to this study because it is essential
to determine if the Soviet leaders felt and still feel
legally bound even by their own interpretation of the
document, let alone by that of the West European coun¬
tries. If the Soviet leaders do not recognize a legal
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responsibility to abide by the principles of the Final
Act, then the extent of their political and moral
obligations must be addressed. In order to consider the
Soviet record in adhering to the human rights proclama¬
tions, a section of this chapter will present an overview
of recent Soviet legal and theoretical commentary on the
subject of human rights. It is well beyond the parameters
of this study to delve into the early theoretical writings
that discuss human rights such as the works of Marx and
Lenin. The focus here is on contemporary Soviet writers
since they helped to fuel the present controversy over
human rights in the Final Act.
LEGAL STAIUS OF THE HEISINKI FINAL ACT
Soviet spokespersons have offered mixed views on the
legal status of the Final Act, but there has been
virtually unanimous agreement that some sections of the
document are more significant than others. The distinc¬
tion between the legal and non-legal provisions allegedly
stems from the fact that some portions of the Final Act
were already pre-existing legal codes of conduct, while
other sections were simply important for promoting
security and cooperation. In making this discernment,
Soviet authors ultimately divide the Final Act into
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sections which are legally binding and sections which are
purely recommendatory. Since the primary Soviet objective
has been to confirm the territorial status quo in Europe,
the principles which advance that end are binding from the
Soviet perspective. Since the humanitarian provisions
were not designed to confirm the post-war geographic
arrangement of Europe, Soviet representatives often
consider them moral and political obligations which are,
from their perspective, a very minor part of the Helsinki
process.
The first significant Soviet interpretation of the
content of the Final Act, especially for the human rights
category, was issued during a meeting on the results of
the CSCE attended by members of the Politburo of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the
USSR Council of Ministers. According to this statement,
the Final Act includes principles for relations between
states which "already have the force of law" and were
outlined in earlier bilateral and multilateral agreements;
the document "summed up the necessary political outcome of
World War II . . ., and consolidated the principles
necessary for peaceful coexistence between states.3" This
interpretation was applied consistently to the Final Act
through the first two follow-up meetings.4
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There are ten principles of relations among states:
sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent in
sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force;
inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of
States; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention
in internal affairs; respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought,
conscience, religion or belief; equal rights and self-
determination of peoples'; cooperation among States; and
fulfillment in good faith of obligations under interna¬
tional law. According to the Soviet position, all of
these principles predate the Final Act as legally binding
codes of conduct, especially through the United Nations
Charter and its accompanying agreements.5 Furthermore, a
triad of the principles (respect for the rights inherent
in sovereignty, inviolability of frontiers, territorial
integrity of States) are vital, at least in Soviet eyes,
for confirming the status quo in Europe.6
By emphasizing the legal nature of the principles,
the Soviet leadership achieved yet another objective—to
solidify a very narrow definition of peaceful coexistence.
The doctrine of peaceful coexistence discounts the use of
military force and encourages economic, technological and
agricultural exchange on a broader scale, but does not
typically include discussion of the rights of citizens in
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various countries, or governmental violations of such
rights.7 As was revealed early on in the CSCE, the
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, having
legal force, could be used to discount all of Basket
Ill's humanitarian provisions since, in the Soviet view,
this section of the Final Act is not legally binding. To
consolidate the legitimacy of this tactic, the Soviet
delegation at the CSCE was able to incorporate the
following statement into the preamble of Basket III:
this cooperation should take place in full
respect for the principles guiding relations
among participating States as set forth in the
relevant document.
Because of this restrictive clause, all of Basket III
could be tempered by the sweeping principle of non¬
intervention. The principles could also be used to argue
that any activity which did not contribute directly to
peace, as the Soviet leadership interpreted peaceful
relations, would violate the legally binding section of
the Final Act.8
Yet, there are serious problems with this approach to
the legal status of the Final Act and some of these
difficulties have been discussed by Soviet scholars
themselves. First, the Final Act was signed as a single
text and should be interpreted as a unified whole. To say
that one section is legally binding while others are not
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would mean that the CSCE culminated in a series of final
acts rather than in a single document. This reasoning is
inadequate because, according to many participants in the
Conference, including the Soviet delegation, individual
sections should be interpreted in relation to the totality
of the Final Act.
Second, the participants of the CSCE stated their
intention to create a final act and not a treaty. The
concluding section on the follow-up procedure states:
The Government of the Republic of Finland is
requested to transmit to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations the text of this Final
Act, which is not eligible for registration
under Article 102 of the Charter of the United
Nations, with a view to its circulation to all
the members of the Organization as an official
document of the United Nations.
Had the participants wanted a legally binding document,
they certainly would have submitted the text to the United
Nations for confirmation as a treaty and then for
ratification in their own legislatures, if necessary. It
is possible that the Soviet leadership was pessimistic
about the likelihood that the US Senate would ratify a
Helsinki Treaty. After all, a Senate debate over
ratification would simply increase the possibility of
peripheral issues spoiling the importance of the document.
Soviet representatives had already had a taste of this
problem in the debates over most-favored nation trading
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status in 1974 and this concern was legitimized further in
1979 when the SALT II Treaty was scrapped in the Senate
after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and rumours of a
previously unknown Soviet brigade stationed in Cuba.
Even so, Soviet authors have demonstrated a remark¬
able degree of disagreement on the actual legal force of
the Final Act. The discussants who have commented on this
issue fall into two basic "camps." The first group,
represented by G.V. Ignateriko and S.A. Malinin, stresses
that the Final Act "offers a specific source of interna¬
tional law.1,9 Malinin's argument is that, while the Final
Act is not a treaty, it has became a part of customary
international law.10 An examination of the predominant
Soviet view of custom in international law, though, does
not support Malinin's contention.11
A second collection of individuals representing a
Soviet interpretation contend that the obligation acquired
through the Final Act was less than a legal one.
Representative of the contentions of this larger group
were the comments of Viktor Soldatov, special correspon¬
dent for Sovetskaia Rossiia in Helsinki. Curing the final
stage of the CSCE he addressed his comments to citizens in
the West who were complaining that the final document was
not significant because it did not have legal force.
Soldatov stated:
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These skeptics should be reminded of an
important fact that all the States, participants
in the security and co-operation conference,
showing good will, have worked jointly on the
final document and will sign it at the summit
level. This will impart to it the nature of a
solemn pledge.12
And in specific reference to the Declaration of Prin¬
ciples, Vadim Nekrasov has argued that this important
portion of the Final Act has "the stature of a code of
moral commandments for international conduct."13 The
predominance of this latter view, that is, that the Final
Act is essentially a political and moral document,
signaled a change in earlier Soviet positions.
As early as 1972, the Soviet delegation to the CSCE
indicated that it desired a legally binding agreement. In
the early proposals for the CSCE, the Soviet representa¬
tives called for the creation of a permanent CSCE body
that would continue to monitor the participants' progress
in complying with the resultant document.14 This approach
was used in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a success¬
ful Soviet-American negotiation, which may have influenced
the Soviet decision to use a committee in the CSCE.
Apparently, this permanent consultative body would have
had the legal authority to petition violators who had
signed the document. But, as the humanitarian provisions
gained momentum, the Soviet delegation favoured a non-
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legally binding document and a biennial follow-up
conference procedure.
Another alternative is to interpret the Final Act as
having both political and legal norms, but this eventually
becomes a semantic exercise in which the distinction
between legal and political obligations will depend on the
advantages to the individual state concerned. A nation
facing criticism for lack of adherence is likely to
accentuate the political nature of both the provision in
question and the accusation made. For the distinction
between political and legal provisions in the Final Act to
attain credibility, it would be necessary to base the
categorization on the pre-existing status of the clauses
concerned. Most of the principles in Basket I are already
part of the United Nations' Charter and other legal
documents. The fact that the same principles appear
within the text of the Final Act does not, in and of
itself, secure legality. Ostensibly, a citation of their
presence in the Charter of the United Nations would ensure
legal authenticity, but the worth of the provisions would
still be jeopardized by conflicting interpretations of
their meaning.
Regardless of the debate over the legal disposition
of the Final Act, its greatest value is its tendency to
generate discussion about provisions in pre-existing
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documents. In the words of one non-Soviet author, "the
Final Act may illuminate the understandings of its
signatories regarding their obligations under general or
specific international law [and] may be used to interpret
an instrument that is binding."15 Disputes arising from
alleged violations of the UN Charter could be discussed
during the follow-up conferences to the CSCE, especially
when those specific provisions are included within the
Final Act. The content of the Final Act is so closely
linked with that of the Charter that such discussions
would be entirely appropriate. Also, the Final Act was
signed by the highest governmental representatives of the
participating nations who realized the extraordinary
political significance and attendant publicity of the
document. In August 1975, the Helsinki Final Act was
potentially as well known in Europe, the United States and
Canada as was the UN Charter, especially among observers
of international affairs. This adds even more support to
the argument of Mary Dominick and Alexandre Kiss that:
the actual costs and benefits of violating a
formal international agreement signed by
nations* highest representatives are arguably
the same whether it is deemed implicitly binding
or non-binding by individual signatories.16
In a political context, the leaders of the East and West
European countries cannot be certain that their citizens
will make the distinction between a moral/political
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undertaking and a venture which resulted in an indis¬
putable legal obligation. A case in point has been the
SAIT II agreement which was not ratified in the US Senate
and did not attain legal force. Nevertheless, both the
United States and Soviet Union were influenced by domestic
and international pressures to adhere to the provisions of
the treaty.
At least one Soviet commentator agrees with this
reasoning by stating that:
[some] signators declare that the Helsinki
documents lack 'binding legal force.' But of
course, the point at issue is not one of legal
casuistry. The leaders of 35 states, including
all the principal capitalist powers, put their
signatures to the Final Act, thus solemnly
undertaking to fulfill its provisions. The
question now is how these obligations will be
fulfilled in practice.17
Since the signing of the Final Act, Soviet spokespersons
have frequently reiterated this interpretation.18
Thus, the predominant Soviet interpretation, that the
Final Act establishes political and moral, rather than
legal, obligations for the thirty-five signatories appears
well-founded. Obviously, the participants in the CSCE
decided that they did not want to create a treaty or an
agreement, but rather, they favoured a final act (or
accord) which expressed a pledge without legal liability.
It is apparent that some sections, such as the "Declara¬
tion of Principles Guiding Relations Between Partici-
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pating States," already have the force of law in earlier
treaties and agreements.19 But Soviet emphasis on the
exclusively legal nature of the principles is unjustified
for the Final Act is a single document with interrelated
sections. Even recognition of this fact, though, could
not curtail the success of the Soviet leaders in achieving
their primary objective in CSCE-solidifying the terri¬
torial status quo in Europe. Of course, Soviet political-
legal specialists could point to a number of bilateral
agreements, especially the aforementioned 1970 treaty with
the Federal Republic of Germany, which include a pledge to
respect territorial integrity, as a confirmation of the
status quo regardless of the Final Act. Besides, an
attempt to "liberate" the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania
and Estonia), or to reunite Germany, even if the persons
in these countries felt that they were imprisoned, would
necessitate the use of force. Western leaders do not
consider this a sensible option and, from a legal
standpoint, the UN Charter clearly rejects such action.
An even more controversial question is whether or not
Western radio broadcasts into the East European countries
violate the territorial integrity of those states. This
issue will be discussed later in this chapter in reference
to Soviet allegations of "psychological warfare."
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The legal status of the humanitarian provisions is
one of the most significant aspects of this study. A
majority of the Final Act's human rights guarantees are
already a part of recognized international law through the
UN Charter and accompanying agreements. Soviet spokesper¬
sons appear to agree with this fact. Legal theorist
Vladimir Kartashkin states quite plainly:
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights both make it legally incumbent upon the
parties to take immediate steps to implement
their provisions... .The UN Charter imposes on
all countries the [legal] duty of promoting
fundamental rights and freedoms....This
commitment was reaffirmed by the states that
took part in the Helsinki Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe.20
Then why has there been such a controversy over these
provisions? The following sections illustrate that the
Soviet and American interpretations of the substance and
priority of human rights have diverged for over four
decades. The Final Act does not resolve this dilemma and
it does not outwardly support either the Soviet or the
American position.
THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS IN THE FINAL ACT
Perhaps the single most important question for the
issue of human rights in the CSCE is exactly where the
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strongest statement is made on this topic within the Final
Act. Two sections of the document mention humanitarian
concerns: Principle Seven of Basket I and all of Basket
III.21 Of the two, Principle Seven is the most signi¬
ficant for, as mentioned above, Soviet analysts consider
the principles legally binding. But, in a seemingly
inconsistent shift of emphasis, Soviet writers often
stress the special legal significance of the other nine
principles while either conveniently abstaining from a
thorough discussion of Principle Seven, or by contending
that the other principles restrict the scope of Principle
Seven. For example, in one of the few Soviet monographs
devoted in full to the Final Act, written by C. Vladimirov
and L. Teplov entitled, Kursam Khel' sinkskikh
Docrovorennosti [A Course on the Helsinki Agreement],
Principle Seven or Basket III is rarely mentioned in over
200 pages of analysis, effectively downplaying these
particular provisions.22
Vladimirov and Teplov recognize that the Final Act
consists of three baskets, but they apply the labels,
"political, economic and humanitarian" to these respective
sections.23 This strict distinction is disputable—after
all, Soviet commentators themselves have argued that the
overriding human "right to life" is represented in Basket
I—yet this division does return to earlier Soviet
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attempts to subdivide the accord into parts that they
consider more important than others.24 The "political"
basket is most important in this approach because it
houses the accepted "code or norms of peaceful coexis¬
tence" and is the political nucleus (politicheskoe iadro)
of the CSCE.25 The authors argue that it was the greatest
desire of the participating states to establish this code
because the full implementation of the ten principles
would improve the political and military climate in
Europe.26 Therefore, the authors summarize the achieve¬
ments of the Conference as follows:
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe has geared itself toward the true essence
of the matter in this highly significant stage
of the process of normalizing relations between
the states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as well
as all other European nations, and the prospects
for improving these relations, on the basis of
the principles of peaceful coexistence, have
been strengthened.27
In other words, in order to "normalize" relations in
Europe, the participants in the CSCE were concerned
primarily with creating a code of norms (kodeks norm).
The broad recognition of this code also signaled the
beginning of a process (prgtsess) to put the principles
into practice. Soviet officials viewed the CSCE as the
start of a process, but they did use the word,
zakliuchitel'nvi (conclusive) to assert that the formerly
unresolved questions over territory were finally settled.
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Soviet spokespersons were careful, however, not to use the
word reshitel'nyi (decisive) to describe the Final Act for
this may have implied that there would not be an ongoing
process to improve relations, especially in the area of
trade. Thus, the document is, in the linguistic sense, as
much a beginning as an end from the Soviet perspective.
The Helsinki Final Act then, has initiated a process
which could fail as easily as it could succeed. The
greater danger is that the positive political and military
climate in Europe could be spoiled. Soviet commentators
have asserted that it is, in fact, the ultimate aim of the
United States to spoil the process for normalizing
relations in Europe.28 The United States is blatantly
targeted for criticism while West European governments
often escape such severe ridicule. In this manner, the
United States is presented as an imposter on the European
political scene and Vladimirov and Teplov imply that the
role of the United States in European affairs should be
limited.
On the subject of human rights violations, the United
States is again blamed. Vladimirov and Teplov do
reproduce Principle Seven in their "code of norms" and
they acknowledge the role of human rights in improving
relations in Europe. But the process is spoiled once again
by the United States. The problem in this area results
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from alleged American imperialism or neo-colonialism in
Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and the attempts of the United
States to crush liberation movements in Ethiopia, Angola,
Mozambique, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe and Guinea-
Bissau.29 These are considered the genuine violations of
the norms presented in the first basket and the discussion
of human rights in this text, as well as others, is
dominated by these claims.30 For American and West
European observers to understand the Soviet view of
Principle Seven, it is necessary to recognize that the
Soviet leadership most often places issues of human rights
into the context of superpower regional competition. The
notion of the rights of the individual is quite secondary,
but the determination of the nations of the Warsaw Pact to
limit American imperialism will, supposedly, ensure that
the rights of all persons are protected.31
Within the context of the CSCE, Vladimirov and Teplov
are justified in asserting the link between international
security and cooperation on the one hand with human
rights. In fact, Principle Seven states:
The participating States recognize the universal
significance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for which is an essential
factor for the peace, justice and well-being
necessary to ensure the development of friendly
relations and cooperation among themselves as
among all States.
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But the participants in the CSCE agreed to advocate human
rights as a necessary end in and of itself. Principle
Seven includes the most significant statement on the
protection of human rights due to the following clauses:
The participating States will respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
freedom of thought, conscience, religion or
belief, for all without distinction as to race,
sex, language or religion....In the field of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, the
participating States will act in conformity with
the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. They will fulfill
their obligations as set forth in the interna¬
tional declarations and agreements in this
field, including inter alia the International
Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be
bound.
According to Kartashkin, "a number of agreements and
decisions have been adopted within the United Nations
which underline the legal character of the obligation of
states to observe fundamental rights and freedoms of
persons (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948
. . . The Covenants on Human Rights of 1966, Declaration
of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Cooperation Between States of 1970).1,32 He
is certain that the Final Act confirms the legal force of
these universally recognized principles of contemporary
international law.
The UN Charter, Article 1(3) states that one of the
purposes of the United Nations is "to achieve internation-
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al cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and
in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion...."33 Soviet legal
theorists recognize treaties as the primary source of
international law and the Charter definitely falls into
this category.34 Since the Final Act reaffirms principles
that were already legally binding, its most important role
may be in reenphasizing the previous obligations of states
under international law. But if the strength of the Final
Act actually rests in the United Nations, then the
Helsinki process must be perceived as very weak because
any disputes over human rights could be resolved in the
United Nations rather than in the follow-up conferences of
the CSCE. In fact, since the CSCE reconvenes every two
years at the most, although occasional meetings relating
to specific topics occur more frequently, the United
Nations offers the only permanent facility for debating
alleged violations of human rights. Thus, Principle Seven
is an enigma because it reiterates the Charter to gain
legal punch, but the fact that it cannot stand on its own
merit openly illustrates its weakness.
Another document from the United Nations which is
mentioned in Principle Seven is the 1948 Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights. This is the most extensive
document on the rights of individuals, but its legal force
is questionable due to the fact that the Universal
Declaration is a resolution of the General Assembly of the
United Nations. Western legal theorists generally agree
that the Universal Declaration is an important recommenda¬
tion which the signatories have voluntarily agreed to
implement in their respective countries, but it does not
have legal status.35 The Universal Declaration may have
became a part of customary international law, but it could
be argued that the Final Act also qualifies for this
categorization.3 6
Principle Seven also mentions fulfillment by states
of their obligations under the International Covenants "by
which they may be bound." There are two covenants: The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966) and The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (1966). Representatives of the Soviet
Union signed both covenants on 18 March 1968, but they
were not ratified until 16 October 1973 when the Soviet
leadership was attempting to deflect criticism of the
status of human rights in the Soviet Union and to downplay
the need to consider human rights issues in the CSCE. And
Soviet spokespersons have stressed that the covenants do
allow the signatory governments to restrict emigration and
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the flow of ideas for national security, protection of
public order, health and morals.37 As for the United
States, both covenants were signed on October 5, 1977 as
part of President Carter's human rights foreign policy,
but to date they have not been ratified. This has graced
the Soviet leadership with a propaganda victory as it
called into question the sincerity of American attempts to
improve the general well-being of individuals (as this was
defined by the American leadership). According to
Kuritsyn:
The refusal of the USA to sign the international
covenants on human rights is not surprising:
after all, these covenants speak of the human
rights which do not exist in the USA.. .the
United States has not only renounced interna¬
tional cooperation 'in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms' as envisaged by the UN Charter, but
also is unwilling to condemn flagrant and mass
violations of human rights as a result of
aggression, colonialism, racism, genocide and
apartheid.38
Of course, the implication is that the reason that the
representatives of United States will not condemn these
violations of human rights is because they actually
incorporate these tactics into overall foreign policy.
Hence, the explanation provided by Vladimirov and Teplov,
that human rights in the Final Act have not been imple¬
mented in the international sphere because of American
disregard for the "code of norms," is reinforced.
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Kartashkin actually goes on the offensive and argues that,
even though the United States has not ratified the
covenants, this "does not mean that they are not bound by
any obligation in this sphere" because of pre-existing
obligations under the UN Charter.39 As presented in
Chapter Five, President Carter recognized that the lack of
an American signature on either covenant was inexcusable.
Soviet leaders have signed and ratified the two
covenants which have now entered into force and violations
of them breach international law. An interesting
consideration for the Final Act, and one often overlooked,
is that no nation could have been bound by obligations in
the covenants in 1975 when the Final Act was completed.
This is because the covenants did not enter into force
until several months following the last meeting of the
CSCE in Helsinki.40 And there is unanimous agreement
amongst Soviet and American legal theorists that interna¬
tional treaties, agreements, covenants and other documents
are to be implemented through adjustments in domestic
legislation, but there is no enforcement procedure to
insure that this actually occurs.41 This reality has the
propensity to reduce even treaties to recommendatory
status.
While there has been much commentary on how Principle
Seven should or should not be implemented in the signatory
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nations, this discussion has always reiterated the notion
that the Final Act intermeshed a number of documents on
human rights into a single, uniform treatise. This has
been regarded as a positive development. But, in the case
of the covenants, the Final Act has been a divisive
document. This is due to the fact that, even though
Principle Seven mentions both covenants, the principle
itself is lodged within a basket that presents a code of
political norms from the Soviet perspective. The most
important statements of rights to Soviet commentators are
in Baskets II and III because they outline basically
economic, social and cultural rights. As will became
evident in the following section, Soviet writers emphasize
Soviet achievements in these latter areas which, it is
claimed, can never be matched by the capitalist countries.
In simple terms, these spokespersons are able to use two
baskets to press their assertion of compliance. At the
same time, Principle Seven can be treated as merely one of
ten important principles in the first basket for enhancing
security and cooperation in Europe.
In fact, Principle Seven does merge human rights and
international security. It states:
The participating States recognize the universal
significance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for which is an essential
factor for the peace, justice and well-being
necessary to ensure the development of friendly
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relations and cooperation among themselves as
among all States.
Soviet spokespersons frequently refer to the link between
international tension and the need to improve human
rights.42 This merger already exists in the preamble to
the Charter of the United Nations, but the fundamental
problem of mediating between different interpretations of
the content of human rights remains, as will be discussed
below.
The other major section of the Final Act that deals
with issues of human rights is Basket III, which outlines
four general areas of humanitarian cooperation: human
contacts (reunification of families, marriage between
citizens of different states, improved conditions for
travel and tourism, and meetings between people for mutual
understanding and for sport); information (wider distribu¬
tion of printed, filmed and broadcast information and
better working conditions for journalists)7 cooperation
and exchanges in the field of culture; and cooperation and
exchanges in the field of education. Even though these
provisions are more specific than those in Principle
Seven, they involve broad application over an extended
period of time. For this reason, it is difficult to
assess compliance. In any case, there is little apparent
theoretical disagreement over the benefits of increasing
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cooperation in these categories. Soviet writers con¬
tinually emphasize the necessity of broadening exchanges
of this type.43 The only questions raised are how best to
go about broadening the exchange, especially when the
Soviet and East European governments consider only a
narrow range of exchanges as appropriate (as illustrated
in Chapter Four with the unofficial Helsinki Monitoring
Groups).
The overriding objective in Basket III was to secure
recognition that the implementation of Basket III was left
entirely to the relevant governmental organizations.
Therefore, the Soviet delegation insisted on the following
phrase in the preamble to Basket III:
This cooperation should take place in full
respect for the principles guiding relations
among participation States as set forth in the
relevant document....
Subsequently, Soviet writings have stipulated that "such
cooperation must proceed in strict observance of the
principles of mutual relations . . . principles of non¬
intervention in internal affairs, of sovereign equality,
and for respect of the laws and regulations existing in
individual countries."44 Thus, all the activities
outlined in Basket III are strictly controlled by the CPSU
and the relevant Soviet governmental bodies. Curing the
CSCE, the Western nations argued for a minimum of state
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interference in such exchanges. The ultimate result of
this dispute is that the non-communist signatory nations
are totally powerless (aside from political or publicity
pressure tactics) to effect changes in Soviet policy in
this category.
The following sections examine the Soviet interpreta¬
tion of human rights and why the Soviet leadership
believes that Soviet citizens already enjoy more rights
than the citizens of western democracies. If the Soviet
leadership could substantiate this claim, the human rights
debate in the CSCE forum could be dismissed as entirely
artificial.
FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS DOCTRINE
An examination of the theoretical origins of the
Soviet interpretation of human rights, as well as an
analysis of human rights represented in the 1977 Soviet
Constitution, will help to illustrate the complications
inherent in any attempt to apply the Final Act on a
universal basis. American and Soviet interpretations
differ in the substance and priority of human rights.
Because of these antithetical perceptions, which existed
long before the completion of the Final Act, the prospect
of accommodation between the superpowers on the content of
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the Final Act is negligible. While many Western legal
theorists contend that the rights presented in the Final
Act are recognized as universal, their analysis has, in
many cases, proven quite the opposite. Soviet leaders do
not recognize the Western democratic interpretations of
human rights and they steadfastly reject claims that the
lives of citizens in the Western democracies have improved
substantially. With the insuperable ideological division
between the superpowers still intact, American and West
European officials will find a heightened awareness of
differences in the Soviet view of human rights more
beneficial for negotiations than a confrontational
approach that presupposes a world-wide definition of human
rights based on the perceptions of their respective
governments.
Theoretical Foundations of the Soviet Human Rights
Doctrine
The Soviet Union, in the words of its most prolific
writers, on ideology, has developed into a more democratic
nation than has ever existed. This new state, a "state of
the whole people,"45 is novel not only because it allows
for the fullest and freest development of the individual,
but also due to the alleged fact that its citizens are
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enthusiastically united in the caramon goal of building
communism. These dual privileges of individual and
collective freedom form the linchpin of the Soviet
argument on human rights. The present Soviet "state of
the whole people" represents the blending of individual
and collective rights and is the result of the unique, but
inevitable historical development of the country on a path
to communism.
For the purposes of this study, it is sufficient to
begin with the period following the consolidation of
Bolshevik power when the nation, according to official
ideology, became a dictatorship of the proletariat. In
the immediate years following the October revolution, the
new nation allegedly entered a period of transition "when
all aspects of society were in a state of flux, [when] new
socialist trends combined and clashed with the relics of
the old exploitative society."46 In this environment:
resistance by the dispossessed capitalists
demanded that the workers' and peasants' state
take repressive steps against the activity of
the exploiting classes within the country.
Without action of this kind it would be
impossible to consolidate working people's
power.47
While Soviet writers refer to this as a period of growth,
consolidation and implementation of socialist principles,
more importantly, it was an early example of the difficul¬
ty in balancing the rights and freedoms of individuals
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with the broader egalitarian social and economic goals of
representatives of the working class.
But Soviet historians, who have been forthright about
the fact that the foundations of the Soviet system were
built by one major segment of society—the working class
(represented by the Party)—have also argued that what may
have appeared as a period of sacrifice for some individual
freedoms was necessary for achievement of a greater goal.
This more important objective was, in fact, broader
equality in Soviet society. One Soviet theorist explains
that:
after the foundation of socialism had been laid,
the workers were faced with the task of building
developed socialism. The fulfillment of these
complex tasks was connected with a whole
historical stage in the life of society, during
which the functions of the proletarian dictator¬
ship were gradually completed and the state of
proletarian dictatorship developed into the
state of the whole people... .At this stage, when
socialism is developing on its own basis, the
creative forces of the new system and the
advantages of the socialist way of life became
more fully apparent and the working people gain
greater enjoyment of the fruits of their great
revolutionary gains.48
According to contemporary Soviet theorists, the current
socialist "way of life" fobraz zhizni) is an improvement
over the living conditions under tsarism, but the
perception that full communism has not yet been attained
is quite clear. The level of maturity that has been
reached is "developed socialism" which guarantees the
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rights of Soviet citizens well beyond the pledges made in
the Helsinki Final Act. According to I. Bestuzhev-Lada,
the principle characteristics of developed socialism
include:
collectivism, democratism, true humanism in all
societal relationships, the development of a
sense of human dignity, social duty, and
comradely mutual assistance, socialist inter¬
nationalism and patriotism, a new attitude of
people toward work and of society toward the
working person, complete equality of women and
men, concern of the entire people for children,
moral and political unity, social optimism, and
so forth. In these and many other respects, the
socialist way of life is opposite to the
capitalist way of life and the social problems
associated with the socialist way of life differ
fundamentally from social problems under
conditions of the capitalist system.49
He continues:
Under capitalism there is a fundamentally
negative stimulus to work: if your pace drops
and your output capacity declines, you are out
on the street! Perhaps the fired worker will
find another job. But in any case he is like a
leper. To avoid this kind of socioeconomic
reprisal, the worker keeps going for years under
unbelievable tension, like an athlete at the
finish line. Just so he can keep up, just to
avoid being dismissed! The human mind has
conceived nothing more inhumane than this
stimulus... .Socialism has made a clean break
with negative stimuli as a means of raising
labor productivity. The fear of reprisal has
disappeared and this is among the greatest
social achievements of the new social order.50
Since Soviet writers frequently reiterate these basic
differences between the socialist and capitalist ways of
life, there is little room for compramise or thorough
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discussion.51 The fundamental problem with capitalism is
its mode of production. Soviet authors often refer to
Marx's, The German Ideology which states that:
The way in which men produce their means of
subsistence depends first of all on the nature
of the actual means of subsistence they find in
existence and have to reproduce. This mode of
production must not be considered simply as
being the reproduction of the physical existence
of the individuals. Rather it is a definite
form of activity of these individuals, a
definite form of expressing their life, a
definite mode of life on their part. As
individuals express their life, so they are.
What they are, therefore, coincides with their
production, both with what they produce and with
how they produce. The nature of individuals
thus depends on the material conditions
determining their production.52
In other words, because the main principle of activity in
capitalist society is, from the Soviet vantage, the
pursuit of profit, the social, political and economic
well-being of individuals in capitalist society cannot
improve substantially. Minor improvements in the social
system of Western democracies are possible because such
progress is particularly comprehensible in the age of the
scientific and technological revolution but this admission
in no way retracts from the claim that capitalist society
is grossly unequal. And since broader cooperation and
exchange in the areas of science and technology will
improve the quality of life for all citizens, Soviet
leaders could argue that Basket II of the Final Act is an
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important section for human rights and the refusal of
Western leaders to expand such trade would be tantamount
to violating the rights of citizens.
Soviet commentators admit that some "negative
phenomena" still exist in developed socialism, but these
remaining pockets of greed and immorality are leftover
vestiges of pre-revolutionary capitalist society. For the
most part, these evils have been overcome because:
The most characteristic feature of the way of
life in the USSR and in other socialist
countries is, indisputably, society's concern
for the individual, for his well-being and the
responding concern of the individual for
society, the individual's feeling of participa¬
tion in the affairs of society, a feeling of
for the course of social
But since a deeper probe into the socialist way of life is
necessary here, it is best to consider three recurrent
controversies in the Soviet-American debate over human
rights: state-granted versus individual rights; collec¬
tive versus individual rights; and economic versus
political rights.
Contemporary Soviet human rights theory defends the
role of the state in granting even more rights to Soviet
citizens. This, however, appears in marked contrast to
Lenin's argument that true individual freedom was
impossible until the state "ceased to exist."54 Yet, in
the 1977 Soviet constitution, the rights of persons
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clearly derive from the state. The preamble to the 1977
constitution refers to the "socialist all-people's state"
which combines the nongovernmental and governmental
aspects of Soviet society into a single socialist
entity.55 In other words, the state is an integral part
in the life of the Soviet citizen. Allegedly, rights are
assured because, with the advancement to nature socialism,
exploitation of man by nan has been eliminated, thus
guaranteeing socio-economic freedom.56 Rights in the
Constitution, as granted in Chapter 7, are prefaced by the
phrase, "Citizens of the U.S.S.R. shall have the
right...," but exercise of the subsequent rights must be
"in conformity with the aims of communist construction."5,7
Since the Soviet Union is not yet a communist society, it
is implied that even more "freedoms" are forthcoming.
The Soviet Constitution (Chapter 1, article 6)
reiterates the "guiding and directing force" of the
Communist Party which "shall determine the general
perspective of the development of society" toward
communism. Thus, the Party plays the central role in
granting constitutional rights to citizens even though the
Party is also the sole defender of these same rights.58
In this sense, the legislative and judicial functions in
the Soviet system reside in the same body, creating the
ultimate paradox—a citizen seeking retribution for an
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alleged violation of human rights must appeal to the
Party, even though the actions of Party members may have
caused the infringement. As will be seen in Chapter Six,
the current Soviet leaders are beginning to discuss openly
the potential for abuse in this situation, and reform of
the legal system is now on the political agenda.
Instances of manipulation are most often blamed on
individual greed or corruption rather than on systemic
problems. Furthermore, the decisions of the Party in
human rights cases should actually display how the
Constitution is being applied, but these decisions are
rarely published in detail. In this sense, the Party has
created a second constitution which is unwritten and
inaccessible to most citizens. In 1979 though, an article
did appear in Sovetskoe crosudarstvo i pravo which claimed
that citizens required easier access to the court system
when their rights were neglected at the workplace or
violated by the actions of a governmental agency. It was
argued that there should be procedural limits to court
jurisdiction and that citizens could not vent complaints
about general decisions or resolutions by state or
administrative agencies.59 In light of the great drive
by Gorbachev to mate officials more accountable for their
actions, this article in the prominent Soviet legal
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journal was an important catalyst of subsequent discus¬
sions.
In contrast to the Soviet Constitution freedoms in
the American Constitution are based on what are perceived
as natural rights. In other words, American rights theory
promotes the belief that individual rights exist irrespec¬
tive of political systems and claims that the encroachment
of governments upon the individual rights of persons,
should be limited. Thus, the Bill of Rights of the United
States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no
law...abridging the freedom" of citizens. The American
constitution is state-restrictive in its approach to
human rights while the Soviet constitution accentuates the
role of the state in granting and protecting human
rights.60
One of the best examples of these antithetical view¬
points in action is the issue of emigration. The Helsinki
Final Act does not specifically mention emigration, but
encourages the easing of prerequisites for travel,
especially for reunification of families. The problem
centres around denaturalization because "the fact remains
that emigration from the U.S.S.R. today is, in the main,
contingent on prior denaturalization."61 This means that
Soviet citizens cannot divest themselves of citizenship
because only the state administrative apparatus has this
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power. Conversely, Americans may renounce their citizen¬
ship at any time, and the government may not strip them of
their citizenship without due process of law, as well as
the attendant publicity from an independent (non-governme¬
ntal) media. This is most significant for the Final Act
because, without a more lenient attitude on state control
of denaturalization, the Soviet leadership can effectively
undermine much of Basket III.62
Another prominent theoretical foundation for the
Soviet doctrine of human rights, and a cause of further
disagreement with Western legal theorists, is the
collective nature of human rights. A citizen's rights
extend only so far as they comply with the "rules of
socialist community life" and all rights are prefaced by
the primary duty of all citizens to "safeguard the
interests of the Soviet state and to further the strength¬
ening of its might and authority. "63 Again, the predomi¬
nant notion is that the Soviet state dispenses rights to
citizens, but only after the interests of governmental
bodies have been protected. But Soviet commentators have
became increasingly sensitive to the accusation that the
rights of the individual are subordinate. In defense of
an admitted problem of the socialist way of life, Georgi
Shakhnazarov states that:
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The untenability of bourgeois assertions that
socialism spells the suppression of the
individual by the collective with all the
ensuing tragic consequences for civilization, is
obvious. Socialist practice, free of distor¬
tions, has proved that the collectivist environ¬
ment, more than any other, promotes the
development of the personality, the flowering of
individual talents. Under socialism, collec¬
tivity. .. acquires a deep humanistic meaning the
contrary of...the mechanical joining of socially
disparate individuals characteristic of the
private-property system.64
In a thorough discussion of this problem, Shakhnazarov
admits that there is no "universal formula" to secure a
balance of rights. He continues:
The gain of socialism, one of its most valuable
features—a thoughtful, tactful attitude to
people, the well-meaning influence of the
collective on the individual without in any way
interfering in his personal affairs—must
undoubtedly be preserved. Otherwise, relapses
of such phenomena as anarchism are inevitable,
at the bottom of which lies bourgeois indi¬
vidualism, indifference to those around you,
disregard of social demands and norms. Hence,
here, too, it is a matter of evolving an optimal
relationship between the personal and the social
which would meet the interests of the all round
development of the individual and the progress
of the whole of society.65
The specific political aspect of this problem, according
to Shakhnazarov, has to do with the balance between public
discipline and personal freedom. His answer as to how to
create harmony between one's personal interests and the
interest of society is to raise the level of consciousness
of citizens who would subsequently exercise self-dis¬
cipline. But most importantly of all, the level of
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consciousness can only be increased by further education
about the communist ideal. Shakhnazarov recognizes this
and admits the fact that the need for further education
necessitates more state institutional involvement, not
less. It appears that state organizations and, most of
all, the CPSU, will have to play a larger role in the
individual lives of citizens before the level of con¬
sciousness can be raised to the point where "society will
no longer have to enforce certain rules and regula¬
tions."67 But he is confident that anti-social behavior
will be reduced to the point where state-legal control
can be curtailed accordingly. Delays in this development
may occur and external conditions such as imperialist
aggression, cold war and international tension will simply
prolong the transition stage. Thus, Shakhnazarov has
constructed an argument in which the capitalist nations,
to be truly humanitarian, should pursue a peaceful foreign
policy (as defined by the Soviet Union) which would allow
for the full socialist development of the Soviet Union.
The rights and privileges of citizens would then be much
broader under communism and certainly greater than in any
capitalist society.68
This is the perspective applied to dissidents in
Soviet society who are referred to as inakomvsliashchie.
or "differently minded." In Soviet society, being charac-
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terized as inakamvsliashchie is tantamount to treason
since such minority beliefs threaten to hinder the
transition from mature socialism to communism. The views
of dissidents will be discussed in Chapter 5, but it would
be useful here to note that only seven months after the
completion of the Final Act, an article appeared in Pravda
which discussed dissidence within the context outlined
above.69 In the article, written under the pseudonym, I.
Aleksandrov, the issue was presented as follows:
The true visage of the people whom the West
calls "dissenters" is indicated very clearly by
the fact that, after going abroad, they enter
the service of anti-Soviet centers controlled by
the imperialist secret services... .It is also
characteristic that all the dissident's so-
called "ideas" are direct borrowings from
bourgeois anticammunist and anti-Soviet propa¬
ganda. ...This is a convincing answer to all
those who try hypocritically to accuse our state
of failing to fulfill the provisions of the
third section of the Final Act of the Conference
on Security and cooperation in Europe.70
This is not, in fact, a convincing answer to criticism
from Western human rights theorists. For example, Arpad
Kadarkay disagrees emphatically with Soviet assertions.
He writes:
Soviet dissidents, with the possible exception
of Sakharov, fail to realize that respect of
human rights presupposes the legal value of the
individual that is non-existent in Russian
political thought. Hence the pathos of distance
between the Russian "spirit" and Western
"legalism" upon which Russian moralists, from
Tolstoy to Solzhenitsyn, insist upon. From the
viewpoint of Western political theory, which
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predicates political society on the civic-legal
relationship between individual and the
government, Soviet society is lawless.71
These points of view are so disparate that a compromise
would require admission from Soviet theorists that there
was a fundamental flaw in the socialist system—that is, a
basic disregard for the rights of the individual. While
Soviet authors staunchly defend the expanding rights of
the individual in Soviet society, Western democratic
theorists have not yet proven that Soviet socialism has
actually curtailed individual freedom, since the latter
years of tsarist rule. Soviet commentators are quite
certain that all rights and privileges are continually
expanding. The debate over individual and collective
rights is then, only one aspect of the greater controversy
between the two antithetical socio-political systems.
The final category of Soviet human rights theory is
the primacy of economic rights. As discussed above, in
the Soviet view, the mode of production is fundamental to
all aspects of human existence. Among contemporary Soviet
theorists, Samuel Zivs has stated that:
The truth is that we consider the firm guaran¬
tees of socio-economic rights made by socialism
as an absolute necessary condition for the
effective exercise of civil and political
rights.72
Soviet citizens are guaranteed economic and social rights,
such as the right to work, shelter and health care,
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through "socialist Democracy" (Chapter 7 of the Soviet
constitution). In fact, Soviet legal theorists maintain
that the broader international concern for human rights is
actually due to the realization of these rights in
socialist democracy and the lack of respect for human
rights in the capitalist countries.73 But Western legal
theorists claim that economic rights cannot be secured
before political rights such as freedom of speech,
assembly and press. One Western legal theorist convincing¬
ly argues that the rights granted to Soviet citizens are
not rights at all. In reference to the Soviet constitu¬
tion, Kadarkay writes:
article 40 states, 'Citizens of the USSR have the
right to work, [and] on first impression,
appears to enlarge the concept of human rights.
In practice, it involves a 'direction' of
labor... .The right to work, not surprisingly,
precludes the 'right' to strike. By Soviet
logic, the workers cannot strike against their
own interests as owners of national assets. The
intra-bloc implications of this logic were
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Yet, it is readily apparent that the emphasis on political
rights in the United States Constitution has led to the
total absence of any of the economic rights presented in
the Soviet Constitution. And since the United States has
not ratified the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, it is open to the charge that
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the American leadership recognizes that the United States
cannot fulfill the pledges that would be undertaken.
Principle Seven of the Final Act combines political
and economic rights and presents them as mutually
beneficial. The participating states agreed to "promote
and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political,
economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms
all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human
person and are essential for his free and full develop¬
ment." This clearly demonstrates that all of the rights
in the Charter of the United Nations, the International
Covenants and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
are of equal value and should be applied to all
citizens.75
Unfortunately, the superpowers disagree on the
content of these provisions. Further international debate
and criticism could facilitate improvements in the human
rights category but, as will be seen in the following
section, the Soviet leadership has not accepted the
jurisdiction of the international community to evaluate
Soviet adherence to human rights guarantees.
254
The 1977 Soviet Constitution
The new Soviet Constitution, or Fundamental law,
which was adopted on 7 October 1977, has been presented by-
Soviet commentators as a showpiece of human rights.76 In
fact, one Soviet assertion is that the new Constitution
goes much further in implementing the provisions of the
Final Act than is possible in Western democracies.77
Again, this allegation is based upon a definition of human
rights which representatives of Western democracies
continually repudiate. In this case, the objective is not
to examine the 1977 Constitution in its entirety, and the
controversy surrounding it, but to analyze a number of
aspects which relate to the human rights provisions of the
Helsinki Final Act.
First of all, the 1977 Constitution was fifteen years
overdue. During the Twenty-first Party Congress of
January 1959, First Secretary Khrushchev called for
amendments and additions to the 1936 Soviet Constitution
which would reflect the new stage in the building of
Communist society in the Soviet Union. Also, Khrushchev's
initiative was one aspect of a broader destalinization
campaign in which he distanced himself from the "cult of
personality" which he believed was reflected in 1936
Constitution.78
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On 25 April 1962, Khrushchev1s idea of a new
Constitution became a formal proposal for constitutional
reform presented to the Supreme Soviet. A constitutional
commission was established in order to consider the
formulation of provisions that would reflect the progress
toward full-scale communist construction in the Soviet
Union. Khrushchev spoke to the commission on 16 June
1962, and outlined its basic tasks, but this was the last
reported meeting of the commission until May 1977.
Constitutional reform became Brezhnev's concern
following the ouster of Khrushchev in October 1964. In
his pre-election speech of 10 June 1966, Brezhnev
announced that the Constitution would be completed one
year later in time for the Fiftieth anniversary of the
Revolution, but this event passed without Brezhnev
actually producing it. In December 1972, after five
years of silence on the issue, Brezhnev revived the idea
of a constitution, but a draft was not completed until
June 1977. The draft was subjected to a four month
nationwide discussion which allegedly led to numerous
alterations before the final version of the 1977 Constitu¬
tion was published on 7 October 1977 in time for the
Sixtieth anniversary of the Revolution.
Any attempt to pinpoint the cause of delay in
formulating the new Constitution would be laced with
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speculation.79 Still, it is quite possible that the
international human rights debate, that was spawned in
part by the Helsinki Final Act, influenced the formulation
and completion of same sections of the Constitution. For
the purpose of this study, it should be noted that the new
Constitution was completed two years after the signing of
the Final Act and in the same year as the first CSCE
follow-up meeting in Belgrade. This has allowed the Soviet
leadership to cite the text, properly or improperly, as
evidence of Soviet compliance with the Final Act.
Krutogolov writes:
The provisions of the Constitution reflect those
obligations which the Soviet Union undertook in
accordance with international treaties and
agreements. This relates primarily to such
important international documents as the UN
Charter and the Final Act of the Helsinki
Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. Article 29 of the Fundamental Law of
the USSR sets out the basic principles on which
the Soviet Union builds its relations with other
states and which correspond to the ten points on
the Helsinki Final Act.®0
A. Movchan extends these comments a step further by
claiming that the new Soviet Constitution actually gives
even more rights to Soviet citizens than is proclaimed in
international documents.81 Thus, the first major point
about the new Constitution is that the timing of its
completion was significant for the debate over the Final
Act.
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Second, on the topic of human rights, the 1977
Constitution modified substantially the 1936 Constitution.
In the most general sense, it is alleged that the Soviet
Union is now an "all-people's state" and a "developed
socialist society," which automatically enhances the
equality of its citizens. If Soviet commentators are to
argue that the Soviet Union has reached a higher stage of
socialism, then they must also claim a corresponding
increase in human rights. They commonly tackle this
problem on two fronts: first, by citing specific new
provisions in the 1977 Constitution; and second, by
asserting that the new atmosphere allows for fuller
implementation of current and pre-existing provisions.
There are two chapters concerned directly with the
rights of citizens, rather than one as in the 1936
Constitution. Chapter 6 is entitled, "Citizenship of the
U.S.S.R.—Equality of Citizens." Chapter 7 is devoted to
the "Fundamental Rights, Freedoms and Duties of Citizens
of the U.S.S.R." Here, many rights have remained from the
1936 Constitution as Soviet citizens are guaranteed the
rights to: work (Article 40), rest and leisure (Article
41), health care (Article 42), social insurance (Article
43), education (Article 45), speech, press and assembly
(Article 50) and freedom of conscience (Article 52). New
rights include a reduction of working time for women with
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small children (article 35), systems of vocational
guidance and placement (Article 40) and the right to elect
or to be elected to elective state organs (Article 48).
As examples of new rights, one can cite the prohibition of
persecution for criticism (Article 49), the right of
citizens to lodge a complaint against the actions of
officials and state and public bodies (Article 58) and the
right to housing (Article 44). According to Soviet
authors, these and other provisions are either entirely
new or they had previously been part of legislation, but
now had became constitutional norms.82 On paper, these
guaranteed rights bring human rights in the Soviet Union
fully into line with Principle Seven of the Helsinki
Final Act.
But the third point is that while these rights have
increased quantitatively, they have been thoroughly
disassembled qualitatively through an excess of individual
duties or obligations to the State. The introductory
article (39) of Chapter 7 states that the "exercise by
citizens of rights and freedoms must not harm the
interests of society and the state or the rights of other
citizens." This is an argument accepted by Western legal
theorists. But the Soviet constitution goes a step
further in Article 59 where it stipulates that "[cjitizens
exercise of their rights and freedoms is inseparable from
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the performance of their duties and obligations." The new
duties, which were absent from the 1936 Constitution, are
"to promote the growth of the power and authority of the
Soviet state" (Article 62) and "to promote in every way
the protection of public order" (Article 65). Valentin
Patyulin openly admits that these are new duties by
arguing that:
The extension of civil rights and the strength¬
ening of the guarantees of their implementation
presuppose, in their turn, the growing respon¬
sibility of the individual to the state and
society, a more conscientious discharge by
citizens of their duties envisaged by the
Constitution has introduced duties in addition
to those provided for by the 1936 Constitu¬
tion.83
In essence, Patyulin has stated that the more rights that
Soviet citizens receive, the more corresponding duties
they will also absorb.
As presented in the previous section, human rights in
the Soviet Union are gifts of the State. The new
Constitution confirms this fact as the exercise of
political rights must serve State interests, that is,
rights are limited to those which "strengthen and develop
the socialist system" (Article 50). Thus, one can
ascertain that the duties of Soviet citizens far outweigh
the corresponding rights which, in the words of one
Western commentator, "illustrates a serious case of
constitutional overkill."84 In this sense, the Soviet
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interpretation of the Final Act is consistent with the
human rights provisions of the Soviet Constitution, but it
is an interpretation that is unacceptable to Western
nations.
A fourth and final point about the 1977 Constitution
is that the extraordinary emphasis on the principles in
Basket I of the Final Act is represented within the
Constitution itself. Chapter 4, Article 29, sets out the
principles of relations between the Soviet Union and other
states and includes the Final Act's principles in toto.
In fact, one Western observer, Aryeh Unger, has stated:
they appear to have been taken almost verbatim
from the headings of the relevant sections of
the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe. This
reversal of the first two principles in the
final version of article 29 brought them into
line with the order in which they are listed in
the Helsinki accord.85
He also claims that:
the Soviet Union, by including the Helsinki
catalogue in its constitution, has become the
first state to have transformed such an
impressive catalogue of international norms into
its domestic fundamental law [but] this may not
increase the likelihood that the Soviet
leadership will actually observe all or any of
these norms in its relations with foreign
states....86
Nevertheless, the fact that all of these principles were
included in the Constitution confirms the significance of
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Basket I and the broader Helsinki process for the Soviet
leadership.
In conclusion, while the presentation of human rights
in the 1977 Constitution may appear to coincide with the
Western democratic perception of human rights, closer
inspection illustrates that, in fact, the antithetical
Soviet interpretation has remained intact. This has grave
consequences for the Final Act, at least from the Western
perspective, because the human rights provisions nego¬
tiated in Helsinki and Geneva are to be implemented
domestically through each nation's legal system. As
described in the following section, the Soviet leadership
rejects international commentary on its internal policies,
and losing the new Constitution as an example, the Soviet
leaders aire unlikely to modify their domestic human rights
policy along the lines of the Western concept of democracy
in the foreseeable future.
HUMAN RIGHTS DEBATE IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORUM
The most frequent Soviet response to international
criticism of human rights abuse in the Soviet Union, is
that such matters fall within the domestic jurisdiction of
states. In the official Soviet view, human rights are not
a legitimate concern for the international community and
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any complaint voiced by a foreign government encroaches
upon the sovereignty of the Soviet Union as outlined in
the first principle of the Final Act. Therefore, Soviet
government officials and human rights specialists have
formulated a doctrine revolving around three concepts:
non-interference in internal affairs; gross and massive
violations; and peaceful coexistence. Application of this
doctrine allows the Soviet leadership to shield criticism
while providing the theoretical basis to criticize the
human rights performance of other nations.
In Principle Six of the Final Act, the participating
nations pledge the following:
[to] refrain from any intervention, direct or
indirect, individual or collective, in the
internal or external affairs falling within the
domestic jurisdiction of another participating
State, regardless of their mutual relations.
The same provision is included in the Charter of the
United Nations, Article 2(7) and supported by Article 29
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The idea of
non-interference in the internal affairs of other
countries accentuates the individual responsibility of
governments to implement international agreements within
their own countries. The majority of legal theorists in
the East and West accept the concept of domestic implemen¬
tation which is confirmed in Articles 55 and 56 of the
United Nations Charter, as well as in the preamble of the
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United Nations covenants. When a particular government
does not implement an international agreement and fails to
fulfill an obligation, there is little that other nations
can do short of enacting trade sanctions and curtailing
other interstate activity of benefit to the country in
question. But retaliatory action of this type is likely
to damage diplomatic relations to the point where the
complaining state suffers as well.87
Ironically, Soviet spokespersons argue that the
international documents mentioned above, which are
intended to establish international standards, actually
legitimize the internal standards set by each government.
This is especially true with reference to human rights.
According to G.I. Tunkin, "the principle field of struggle
for human rights is the internal system of a state, and
especially its socio-economic system.1,88 State implemen¬
tation according to the Soviet definition means that only
individuals in the Ommmunist Party and state apparatus
decide when human rights are violated. For example, when
in 1976 Soviet citizens established a series of unofficial
Helsinki Monitoring Groups (in Moscow, the Ukraine and
Armenia), numerous members were arrested and imprisoned,
not only because monitoring Soviet compliance was a state
function, but also due to the fact that this activity was
actually anti-Soviet.89
264
By stressing the purely internal nature of human
rights, Soviet specialists have presented domestic law as
superior to international law. This viewpoint is not
easily dismissed for it has firm foundations in statist
assumptions about sovereignty that have dominated
international conduct for well over three centuries.90
Soviet writers who rely on the primacy of sovereignty,
consistently claim that each government is responsible
for interpreting the relevant international provision and
then incorporating it into domestic legislation. The
human rights debate provides one of the clearest examples
of the debate over the relationship between domestic and
international law. Those persons who point to the primacy
of international law often cite the example of Nazi
genocide against Jews during World War II. According to
this interpretation, the Nuremburg Trials set a precedent
which changed the traditional notion of the exclusive
domestic control over citizens, although it should be
noted that the trials of Nazis were ex post facto and they
are not examples of intervention before or during a
violation. Allegedly, international citizenship, with
international remedies for human rights abuse, was a by¬
product of the World War II experience.91
By contrast, Tunkin refers to this alleged develop¬
ment as an:
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intrusion of the regulatory influence of
international law into the domain of human
rights [and] does not mean that human rights are
directly regulated by international law nor that
they have ceased basically to be the domestic
affair of a state.92
Chizov claims that the idea of world citizenship has never
gained wide popularity except in the capitalist countries
when using it against the socialist nations.93
Soviet insistence on the superiority of domestic law
has been giving way to a more "internationalist" approach,
but this has done little to change the Soviet position on
human rights. Y.A. Korovin views domestic and interna¬
tional law as co-equals, but "by promulgating a law
clearly contrary to International Law, the government
concerned commits a violation of International Law, for
which the State concerned is responsible under Interna¬
tional Law....1,94 While this is a promising sign that
same Soviet legal theorists may accept international
remedies for human rights abuse, the longstanding view of
exclusive domestic jurisdiction remains in the most recent
writings on the subject, especially in the field of human
rights.95
The Final Act has not bridged the gap between these
antagonistic viewpoints. When the United States Congress
decided to create a Commission for Security and Coopera¬
tion in Europe to monitor other nations' compliance with
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the agreement, the Soviet response was that this violated
the principle of non-interference.96 Virtually any
enquiry into human rights in the Soviet Union elicits this
response. Samuel Zivs claims that there is a logical
connection between Principle Six and Principle Seven and
that they were deliberately placed side-by-side in order
to prevent same nations from using the human rights issue
to subvert the political foundations of other nations.97
Yet, if the rights of citizens are a purely domestic
matter, how can the Soviet leadership justify the actions
against Nazi war criminals? According to the official
position, these crimes fall into the special category of
"gross and massive violations against humanity" and
include especially serious violations such as genocide,
apartheid, colonialism, foreign occupation and threats
against national sovereignty and self-determination.98
The Soviet leadership denies that any gross and massive
violations occur in the Soviet Union, a point disputed by
certain groups of Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars, Jews and
Baptists, to name only a few.99 Most interestingly, the
category of gross and massive violations allows the Soviet
leadership to criticize other governments, like Chile,
South Africa and Israel, without violating their internal
affairs.100 In reference to the United States, criticism
usually centres on discrimination against American Blacks
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and American Indians.101 But the justifications for
criticism against other nations appears hypocritical given
the sweeping use of the non-interference doctrine by the
Soviet leadership. And one could ask how large a
violation must became before it is gross and massive.
Using the Soviet definition, the international community
is excluded from action before human rights violations
develop on a large scale. This displays a lack of concern
for the individual abuses that can occur.
Another Soviet response to the international debate
over human rights is that this issue contradicts the
principles of peaceful coexistence. This point is
particularly difficult to accept given the fact that
peaceful coexistence excludes military competition, but
actually encourages ideological competition.102 Y.
Mblchanov elaborates on the definition of peaceful coexis¬
tence:
The Marxist-Leninist concept of peaceful
coexistence does not consist merely in an
absence of wars in relations between social and
capitalist states...[it] presupposes, as a major
element, the establishment and promotion of
variegated and mutually advantageous cooperation
between countries with differing social
systems....103
To Western theorists, the human rights issue lies at the
heart of legitimate and peaceful East-West ideological
competition. Former General Secretary Brezhnev appeared
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to use this reasoning when he contended that "the truth of
history and objective laws of social development are on
our side."104 What better way to display the alleged
superiority of the Soviet system than to participate in an
open human rights debate in which the citizens of all
countries are permitted to compare and contrast the
advantages of the Soviet system to others in a truly open
forum?
The link between ideology and human rights is
recognized by S. Zivs who makes this point emphatically:
There is not, and cannot be, a conception of
human rights outside ideology, just as there can
be no concrete ideology of human rights outside
philosophical systems.105
American criticism of the Soviet version of human rights
guarantees is considered by the Soviet leadership a
"psychological attack" designed to damage the Final Act
and to try to tip the balance of forces against socialism.
The Soviet position has been that criticism of the lack of
human rights will damage detente even though human rights
are integral to the Helsinki process. Such criticism is
considered an aggressive attack at the internal structure
of the Soviet social system. But does this also apply to
nations of the same social system?
To answer this latter question it is necessary to
examine briefly the Soviet concept of "socialist inter-
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nationalism" or "proletarian internationalism" which
appears to contradict the non-intervention doctrine.106
As one of the main principles of socialist law, socialist
internationalism dictates relations between socialist
states.107 It provides for "the fraternal friendship,
close cooperation, and mutual assistance of the working
class of various countries in the struggle for their
liberation.1,108 According to Soviet legal scholar, G.I.
Tunkin:
The principal of comradely mutual assistance
includes the rights of each state of the world
system of socialism to obtain assistance from
other socialist countries and, at the same time,
the obligation of each socialist state to render
assistance to other socialist countries. This
obligation of mutual assistance applies equally
to the spheres of political, economic, military,
and other relations.109
The eventual corollary to socialist internationalism was
the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" used to justify Soviet
intervention in Czechoslovakia in September 1968. This
apparent gross violation of the non-interference doctrine
was justified by Brezhnev in an address to a Polish United
Workers Party Congress in Warsaw on 12 November 1968:
Naturally, an action such as military assistance
to a fraternal country designed to avert the
threat to the socialist system is an extraordi¬
nary step and may be taken only in case of
direct actions of enemies of socialism within
the country and outside it, actions threatening
the common interests of the socialist camp.
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Article 8 of the Warsaw Pact, which contains its own non¬
intervention principle, is effectively overridden by this
doctrine.110 While the Western delegations in the CSCE
were able to block all efforts to include the phrase
"socialist internationalism" in the Final Act, they did
have to concede terminology desired by the Soviet
representatives in the non-intervention principle which
disallows ideological intervention, rather than the more
limited context of armed intervention. But even in this
case, it is clear that the "Brezhnev Doctrine" contravenes
the Final Act as it definitely involves armed intervention
and is inconsistent with the Soviet leadership's own
definition of peaceful coexistence.
In conclusion, the Soviet strategy for debating human
rights in the international forum has included three main
components: non-interference in internal affairs, gross
and massive violations and peaceful coexistence. Even
though the application of these concepts is frequently
inconsistent, they have effectively diluted most of the
criticism directed against the Soviet human rights record.
CONCLUSION
The Soviet interpretation of human rights in the
Helsinki Final Act has been consistent with Soviet
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negotiating positions during the CSCE. Because the
official Soviet viewpoint is a direct reflection of
ideological and political perceptions, it is unlikely that
the Soviet leadership will ever adopt a "natural rights"
notion of human rights even though same individual rights
are developing under Gorbachev. Since the Helsinki Final
Act is not a legally binding document and cannot be
enforced except through political pressure, Western
leaders would be unwise to attempt to force Soviet
representatives to the ongoing CSCE follow-up meetings to
accept an antithetical interpretation of the provisions of
the Final Act. But, as will be presented in the next
chapter, a small number of Soviet citizens did interpret
the Final Act in the same terms as leaders in the United
States. This small group of individuals who surfaced
during the Carter administration had a dramatic impact on
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
in the sphere of human rights.
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CHAPTER 4
THE HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS
DEBATE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
The completion of the Helsinki Final Act of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, on 1
August 1975, was a major achievement for Soviet foreign
policy, at least in the eyes of the Soviet leadership.
Yet, by the time of the 1977 Belgrade meeting to review
implementation of the Final Act, Soviet sentiment had
changed dramatically. This reversal was due to domestic
as well as international events. While the Soviet
leadership tried to emphasize the permanence of post-World
War II geographic boundaries in Europe, allegedly
guaranteed in the Final Act's Declaration of Principles, a
majority of Western nations deflected importance from
this.1 Instead, political leaders in the West stressed
the significance of the humanitarian provisions of the
Final Act and criticized the Soviet Union, and other East
European countries, for failing to respect this section of
the agreement. Many representatives of the Western
nations, including the United States, interpreted the
Final Act as a culmination of compromises. If the Soviet
Union wanted the CSCE signatories to accept the Soviet
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line on the boundaries question, then the Soviet leader¬
ship would have to reconsider its interpretation of the
humanitarian provisions.
As if the international debate over the content of
the Final Act was not troubling enough, the Soviet
leadership was petitioned by groups of Soviet citizens
whose interpretation of the Final Act was more aligned
with the Western view. They insisted on official
recognition of the humanitarian provisions and threatened
to appeal to the international community to initiate
political and economic strategies to force their govern¬
ment into line.
This chapter discusses the aims, functions and
international nature of the Obshchestvennaia gruppa
sodeistviia, translated literally as "The Public Group for
Assistance," (hereafter referred to as OGS). From 1976, a
number of groups were formed, referred to in Western
literature as the "Helsinki Monitoring Groups." Regard¬
less of the official Soviet interpretation of the Final
Act, the OGS presented an unofficial interpretation which
was more consistent with Western views. Members of the OGS
claimed that their legitimacy derived from the "spirit" of
the Final Act. In their perception, the KGB clampdown on
their activities portrayed the Soviet leadership as
hypocritical and not trustworthy in international
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relations. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership decided to
suffer the propaganda attack, and the damage to an already
strained detente, in order to quash the Helsinki movement
for human rights in the Soviet Union.
FORMATION AND GENERAL AIMS
OF THE HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS
Eight months after publication of the full text of
the Final Act in Pravda (2 August 1975), a group of eleven
human rights' activists announced that they intended to
monitor Soviet compliance with the agreement. Their first
document, released in Moscow on 12 May 1976, named the
founding members: Yuri Orlov (chairman), Ludmilla
Alexeeva, Mikhail Bernshtam, Elena Bonner, Aleksander
Ginsburg, Peter Grigorenko, Alexander Korchak, Malva
Landa, Anatoly Marchenko, Vitali Rubin and Anatoly
Shcharansky.2 As the founding members throughout 1977 and
1978 were arrested and imprisoned or else emigrated, new
members filled the vacancies.3 Following the initiative
of the Moscow OGS, citizens in four other republics within
the Soviet Union formed their own independent monitoring
bodies. The first announcement was issued from the
Ukraine, then Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia.4
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One of the most striking characteristics of the
Helsinki Monitoring Groups was the diversity of their
membership. For example, Yuri Orlov is a physicist, Petr
Grigorenko a former Red Army major-general, Aleksandr
Korchak a "refusenik" and professor of astrophysics (all
from the Russian republic), Oleksa Tykhy a lawyer, Nine
Strokata a microbiologist (both from Ukraine), Rev.
Karolis Garuckas (Lithuania) a Jesuit priest and Zviad
Gamsakhurdia (Georgia) is a journalist. And the member¬
ship was not confined to the technical and liberal arts
intelligensia. After 1976, increasing numbers of white-
collar and blue-collar workers participated in the work of
the groups. Even though the OGS members have come from
varied backgrounds with rather individual concerns, they
have given unanimous support to the five general aims
outlined in the Moscow OGS's 12 May document. Let us then
turn to an examination of these aims.
First, the OGS sought to assist in the observance of
the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act in the Soviet
Union. By vising the term "assist," the groups stressed
their desire to help the Soviet government to implement
Basket III and Principal Seven, rather than to work
against the Soviet authorities. The first document
explicitly stated:
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The aim of the group is to promote observance of
the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act of
the Conference on Cooperation and Security in
Europe.5
In testimony before the US Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, Ludmilla Alekseeva, a founding
member of the Moscow OGS stated:
Human rights activists are persons with
differing political views, ranging from
socialists to monarchists, but they all share
the belief that society can only develop through
the effective exercise of elementary human and
civil rights. They all renounce violent methods
of struggle as a matter of principle, and they
condemn such methods....[Our] name was chosen
to underline our members' loyalty to the
government and the members' desire to work
together with the authorities toward conscien¬
tious fulfillment of the human rights obliga¬
tions undertaken at Helsinki.6
But the very fact that the members of the OGS saw the need
to assist the government in implementation suggested that
Soviet officials were not fulfilling their obligations,
either deliberately or due to incompetence. Predictably,
the official response to the OGS's gesture was that
implementation rests solely with the Soviet government and
assistance was not needed. This applied to all the
concerns of the OGS including, contacts between people,
freer flow of information, cooperation and exchanges in
the area of culture, and cooperation and exchanges in the
area of education.
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Since many nations had signed the Final Act, the OGS
declared as a second aim, that it would inform all the
heads of state of the nations participating in the CSCE,
and the general public, of violations of the provisions
outlined above.7 Unfortunately, the Soviet authorities
viewed such activities as slanderous and anti-Soviet,
which effectively undermined the OGS's attempt to "assist"
the Soviet government in protecting human rights.
Third, the OGS called for the creation of an interna¬
tional commission to investigate special cases of
inhumanity. Such a commission could investigate severe
violations on the spot, especially when the groups were
unable to carry out investigations themselves.8 Especial¬
ly severe examples of human rights violations were divided
into four categories: taking children away from religious
parents who educated them in their religious faith;
forcible psychiatric treatment with the objective of
changing thoughts, conscience, religion or belief;
intentional division of families; and special inhumanity
to prisoners of conscience, such as the use of psychiatry
against them.9 Information gathered from investigations
of these violations would provide the basis for criticism
at the biennial follow-up conferences of the CSCE. By the
time the first follow-up conference took place in
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Belgrade, the Moscow OGS had prepared 26 documents for
this purpose.10
The fourth aim of the groups was to encourage other
citizens to create similar monitoring bodies to urge their
own governments to implement the Final Act.11 Human
rights groups were subsequently created in Poland in 1976
(the Workers Defense Committee—KOR—specifically offered
support to the OGS), in Czechoslovakia in 1977 through
Charter 77, in Romania through the Paul Goma movement
which openly supported the principles of Charter 77, and
in Bulgaria through Declaration 1978 (the first clear
example of dissent over human rights in that country). By
the beginning of 1978, at least two unofficial groups had
been established in the United States: the Helsinki Watch
Group and the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine committee.12
The fact that these groups were formed due to the call of
the Soviet Helsinki Monitors, and the interest they had
generated in the Final Act, was not widely recognized in
the United States. Indeed, the chairman of the US
Helsinki Watch Group, Robert L. Bernstein, wrote a letter
to The New York Times which represented his frustration
about the misunderstandings of the Group's aims (an
earlier report in the same newspaper had stated that the
Helsinki Watch Group would monitor only the US record in
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adhering to the Final Act13). Thus, he summarized the
objectives of, and the influences on the Group as follows:
The purpose of our committee, incompletely
reported...is to document and publicize
violations in all countries that signed the
Helsinki accords [including the US and] we will
pay particular attention to East European
countries where independent civil rights groups
are suppressed and remedies are seldom avail¬
able. In fact, the formation of our committee
is a direct response to the appeal of the Moscow
Helsinki Watch urging creation of such groups in
other countries remphasis added!.14
While Bernstein stressed that the group would also monitor
the human rights record of the US government, it was
obvious that the greatest emphasis would be on the Soviet
Union in preparation for the follow-up conference in
Madrid in 1980.15
The final aim of the OGS was to convince governments
and the general public of the link between humanitarianism
and the free flow of information on the one hand and the
problems of international security and cooperation on the
other. This connection was outlined by Professor Yuri
Orlov in his appeal to the CSCE participants to protect
the Moscow OGS:
The non-violent struggle for respect for the
fundamental rights of the individual, for more
humane practices and against cruelty, for
tolerance and for the free circulation of
information offers a more sure and lasting basis
for confidence and peace than can be achieved by
political efforts alone. The problems of
security in today's world are inseparable from
humanitarian problems. This is the evident
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rationale for the humanitarian provisions of the
Final Act. And this is why all peoples and all
governments have an interest in their fulfill¬
ment.16
In summary, the general aim of the OGS was "to collect,
analyze and transmit to the participating states informa¬
tion on violations of the humanitarian provisions of the
Final Act."1'7 Such information could be utilized by an
international commission designed to investigate the most
serious violations. The OGS encouraged the creation of
more groups in the Soviet Union and in all the countries
whose representatives signed the Final Act.18 And
finally, the OGS sought to establish the inseparability of
respect for human rights and the broader concern for
international security.
What were the main characteristics of the members of
the OGS and their specific goals? In his attempt to
present a working definition of dissent, Roy Medvedev
labels a dissident as:
someone who disagrees in some measure with the
ideological, political, economic, or moral
foundation that every society rests on [and]
openly proclaims his dissent and demonstrates it
in one way or another to his compatriots and the
state.19
This definition is useful because it expresses the
unlimited range of action which officials in government
could regard as dissent.
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Dissidents in the Soviet Union are referred to as
inakamyslyashchie or, "those who think differently." To
state views at variance with official Stalinist ideology
before 1953 meant certain arrest and imprisonment, but
this was not necessarily so after Khrushchev's "secret
speech" to the 20th party Congress in 1956 which denounced
Stalin's abuses of power. Khrushchev's open condemnation
at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 made an even stronger
plea for de-Stalinization. Throughout the 1960's,
dissidents wrote about the inadequacies of the Soviet
system in an unprecedented atmosphere of leniency. This
"thaw" in the domestic climate was well under way by 20
November 1962 when Alexander Solzhenitsyn's, One Day in
the Life of Ivan Denisovich appeared in the Soviet
literary journal, Now Mir.20 Other prominent dissidents
such as Andrei Sakharov and Roy Medvedev also expressed
alternative views to the long-established Party line,
although their works appeared later in the 1960's when the
trials of two well-known literary figures, Andrei
Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel, signaled the end of the
"thaw." Thus, Sakharov and Medvedev had their works
smuggled to the West for publication.21
Perhaps the most outstanding feature of this period
of dissent was the variety of writings calling for broader
civil rights for all Soviet citizens and redress of
301
transgressions by the Soviet government against specific
national, ethnic and religious groups.22 The first
journal to reprint the literature from many of these
groups, entitled A Chronicle of Current Events, appeared
in April 1968. In a 1972 landmark publication, Uncensored
Russia. Peter Reddaway translated the first ten editions
of the journal which made the dissident writings acces¬
sible to a much larger Western audience.23 The OGS have
carried on the tradition of diversity in their specific
human rights concerns which were represented in the
Chronicle.
The Ukrainian OGS for instance, emphasized that the
Ukraine was a sovereign European nation, a member of the
United Nations and entitled to its own representation
through a separate delegation at all international
conferences concerned with the implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act. The Ukrainian OGS also pointed to the
absence of foreign press correspondents in the Ukraine and
the especially severe curtailment of the free flow of
information.24 All of the OGS groups, although the Moscow
group to a lesser degree, found it difficult to solve this
problem, since most foreign press and government represen¬
tatives were centred exclusively in Moscow. The fact that
most OGS documents had to go to Moscow in order to reach
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the West, was a unifying force between the Moscow OGS and
similar bodies in the republics.
While the Ukrainian OGS presented a particularly
nationalistic tone, the Lithuanian OGS combined national¬
istic sentiment with an especially strong identification
with the Lithuanian Roman Catholic Church. Over 90 per
cent of the population of Lithuania is Roman Catholic and
most samizdat from Lithuania since 1970 has centred on
"state interference with the Lithuanian Catholic Church
and the persecution of priests, laymen, parents and even
children who openly practise their faith."25 Continual
religious persecution in Lithuania was alleged in the
first two documents of the Lithuanian OGS and regularly
thereafter.26
Georgian dissent has been heavily nationalistic in
tone since the mid 1950's and this is reflected in the
Georgian OGS. The original leader of this group, Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, issued statements protesting governmental
interference in the Georgian Orthodox Church and system¬
atic efforts, on the part of the predominantly Russian
leadership, to destroy Georgian culture and language.27
In one specific article, Gamsakhurdia documented a number
of protests and arrests which took place in Tbilisi in
1976. He concluded his essay by stating:
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It is possible to surmise that while the Kremlin
and Shevardnadze are not stopping Draconian
measures against 'economical crimes' [allegedly,
the political protests resulted in physical
damages ranging from 200 to 50,000 rubles] and
while they are continuing political Russifica-
tion, unrest and demonstration will continue.28
Gamsakhurdia' s comments were directed to Eduard
Shevardnadze, the First Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Georgia from 1972-85.
Shevardnadze was to became a full member of the Politburo
and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs in July 1985. His
intransigence towards Georgian dissidents may have
accelerated his political career. Gamsakhurdia was one of
the first OGS members arrested outside of the Russian
republic.29
The Armenian OGS stated in its first document that it
wished Armenia to became a member of the United Nations,
that a portion of territory, Nagorno-Karabakh, now part of
the republic of Azerbaidzhan, should be returned to
Armenia (referring to the Final Act's provisions for equal
rights and self-determination of people, Principle VIII),
and that discrimination against the Armenian language in
state, economic and cultural affairs should cease.30
Furthermore, the Armenian OGS proposed the creation of a
new Armenian constitution more in line with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (reaffirmed in the Final Act).
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Variolas specific concerns among the OGS groups were
inevitable given the variety of dissent in the Soviet
Union since 1965. The wide range of topics presented in
the longest running samizdat journal, The Chronicle of
Current Events (1968-present), is represented in OGS
samizdat as well. Nevertheless, the human rights
provisions in the Final Act have acted as a unique
assembly point for all human rights advocates and became a
unifying force. The following section describes the
development of this unprecedented alliance using the Final
Act as the focal point.
THE OGS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY IN THE USSR
In order to assist in Soviet implementation of the
Final Act, the Moscow OGS began to collect and distribute
information on intentional or unintentional violations of
the human rights provisions. The eleven members of the
group established a system to catalogue complaints from
Soviet citizens and to investigate their authenticity.
This section outlines what is known of the communication
network between the various groups and individuals
involved in unofficial monitoring activities. Due
primarily to its access to the international media, the
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Moscow OGS has served as the centre of the network and,
for that reason, this discussion focuses on this parti¬
cular group.
The Moscow OGS based its documents upon both written
and oral statements from Soviet citizens, even though its
founding document called for written statements only.31
On occasion, the Moscow OGS received telephone calls from
various areas of the Soviet Union from persons complaining
of socio-economic or civil-political human rights
violations. The complaints ranged from frustration over
rejected emigration requests to psychiatric imprisonment
for nonconformist political beliefs. Sometimes complaints
were delivered in person by individuals eventually
labelled "messengers," who travelled long distances from
their respective communities. Some "messengers" represen¬
ted groups, such as the Pentecostals (numbering over
500,000) while others represented nations such as the
Crimean Tatars and Meshki.32.
While reports from individuals and groups provided
the foundation for investigations of alleged violations,
copies of official documents dealing with a particular
violation established the validity of claims. For
example, Document Number Five of the Moscow OGS, dated 17
June 1976, presented copies of official documents in an
effort to substantiate repression against religious
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families.33 This document illustrated a conflict in
Soviet law between the socialist upbringing of children
and the rights to profess and practise any religion or
none at all (between Article 66 and Article 52 of the 1977
Fundamental Law of the Soviet Union).
Another even more convincing case involved the forced
separation of an adventist, Maria Vlasyuk, from her two
children. Official documents from the Khmelnitskaia
oblast court collegium for civil matters and from the
Starosiniavski Regional People1s Court (Ukraine), helped
to legitimize the claim that the Vlasyuk family had been
forcibly separated in violation of the Helsinki provi¬
sions.
When government documents were unpublished or
"secret," the OGS groups attempted to substantiate their
existence. Exposure of secret laws would invalidate the
official Soviet claim that the rights of citizens are
guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution and Criminal Codes
of the various republics because the rights of citizens
could be revoked or seriously breached by such secret
laws. Moscow OGS Document Number Six outlined the use of
secret laws to restrict residence permits available to
former political prisoners.34 In this case, a USSR
Council of Ministers resolution of 28 August 1974 stated
that individuals released from imprisonment were permitted
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to "return to the dwelling space occupied by members of
their family or relatives with wham they have been living
up to the time of their conviction.1,35 But according to
the Moscow OGS, an unpublished section of the resolution
stated, "persons who have served their sentence in the
form of imprisonment and exile for especially dangerous
state crimes [and for] the spreading of deliberately false
fabrications damaging to the state and social system" are
subject to residence restrictions.3® In this way, the
printed version of the resolution was misleading, if not
deliberately deceptive.
In some cases, the Moscow OGS saw special need for
personal investigation of alleged violations. For
example, the Moscow OGS received information pointing to
widespread religious persecution against Lithuanian
Catholics. In order to confirm these allegations, Moscow
OGS member, Ludmilla Alexeeva, travelled to Lithuania.
Her trip resulted in Moscow OGS Document Number Fifteen,
and the Lithuanian OGS wrote its first document with the
Moscow Group's assistance. This first document described
the internal exile of two Lithuanian Catholic Bishops,
Julionas Steponavicius and Vincentas Sladkevicius and
claimed that the arrests of these men violated principles
Three and Eight of Basket I of the Final Act.37
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Once information had been collected, evaluated and a
descriptive document completed, monitoring groups typed 35
copies since no other copying methods were available.
They then sent them by registered mail to the embassies of
the CSCE participants located in Moscow. One copy would
also be sent to the office of General Secretary Brezhnev.
The Moscow OGS sent its first six documents in this way
and only the letters addressed to Brezhnev reached their
intended destination; the other 240 letters disappeared.
Because of this experience, the Moscow OGS began to send
out its material through contacts with foreign ambassadors
of CSCE states and through Western news correspondents in
Moscow.38
From this brief examination of the way in which the
Moscow OGS collected and distributed information about
alleged human rights abuse, it is possible to establish
the nature of same of the internal links between the OGS
groups in various republics and between a wide range of
other human rights dissenters. Even though various groups
and individuals adopted specific concerns, the general
appeal of the Helsinki provisions acted as a unifying
force. For this reason, the OGS documents were the most
significant development in Soviet dissident samizdat
materials since the launching of the Chronicle of Current
Events. As will be seen in the following section, the
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Final Act became a source of unity between dissidents in
the Soviet Union and human rights advocates in the West as
well.
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE
HEISINKI MONITORING GROUPS (OGS)
International support for the OGS became a troubling
phenomenon for the Soviet leadership. Since the groups
offered an unofficial interpretation of the contents of
the Final Act, and an independent assessment of Soviet
compliance, they generated much interest among the CSCE
signatories and their citizens. In the United States
concern was expressed through the Commission of Security
and Cooperation in Europe, which was created by a
congressional bill in June 1976, and through the unoffi¬
cial Helsinki Watch Group, established in 1978. Perhaps
the most important source of support for the OGS came from
the President of the United States himself. The President
submits a semi-annual report to the Committee on Security
and Cooperation in Europe which still evaluates progress
in implementation of the Final Act. President Ford wrote
in his letter for the First Semi-annual Report that the
Final Act "has committed the national leaders who signed
it to standards of behavior which are compatible with
310
Western thoughts about the relationship of people to their
governments." (emphasis added)39 Thus, with regard to the
Soviet Union, the semi-annual reports evaluated Soviet
"progress" in adapting to the Western interpretation of
the Final Act—specifically, to the human rights provi¬
sions. Most importantly, the OGS in the Soviet Union, and
the monitoring organizations in the West, relied upon
similar interpretations of human rights, interpretations
which the Soviet leadership did not accept at the
conference and has refused to recognize since the signing
of the Final Act.
The OGS agreed with the Western interpretation of
human rights, as stated in the Final Act, in three
significant ways: first, it argued that recognition and
implementation of international guarantees of human rights
would enhance international security; second, the rights
of the individual (political rights) were viewed as
equally important as the rights of the collective
(economic rights); and third, all nations were considered
subject to the jurisdiction of international organizations
who acted to monitor the compliance of individual nations
who had signed human rights treaties and agreements. As
will be seen, these three largely "Western" interpreta¬
tions of human rights were contained in numerous OGS docu¬
ments.
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In its first document, the Moscow OGS stated that
"the members of the Group to Assist proceed from the
conviction that the issues of humanitarianism and free
information have a direct relationship to the problem of
international security....1,40 Similarly, the US State
Department's third report evaluating progress in implemen¬
tation of the Final Act, insisted that "any review of CSCE
implementation cannot avoid discussion of action which—if
left unquestioned—might threaten the credibility and
integrity of the CSCE process itself."41 These views,
which incorporate respect for human rights into the
general pursuit of security in international relations,
have remained consistent for both the OGS and for the
American Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The Soviet view has also remained consistent. In
contrast to the OGS, the Soviet leadership discounts the
link between human rights and international security at
least as it is made by the OGS. During the June 1979
Vienna summit to sign the Strategic Arms limitation Treaty
(SAIT II), Brezhnev made it plain to Carter that "human
rights is a sensitive subject for us and is not a
legitimate ground for discussion between you and me."42
Soviet legal scholar, S. Zivs, defends the Soviet record
on human rights, but does not concede to the link between
human rights and international security. At best, he
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argues that protection from nuclear holocaust is the
ultimate human right.43 In his perception, linkage
between arms limitation or reduction talks and human
rights issues, which was considered by the Carter
administration, would simply cloud both topics such that
the prospects for progress in either area would be
lessened. Ultimately, international stability would
decrease with the individual's primary right of survival
threatened.
In order to counter Soviet reasoning, as represented
by Zivs, the OGS and the CSCE Commission presented a
convincing argument which centred on the actual provisions
of the Final Act. For example, Principle Seven appears
quite clear on the connection between human rights and
international security:
The participating States recognize the universal
significance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for which is an essential
factor for the peace, justice and well-being
necessary to ensure the development of friendly
relations and cooperation among themselves as
among all States.
For this reason, the Soviet argument has been rejected by
many of the Western and neutral states that signed the
Final Act, especially those that fought for the human
rights provisions during the CSCE negotiations (notably
the neutral nations, Canada, France, the United Kingdom
and United States). Even more significant is the fact
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that since the OGS have sided with the Western view, they
have received direct support from other CSCE signatories
and their citizens.
The similarity between the Western view and the OGS
view is presented in another East-West debate over the
primacy of economic or social versus political or civil
rights. Both categories of rights are desirable and
complementary. Economic or social rights include the
right to work, education, shelter, medical care and a
reasonable standard of living; political or civil rights
include freedom of speech, press, demonstration and legal
representation to defend the rights of the individual or
to receive a remedy in the case of a violation. The
former have been the allegedly appealing features of
socialist or communist systems, while the latter have been
the proclaimed benefit of Western-type democracies. In
fact, as was discussed in Chapter Three, this division of
rights has been cemented in two separate United Nations
covenants on human rights.44
The OGS interpretation has been a combination of both
categories of rights, with more emphasis on political
rights than the Soviet leadership is willing to accept.
The Moscow OGS writes;
We wish to draw attention to the fact that two
years after the assumption of power of the
Communist Party and 40 years after the publica-
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tion of the present constitution [meaning the
1936 Constitution], citizens of the U.S.S.R. do
not have a normal possibility for practising
their ' rights and freedoms all of which derive
from the inherent dignity of the human person.'
(Final Act, la, VII) Freedom of speech, press,
meetings, political gatherings, processions and
demonstrations are formally secured in article
125 of the constitution of the U.S.S.R., which
even requires that the government make available
for this 'printing presses, paper supplies,
public buildings, streets. means of communica¬
tion, etc. Instead, over the last 60 years, it
has became evident that these freedoms do not
exist for those whose opinions differ from those
of the government.45
Emphasis on these political rights, which are described in
the Final Act as inherent, corresponds to the Western
concept of "natural rights," as expressed in the writings,
of Locke, Jefferson and Lincoln and codified in the
American Constitution's Bill of Rights. This clause was
included in the Final Act at the behest of nations
supporting the theory of natural rights.46 While these
rights are guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution, they
have not played a large role in Russian or Soviet
political culture or tradition. Furthermore, the Soviet
government has been reluctant to implement them when they
do not directly facilitate the building of communism.
Ultimately, the decision about which actions or rights
correspond to the construction of communism is left to the
CPSU and not the international community.
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Given the fact that the Soviet leadership rejects the
OGS's link between international security and human rights
and dismisses the especially important role of political
rights, it should not be surprising that the Soviet
leadership also rejects the jurisdiction of international
human rights organizations to monitor and influence
domestic human rights policy. While the Final Act has not
created its own commission to monitor CSCE implementation,
the signatories meet every two years to discuss implemen¬
tation. Therefore, the OGS and the CSCE Commission in the
United States are the only two "organizations" which
continuously monitor CSCE compliance. Yet, official
statements from the Soviet government have claimed that
implementation of the Final Act is left to each parti¬
cipating state. According to Vladimir Gantman:
Attempts to misuse detente to interfere in the
domestic affairs of states under the pretext of
'protecting human rights' is no small obstacle
in the practice and conception of detente. "The
right' to such interference is drawn by some
people from the Final Act of Helsinki, although
this Act is not a document of international law,
as everybody knows. Furthermore, it does not
contain one word about the so-called 'right' to
interfere. It does not contain one word which
substantiates the conception of so-called
'common responsibility' by the signatories of
the Final Act for all that happens within these
countries, a conception which is used in this or
that form in the scientific, political, and
naturally propagandists press of the West.47
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Thus, Soviet commentators have often rejected Western
support for the Helsinki OGS as interference in Soviet
internal affairs.
But the OGS continued to put forward a view in direct
contradiction to official Soviet statements. Writing
about the conditions of confinement of political prison¬
ers, the Moscow OGS has claimed:
Inasmuch as the Group does not consider the vise
of torture and of cruel and inhuman treatment of
political prisoners as a form of 'the
exercise...by a participating state of rights
inherent in its sovereignty'—Principle VI, Part
A, Basket I—so it does not extend the clause on
'non-interference in the internal affairs' of
the participating states of the Helsinki Accord-
-Principle VI, Part A, Basket I—to the torture
and cruel and inhuman behavior caused by that
sovereignty.48
This interpretation was similar to one expressed by
members of the American State Department, who claimed that
"the Final Act has made human rights and observance of the
commitments in it legitimate and recognized concerns of
the international community.''49 Thus, the OGS agreed with
the Western participants of the CSCE that Soviet reliance
on the doctrine of non-interference was too narrow an
interpretation of the Final Act.
Successive Soviet leaderships have attempted to fend
off American criticism of Soviet human rights abuse
through three assertions: the human rights attack
threatens international security; American (and OGS)
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emphasis on political rights discounts the superiority of
economic rights; and the American interest in Soviet human
rights abuse is motivated by the desire to interfere in
the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.50 But the OGS
have complicated official Soviet strategy by insisting
that the Soviet Union has not fulfilled its obligations
undertaken in the Final Act. Faced with the prospect of
joint international-domestic criticism of human rights
abuse, the Soviet authorities decided early on to suppress
the OGS. The following section describes the methods and
effects of the crackdown on the groups.
OFFICIAL SOVIET REACTION TO THE
HELSINKI MONITORING GROUPS
The founders of the Moscow OGS made their first
announcement on 13 May 1976. Two days later, the chairman
of the group, Professor Yuri Orlov, was detained by the
KGB and warned that the group's activity was "unconstitu¬
tional" and that the members could face legal action if
they continued to express their views. Curing the
following months the OGS continued to function, forcing
the Soviet leadership to arrest the members.
The scenario outlined above was precisely what Soviet
leaders had hoped to avoid. It is clear that their
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strategy was to de-emphasize the human rights provisions
of the Final Act in the hope that they would be superceded
by other areas of the document, especially the sections
dealing with improved trade relations and reaffirmation of
the territorial status quo in Europe. Faced with an
unofficial group in the Soviet Union intent on monitoring
Soviet compliance with the specific area of the agreement
that they wished to forget, the Soviet leaders initiated a
strategy to limit the damage to their image in the CSCE.
This strategy consisted of threats and intimidation and if
necessary, arrest and imprisonment.
Certainly, the OGS members were not surprised by the
reactions of the Soviet authorities to the formation of
their groups. Virtually all members were veteran
dissidents. For example, the founding members of the
Ukrainian OGS had spent a total of 60 years in prisons and
must have been aware of the potential consequences of
their activity. But this is not to say that the Soviet
authorities felt that they could merely arrest the
activists without condemnation from the other CSCE
participants, especially since the human rights provisions
were included as a trade-off for the sections that the
Soviet representatives desired.
Soviet leaders attempted to justify the official
crackdown on the OGS members in two ways. The first
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method was based on exposing the members as anti-Soviet
traitors who were linked with foreign, especially
American, intelligence agencies. Apparently, the Soviet
view was that a strong response would display the
uselessness of a clandestine, as well as public, "psycho¬
logical attack" in the name of human rights. A second
approach was to take the offensive as the best defense, in
other words, to attack the American treatment of human
rights activists. One Soviet commentator centred his
criticism on the American federal prison system. He
concluded his remarks by stating:
The well-known contempt for democratic rights
and liberties in the U.S. no longer requires
further documentation. Over many decades
bourgeois 'democracy1 has developed numerous
methods to combat malcontents and dissidents.
But today the advances in drug therapy,
psychosurgery and electronics have placed new
weapons in the hands of the authorities.51
Also, during the Belgrade follow-up conference, Yuli
Vorontsov, head of the Soviet delegation, read a letter
from the American Reverend Ben Chavis, Jr. (one of the
Wilmington 10) which stated that thousands of Americans
are "thrown into jail" solely because they fight for their
human rights.52 Once again, the overriding objective was
to stifle the activity of the OGS and to prevent accusa¬
tions that the Soviet Union was violating the Helsinki
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Final Act by shifting attention to the American human
rights record.
The Anti-Soviet Label
Since the brief flourishing of nonconformist writing
in the Soviet Union in the mid-1960's and the sudden
clampdown on such activity during the trials of Andrei
Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel in 1965, the use of anti-Soviet
propaganda statutes against dissenters has not been
uncommon. Moscow OGS members, Aleksander Ginzburg,
Viktor Nekipelov, Yuri Orlav, and Tatyana Osipova were
sentenced for this violation under Article 70 of the RSFSR
Criminal Code.53 Soviet state prosecutors have also used
RSFSR Criminal Code Article 190-1 for "circulation of
anti-Soviet fabrications," as in the case of Aleksander
Podrabinek.54 In reference to the OGS, the anti-Soviet
label has been consistently applied and the sentences for
conviction of anti-Soviet activity have been especially
severe. The anti-Soviet label has been used by the Soviet
authorities to accentuate foreign, in this case, American,
subversive threats to the Soviet Union and to claim that
the OGS members are agents of a bourgeois attack on
Soviet socialism.
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This perception of the members of the OGS represents
a pivotal divergence of opinion between the Soviet leaders
and human rights activists. While official Soviet
commentators downplayed the relationship between detente
and Soviet domestic affairs, many dissidents clearly did
not. As Frederick Barghoorn has argued, human rights
activists frequently contend that relaxation of tension
abroad "logically connotes relaxation of controls at
home."55 Since the CSCE began during the high points of
detente, in 1972, and since the Final Act includes human
rights provisions to apply domestically, the OGS presented
a convincing argument. But the Soviet authorities
denounced this interpretation which "facilitates the
'penetration' of Soviet society by 'bourgeois' ideas and
agents."56 In order to substantiate their point, Soviet
officials often make an example of a prominent human
rights activist which warns others of the dangers of
expressing their views, and demonstrates the futility of
further activity. As will be presented in Chapter Six,
the focus on prominent Soviet dissidents has not abated,
but a more common approach in the 1980's has been to exile
such persons to prevent them from serving as "leaders" of
human rights dissent within the borders of the Soviet
Union. In the case of the OGS, in 1978 it appeared that
Professor Yuri Orlov was earmarked to be the example for
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others. His case presented a clear example of the Soviet
strategy to link the subversive activity of foreigners
against the Soviet Union with dissidence.57
Orlov was arrested in February 1977, held incom¬
municado for over fourteen months and sentenced in May
1978 to seven years in a strict regime labour camp
followed by five years internal exile for anti-Soviet
agitation and propaganda. Curing the fourteen months that
Orlov was waiting to go to trial, the Soviet press
uncovered an American intelligence operation linked with
human rights activists. Allegedly, the CIA's attempt to
collect information on Soviet defense matters was carried
out through US Embassy staff and American journalists.
In fact, the CIA had recruited a dissident sometime
in 1975. His name was Sanya L. Lipavsky, a neurosurgeon
of Jewish descent.58 Earlier, he had applied to emigrate.
The recruitment of Lipavsky was considered an extraor¬
dinary achievement since the CIA had been trying,
unsuccessfully, to recruit an agent within the Soviet
Union who had access to valuable information on the Soviet
military. Lipavsky claimed to have worked previously as a
surgeon in Murmansk where he treated Soviet personnel
stationed at the nuclear submarine base there. Lipavsky
was then recruited by the CIA despite concerns that he may
have been an agent provocateur. According to officials
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from the CIA, this risk was worth taking, although they
ignored the potential dangers they were creating for
dissidents.59 When Lipavsky revealed in March 1977 that
he had been working for the KGB, the worst suspicions were
confirmed.
Most certainly, Lipavsky had in fact been involved in
the dissident movement. Soviet authorities have admitted
that he did apply to emigrate and was a dissident.60 Even
more important was the fact that Lipavsky was associated
with Moscow OGS members Yuri Orlov and Anatoly
Shcharansky, and even lived with Shcharansky for a short
length of time. Since Lipavsky had been involved in the
dissident movement since 1972, he must have provided the
KGB with invaluable information on the background of the
OGS members, as well as information about their ongoing
activities. In one of his articles for Izvestiia on 8
May, Lipavsky stated that:
After the European conference in Helsinki, the
Western conspirators gave the signal to
fabricate information on alleged violations of
'human rights' in the U.S.S.R. It was at their
prompting that Yu. Orlov, with the help of V.
Rubin, set up the so-called 'group to monitor
the observance of the Helsinki agreements in the
U.S.S.R.'61
He went on to claim that "although the U.S. government was
interested in information on 'dissidents' in the U.S.S.R.,
its main task was collecting espionage information about
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the U.S.S.R. "s defense capability.1,62 Therefore, by June
1977, it appeared that Professor Orlov could face charges
of treason (Article 64 of the RSFSR Criminal Code) and
possibly receive a death sentence. In May 1978, he was
convicted of the lesser crime of anti-Soviet agitation and
propaganda, but in July, Anatoly Shcharansky was convicted
of high treason with a sentence of 13 years detention.63
Eugene Goldman, chairman of the National Conference on
Soviet Jewry reflected the concerns of American Jews about
Shcharansky■s fate when he stated:
The recent alleged confirmation of Lipavsky's
link with the C.I.A. has in fact no direct
connection with Anatoly Shcharansky. It now
appears that Lipavsky volunteered his services
for the C.I.A., lending credence to the
suspicion that he did so as an agent of the
Soviet secret police and for the purpose of
implicating Soviet Jews actively engaged in the
legal struggle to emigrate.64
Nevertheless, Shcharansky's conviction was upheld and his
opportunity for emigration did not materialize until 1986.
The same was true for Orlov. Despite eventually permit¬
ting him to emigrate, the Soviet authorities engineered a
scenario to justify their claim that both were traitors
(see Chapter Six).
It is possible to draw one of two conclusions from
the Lipavsky affair. Either the CIA made a terrible
intelligence blunder which placed many OGS members in
danger, or the KGB was able to plant agents within the
325
ranks of the dissidents who were especially successful in
aiding the elimination of large sections of dissent.65 In
either case, the CIA practice of recruiting actual or "so-
called" dissidents, provided the Soviet authorities with a
legitimate reason to arrest OGS members. This is not to
say that they would not have arrested the dissidents
anyway, only that the CIA's involvement with dissidents
further undermined attempts to improve Soviet adherence to
the Final Act and merely assisted the Soviet authorities
in using the anti-Soviet clauses.
The Soviet Human Rights Counter-Attack
While Soviet officials implicated OGS members in
anti-Soviet activity, they re-emphasized the unique rights
guaranteed under "developed socialism." By citing the
provisions for citizens' rights in the 1977 Soviet
Constitution, which includes the Final Act's Declaration
of Principles, Soviet authors attempted to deflect the
public outcry over the imprisonment of human rights
activists in the Soviet Union. As an extension of this
strategy, Soviet journalists launched their own attack
against the American violation of human rights. Citing
the persecution of J. Harris, B. Chavis and the
"Wilmington 10," they have claimed that civil rights are
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"violated shamelessly" in the US, which "makes graphically
evident the demagogic nature of the attempts by some
figures in that country to assume the role of devotees of
human rights."66
The specific rights which each ideological system
emphasizes are discussed at greater length in Chapter
Three, but it is sufficient to note here that this type of
debate, if the Soviet leadership would allow more of it,
is a healthy aspect of the Helsinki process. Furthermore,
it means that such matters no longer fall into the
exclusive category of domestic jurisdiction and are a
legitimate concern of the CSCE participants and the
international community. Unfortunately, the Soviet
leadership has traditionally viewed this type of criticism
as a one-way street, although more recent signs of a
willingness to engage in broader debate are evident.
Twenty-seven months after the first announcement by
an OGS group, no less than fifteen of its most prominent
members had been imprisoned for anti-Soviet fabrications,
agitation and propaganda. Even though this had been a
common accusation against dissidents in the Soviet Union
for a decade, the fate of the OGS members aroused special
interest among the CSCE participating nations. As stated
earlier, the OGS understanding of the Final Act's human
rights provisions was more aligned with the "Western"
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rather than the Soviet interpretation. For this reason,
the arrest of the OGS members evoked criticism and
sympathy from official and unofficial organizations in the
West. The following section describes the wide range of
support for the OGS members during the attack against
them.
WESTERN RESPONSE TO THE ARRESTS OF OGS MEMBERS
In December 1976, the Ukrainian OGS issued an
optimistic memorandum which emphasized the need for broad
support for the OGS groups:
If world opinion does not lessen its moral
support, if the Western news media focus more
attention to the struggle for Human Rights in
the U.S.S.R., then the coming decade will bring
about great democratic change in our country.6'
Domestic changes of the type recommended by the OGS were
not forthcoming (see the five objectives of the OGS
outlined in Part I), but support from groups and indi¬
viduals in the West was surprisingly vocal. For the
purpose of this study, Western support for the OGS can be
separated into two categories: statements from represen¬
tatives of the United States government during the Carter
administration and statements from other governments
participating in the CSCE, as well as nongovernmental
organizations. These statements combined to make the CSCE
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less of a diplomatic victory for Soviet foreign policy
strategists. Rather, the Soviet Union was put on the
defensive against what Soviet leaders referred to as
"psychological warfare."68 In actuality, the interna¬
tional debate over the treatment dealt out to the OGS
members was a logical outgrowth of the CSCE process and a
vital component in the long term implementation of the
agreement.
The Carter Administration and the OGS
President Jimmy Carter inherited the CSCE from the
Nixon and Ford administrations. President Ford had
actually signed the completed the Final Act on 1 August
1975. During the presidential campaign debates in October
1976, Carter criticized Ford for not upholding the
Helsinki principles, especially the principles guaran¬
teeing human rights. Carter then pledged to hold the
Soviet government to the obligations it accepted in the
Final Act.69 The sincerity of Carter's commitment to
human rights is still a matter of debate, but this author
contends that Carter's concern was genuine. What is most
important is that, in Soviet eyes at least, Carter
appeared to isolate the Soviet Union for criticism and
public embarrassment.70 This was because Carter had
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eliminated any possibility of pursuing "private diplomacy"
with Soviet leaders over human rights dissidents, as it
was used previously by Nixon and Kissinger.
Yet, if Carter was going to speak out about human
rights violations of the Final Act in a much more public
fashion, it was inevitable that he would arouse antagonism
in US-Soviet relations for two reasons. First, of the 35
CSCE participants, the Soviet record on human rights was
one which evoked the most criticism. Within the United
Nations, the Soviet representatives have been protected by
a human rights cushion since many members of the UN have
had records of human rights abuse that are clearly worse
than that of the Soviet Union (for example, Uganda,
Kampuchea, Chile, Argentina and Iran). This cushion is
not present in the CSCE.
Second, and most relevant for this study, is the fact
that the OGS pushed the Carter administration toward a
public clash with the Soviet leadership over violations of
the Final Act at the same time as the new president was
trying to fulfill his campaign pledges to defend human
rights and dissociate himself from, what he considered to
be, the apathy of the previous administration. In this
way, the OGS was at the very foundation of his denuncia¬
tion of Soviet actions.
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The first signal that President Carter meant to
implement his human rights diplomacy came in his response
to a letter sent to the White House by the famous Soviet
dissident Andrei Sakharov.71 One month later, in February
1977, Carter met with the exiled dissident Vladimir
Bukovsky.72 The Carter administration went directly to
the defense of the OGS members by denouncing the arrest of
Moscow OGS members, Alexandr Ginzburg and Yuri Orlov.73
There is strong evidence to indicate that the Carter
administration felt pressured into making these responses
and realized that an immediate assault on the Soviet human
rights record could be counter-productive. Brezinski
later wrote:
In spite of Carter's private efforts to reassure
both Brezhnev and Dobrynin that he was not
planning to use human rights primarily as an
anti-Soviet weapon, the incident with the
Sakharov letter had clearly touched a raw nerve.
One has to concede that this event did not help
the relationship between the new Administration
and the Soviet Union.74
Nevertheless, by the time of Shcharansky's conviction,
Carter openly stated that he was "sobered by the reminder
that, so late in the 20th century, a person can be sent to
jail simply for asserting his basic human rights."75
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, characterized the OGS
members as "men and women of uncommon courage.. .tried for
asserting fundamental human rights.. .guaranteed in
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international agreements entered into by their govern¬
ments."76 Such comments affected other issues in Soviet-
American relations, notably, the attempt to complete and
receive Congressional ratification of the SAIT II
Treaty.77
While the Carter administration acted as a defender
for the OGS from 1977-81, it was unable to prevent the
arrest and imprisonment of same OGS members, while
obtaining permission for others to emigrate.78 Thus,
Carter's human rights policy was a combination of
successes and failures for the OGS. The President was not
willing to place the OGS at the centre of American-Soviet
relations and to make most other issues secondary. Even
if the President had made the OGS his priority, it cannot
be determined with certainty that Soviet officials would
have been more lenient toward the dissidents. And, after
all, the OGS appealed to all CSCE signatories and the
greatest potential for pressure on the Soviet government
rested on a collective response rather than an individual
American one.
Other CSCE States and the OGS
During the trials of OGS members, other governments
of CSCE states protested about what they considered to be
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clear violations of the Final Act. While accusations of
human rights violations from the United States and Western
democratic governments could be explained away as an
ideological attack, criticism emanating from Western
communist parties proved to be more troublesome. Members
of the French Communist Party condemned the trials of
Moscow OGS representatives Shcharansky and Ginzburg. They
were among approximately 6,000 demonstrators who marched
in Paris in a show of protest against the trials. The
largest group in the procession, composed of leftists,
trade union leaders and French Jews, was led by Natalya
Shcharansky, wife of the accused. Ultimately, the French
Communist Party called upon the Soviet authorities of "end
all repression."79
The British Communist party expressed concern over
the Soviet law of slander against the state by sending
members of its political committee to the Soviet embassy
in London. In a statement they claimed that the law was
"of such an all-embracing character that it open[ed] the
way to prosecutions directed against people holding
unpopular opinions."80 From their perspective, disagree¬
ment was a matter for public debate rather than for legal
action. Italian Communist Party Chief, Enrico Berlinguer
similarly stated that, "Convictions for crimes of opinion
cannot be tolerated."81
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While all of these comments were critical of the
trials in the Soviet Union, they were also aimed at
factions within the respective West European communist
parties that asserted their loyalty to the CPSU. During
the summer of 1978, the loss of unity experienced by many
parties was particularly evident in the French Communist
Party. Georges Marchais, leader of the French communists
and a lukewarm advocate of Eurocommunism, was criticized
by a faction led by Jeannette Thorez-Vermeersch. Her
husband had been General Secretary of the Party for over
30 years and had advocated more traditional communist
tactics including abstention from alliances or compromises
with non-communist parties in Western Europe.82 The fact
that Thorez-Vermeersch attempted a revival of this policy
must have been troubling to Marchais who in turn could
have seized upon the Moscow OGS trials as evidence of the
inadvisability of closer ties to the Soviet Union.
Indeed, many communists in Western Europe sought to appeal
to patriotism and the needs of the relatively well-to-do
working classes in their own countries. They intended, at
least in part, to provide an alternative to the Soviet or
Chinese models of communism.
Perhaps the anxiety of Eurocommunists increased when,
in April 1978, Viktor G. Afanasyev editor of Pravda,
stated at a Madrid meeting of the Spanish Communist Party
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that "Eurocommunism does not exist. Only scientific
Marxism exists."83 Since these comments were uttered only
weeks before the dissident trials, the responses by
Eurocommunists to the latter may have been heightened.
Once again, it is also possible that their outward
criticism was directed toward factions within their own
parties.
While Western communist parties expressed their
discontent, Western governments began to take actions
ranging from verbal protest to trade sanctions.84 In
London a group of Members of Parliament nominated the OGS
for the Nobel Peace Prize. Trials were also held in
London for Yuri Orlov and Anatoly Shcharansky and both
were acquitted for their alleged "crimes." British
Foreign Minister, David Owen described the treatment of
Orlov as "harsh and in my view unjustifiable."85
A motion in the Israeli Knesset, supported by both
the Begin government and opposition Labour Party leaders,
expressed concern over the violation of laws of justice
and humanity in the Soviet Union. It portrayed the Soviet
response to Western concern as a violation of internal
affairs as synonymous with the Nazi justification for
persecution of the Jews.86 The accumulation of such
protests would, it was hoped, protect the OGS members from
further harassment and arrest.
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Finally, numerous non-governmental, allegedly non-
political organizations, attempted to exert pressure on
the Soviet government over the OGS members. In Eastern
Europe, groups such as Charter 77 issued statements at
great risk of arrest, while in the West, the American
based Helsinki Watch and Helsinki Guarantees for the
Ukraine committee translated OGS samizdat materials and
issued their own protests to Soviet officials. In one of
their first statements, the founders of the American
Helsinki Watch attempted to influence the Soviet leaders
through the following declaration:
Shortly after its signing four years ago the
document [the Final Act] was reprinted in its
entirety in Pravda. The Soviet Government is
proud of this fact and has criticized the United
States for not having publicized the accord
widely among United States citizens. But the
Soviet Government's treatment of its own
Helsinki monitors is shameful....Soviet leaders
should be told...that until the legitimate
rights of the Helsinki monitors are restored,
the fulfillment of another goal of the Helsinki
accord—the granting of most-favored-nation
[trade] status—is out of the question.87
Such unofficial human rights organizations are significant
in that they can tarnish the international reputation of
the Soviet Union and, from the Soviet point of view,
adversely affect the ongoing ideological struggle. But
they also pressurized their own governmental representa¬
tives into insisting upon changes in Soviet attitudes.
This is especially true in the United States as each CSCE
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follow-up meeting nears.88 If non-governmental organiza¬
tions were able to function freely in the Soviet Union, as
they are in the US, then the OGS would not have to appeal
to organizations in the West and one cause of alleged
interference in Soviet internal affairs would be elimina¬
ted. Indeed, the Final Act would be implemented more
effectively under such conditions.89
CONCLUSION
The optimism expressed by certain of the OGS members
over the effects of Western public opinion on the Soviet
leadership was premature. The statements of President
Carter, other CSCE participating governments and non¬
governmental organizations usually evoked strong negative
responses from the Soviet authorities. And pessimism on
the American side was at times very noticeable. In a
truly cynical article William Safire, columnist for The
New York Times, called for the United States to rescind
its signature on the Final Act. He continued:
What did we get for agreeing to negotiate the
agreement the Soviets wanted so badly? Nothing.
What did we get for our pains in writing in
human-rights guarantees? A horse laugh from
Moscow...a move to cancel our approval of the
agreement that the Soviets have already broken
would be legal, non-belligerent and cost-free.
It would send a message to the Kremlin that
their continued duplicity [especially in Africa]
will make the 'final act' no act at all.90
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In response, Gennady Gerasimov, at that time a political
observer for Novosti Press Agency, claimed that even if
the United States renounced the Final Act, the other CSCE
signatories would not. Thus, the United States would be
pushed out of European affairs and relegated to the role
of "revenge-seeker." He added:
I am constantly surprised at how Americans
venture to judge the fulfillment of an agreement
whose text is inaccessible to them [the Final
Act was much more widely published in the Soviet
Union than in the United States].91
Gerasimov's remarks were too harsh though, because
Americans can locate a copy of the Final Act with little
effort. Concerns in the United States are focused on the
value of the document rather than on its availability.
It is difficult to determine if the OGS and their
supporters in the West influenced the Soviet leaders to
temper their response to dissidence in the Soviet Union.
But given the combination of harsh sentences and permis¬
sion to emigrate, it seems most likely that a definite
pattern cannot be established. The fortunate OGS members
were forced to emigrate rather than face imprisonment.
Even though the influence of Western governments and
non-governmental organizations was probably minimal, it
would be premature to discount their worth altogether.
Chapter V will argue that the Carter administration did
arouse more discussion of human rights, even though it did
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not cause significant modifications in the Soviet
interpretation of human rights.
This chapter has illustrated how any study of the
CSCE and the human rights debate between the United States
and the Soviet Union must pay attention to the unofficial
Obshchestvennaia gruppa sodeistviia. As these groups
began to publish samizdat for circulation in the Soviet
Union and for distribution to the CSCE participants, it
became apparent that their interpretation of the human
rights provisions in the Final Act was closer to Western
views than Eastern assessments. This was reflected in OGS
attitudes toward the relationship between human rights and
international security, in the special importance OGS
accorded political rights, and in the OGS belief in the
need for international investigative bodies to assess the
performance of CSCE participants in implementing the human
rights provisions of the Final Act.
Even though the groups were successful in enlisting
support from Western governments and citizens, their
efforts to hold the Soviet government to the OGS inter¬
pretation of the Final Act was largely unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, the OGS carried on the human rights activism
of the period 1965-1972, and did so with the support of an
international agreement signed by the Soviet authorities
and widely published in the Soviet Union. The official
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crackdown on the OGS provided a dramatic propaganda defeat
for the Soviet leadership and heightened awareness, both
within and outside the Soviet Union, of the implications
of the official Soviet human rights doctrine.
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CHAPTER 5
THE CARTER AEMINISTRATION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY
When President Jimmy Carter entered office on January
20, 1977, he was prepared to set the United States on a
new course in foreign policy. Carter wanted to interject
American concern for the "rights" of individuals into
interstate relations.1 During his inaugural address he
stated:
Because we are free we can never be indifferent
to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral
sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those
societies which share with us an abiding respect
for individual human rights. We do not seek to
intimidate, but it is clear that a world which
others can dominate with impunity would be
inhospitable to decency and a threat to the
well-being of all people.2
This was the first official statement by the President
that he was about to use "human rights diplomacy" in his
foreign policy. While the provisions of the Helsinki
Final Act were often used as a definitional code of what
rights should be respected, it was clear that the Soviet
Union and the United States did not interpret human rights
synonymously.3 But an equally serious difficulty, which
has not received enough attention, was that Carter's two
chief foreign policy advisors disagreed on how to
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implement human rights diplomacy. In the case of Zbigniew
Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor for the
administration, human rights was largely a political
weapon to use against the Soviet Union. Cyrus Vance, the
Secretary of State, preferred a case-by-case approach in
which the human rights compliance of each nation could be
measured individually. These and other internal differ¬
ences were as detrimental to the President's human rights
policy as were the antithetical ideological differences
between the United States and Soviet Union over human
rights.
This chapter will discuss Carter's use of the
Helsinki Final Act as one aspect of his human rights
policy. Attention will be paid to the foundations of
Carter's human rights drive; the role of the National
Security Council (NSC) and the State Department in the
human rights policy; the difficulty in interjecting
humanitarian concerns into both foreign and domestic
policy; and finally, the tension generated between the
Soviet Union and the United States when human rights were
given priority in bilateral relations. Even though this
is in no way a comprehensive analysis, it highlights the
difficulties inherent in applying the American definition
of human rights to relations with other nations, espe¬
cially the Soviet Union.
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FOUNDATIONS OF A HUMAN RIGHTS PRESIDENCY
Carter's decision to consider issues of morality in
relations with other nations was politically expedient in
1976. The American public was responsive to the new
candidate's disassociation from the Vietnam-Watergate era
and his openness in foreign policy which contrasted with
Kissinger's realoolitik and his alleged "Lone Ranger
diplomacy."4 Carter was particularly interested in
installing a new administration based upon his view of
traditional American idealism which was, in his words, "a
practical and realistic approach to foreign affairs [and]
the best foundation for the exertion of American power and
influence."5 To accentuate this approach, President
Carter responded in writing to a letter from the Soviet
dissident physicist, Andrei Sakharov, early on in his
tenure in the White House.6 This action was in marked
contrast to former President Gerald Ford's refusal to meet
with the exiled Soviet dissident, Alexander Solzhenitsyn,
out of the fear that this would have been detrimental to
American-Soviet relations. Carter's attempt to display
his sincerity resulted in a hostile response from Soviet
leaders who accused him of interfering in their internal
affairs and of promoting a so-called "human rights
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policy," not for general humanitarian interests, but
specifically to badger the Soviet Union.7
The Carter presidency also offered the prospect of a
joint legislative-executive effort to protect human
rights. Congress had traditionally played the role of
human rights watchdog, primarily by linking violations to
restrictions in trade. As outlined in Chapter 2, the
Trade Act of 1974 (and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment) was
one of the first significant pieces of legislation in this
respect.8 Carter's plans to uphold the humanitarian
obligations made by signatory nations to the 1975 Helsinki
Final Act would synchronize with congressional attempts to
monitor compliance.9 A genuine effort to improve the
human condition by a world power also appeared to dovetail
with the work of various non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) such as Amnesty International, the International
Commission of Jurists, and the International Committee of
the Red Cross.10 Although these governmentally "indepen¬
dent" organizations welcomed the Carter administration's
efforts, their enthusiasm was likely to be tempered by
the fact the NGOs have traditionally distrusted any
government's attempt to formulate an impartial human
rights policy.11
Perhaps the most convincing aspect of Carter's
pronouncements on human rights was that he appeared to be
355
genuinely concerned. In the words of one commentator,
"the human rights issue fit Carter like a glove."12 As a
native of Georgia, Carter had witnessed the implementation
of state-imposed racial desegregation throughout the
1950's and 1960's. During his terms as state senator and
governor, he enthusiastically supported civil rights
leaders who were endeavoring to end legal segregation. In
Carter's words, "the political and social transformation
of the Southland was a powerful demonstration of how moral
principles should and could be applied effectively to the
legal structure of our society.13 Further evidence of
Carter's sincerity could be found in his Baptist-Fundamen¬
talist beliefs, which he continued to practise by joining
a Baptist church in Washington. Thus, the strongest
foundation for Carter's human rights policy was probably
Carter himself and the fact that his pronouncements on
human rights were as much a matter of personal conviction
as zeal for political support. The politically inter¬
esting question is how Carter's concern for human rights
was transformed into a policy which was supported
unanimously within his administration and applied
consistently in international relations. To answer this
it is necessary to consider the two most significant
individuals in formulating and implementing foreign policy
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during the Carter administration: Cyrus Vance and
Zbigniew Brzezinski.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE
STATE DEPARTMENT IN HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
The Carter administration's human rights efforts
began without a clear understanding of strategic objec¬
tives.14 This was due, in part, to Carter's inability to
foresee the consequences of a strict, case-by-case
approach which ultimately left him vulnerable to accusa¬
tions of selective, inconsistent criticism of other
states. This was an insoluble dilemma because every
alleged violation of human rights would inevitably
represent a unique set of conditions. But Carter could
not acknowledge the peculiarities of a specific incident
through a predetermined and sweeping policy. Perhaps
through concerted and flawless selection, representatives
of the Administration could have used the case-by-case
approach and maintained at least the appearance of a
political and truly humanitarian concern in its castiga-
tion of the way same governmental leaders treated their
citizens. Yet, the feasibility of preserving such a
fastidious balance when selecting targets for public
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criticism should have been in doubt from the very-
beginning of Carter's term in office.
In a more general sense, Carter did not envision the
problem of intermeshing other foreign policy concerns with
human rights. Even if the National Security Council and
the State Department had been united in their objectives
and priorities, it is unlikely that human rights or, in a
broader sense, "morality," could have been the primary
influence on the formulation of foreign policy. The
primary spokespersons for these two departments did not
present synonymous views on the role of human rights in
foreign policy. In order better to understand these
differences this section will analyse the composition of
these two bodies, especially where relevant to human
rights. This will be followed by a brief examination of
the disputes between them.
The National Security Council
On 23 January 1977, during the ceremony for swearing-
in cabinet members, President Carter introduced his
National Security Advisor as follows:
He has been an incisive analyst of the interna¬
tional field. He will be iry closest advisor in
tying together our economics, foreign policy,
and also defense matters... .He will put together
the most intimate preparations of any kind of
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crisis that affects our nation....I would like
to introduce to you Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.15
This early statement was indicative of the fact that
Brzezinski would became Carter's most influential advisor.
He dominated the decision-making process in the National
Security council and had virtually unlimited access to the
President. Brzezinski was the first advisor to brief
Carter each day. In other words, Brzezinski had immense
potential to influence President Carter and to explain the
administration's human rights policy to others.
Brzezinski first met Carter through the Trilateral
Commission in the early 1970's and was later active in
preparing foreign policy briefs for Carter's presidential
campaign. He stressed the need for Carter to emphasize
the lack of leadership in the Ford administration during
the second presidential campaign debate in which the
incumbent's terrible gaffe about the lack of Soviet
domination in Eastern Europe contrasted with Carter's
determination to hold the Soviet leaders to their
obligations in the human rights category of the Helsinki
Final Act. Brzezinski felt that human rights had a place
in foreign policy, not because of any deep-rooted
humanitarian concern, but because "the previous Admin¬
istration's lack of attention to this issue had undermined
international support for the United States."16 Perhaps
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Brzezinski's own experiences as a Polish emigre and
staunch Polish nationalist also contributed to his
attitude. For these reasons, Brzezinski involved the NSC
in human rights issues for the first time in its exis¬
tence. A "Global Issues Cluster" was established to
consider human rights along with other foreign policy
concerns, in other words, to integrate human rights into
foreign policy. The prominent members of this group
included: Dr. Jessica Tuchman, former political advisor
to congressman Morris Udall and a specialist in nuclear
proliferation; Colonel Leslie Denend, economist and Air
Force officer; and Line Bloamfield, a scholar of world
affairs.
Brzezinski's role as a human rights advocate was
dismissed by certain critics as another way of articu¬
lating his anti-Soviet attitudes and his perception that
the Soviet Union is essentially a totalitarian state.
Such cynics could have quoted a host of Brzezinski's
scholarly writings to bolster their claims.17 As early as
January 1976, he (along with Richard Gardner of the
University of Columbia) had developed a foreign policy for
Carter based on a "comprehensive and reciprocal detente"
with the Soviet Union.18 But the likelihood of recipro¬
city was minimal because, according to Brzezinski:
"communist regimes, more than the pluralistic West,
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require hostility and tension to maintain their
unity...and the development of stabler relations ines¬
capably opens the East to Western influences."19 Because
of the unabated competition between East and West, the
human rights issue could be used to gain an ideological
edge on the Soviet Union. Therefore, he believed that the
"best way to answer the Soviet's ideological challenge
would be to commit the United States to a concept which
most reflected America's very essence."20 In a broad
sense, human rights could be coalesced into an overall
policy of enhancing American power but, according to
Brzezinski:
when a choice between the two had to be made,
between projecting U.S. power or enhancing human
rights (as, for example, in Iran), I felt that
power had to came first. Without credible
American power, we would simply not be able
either to protect our interests or to advance
more humane goals.21
Brzezinski thus argued that military strength was an
essential attribute for the security of the US and its
potential to influence global affairs. After the US had
used power to resolve a conflict, Brzezinski would favour
a justification that held that higher American moral
values had triumphed. An improvement in human rights
would, in Brzezinski's outlook, flow naturally from the
projection of American convictions abroad. President
Carter by contrast, argued that the dynamism of American
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society was due to an unwavering desire by most Americans
to perpetuate the high legal and ethical concepts
enshrined in the US Constitution. Thus, the President
would favour the use of force only after a prior screening
to assure that military operations conformed to a
predetermined set of humanitarian standards. At least in
theoretical terms, Carter and Brzezinski differed in what
is often referred to as the "chicken or egg" dilemma,
although the two men did not acknowledge the differences
in their perspectives.
As an extension of the East-West relationship, human
rights also was a way of gathering support from the
developing nations. For this reason, Brzezinski whole¬
heartedly supported Carter's decision to appoint the black
American, Andrew Young, as US Ambassador to the United
Nations. During the next four years the administration
attempted to improve relations with black Africa (by
encouraging black rule over white minority dominion in
Rhodesia, for example).22
The NSC was to play a significant role in the
formulation of a human rights policy, especially through
its efforts to balance humanitarian concerns with national
security. Zbigniew Brzezinski, as NSA, assured the
predominance of the latter concern.
The State Department
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State Department machinery for promoting human rights
was expanded in 1977, but the origins of these improve¬
ments were derived from the legislative, rather than the
executive branch. The single most influential committee
in this regard was the House Subcommittee on International
Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, chaired by Congressman Donald Fraser. On 27
March 1974, the subcommittee issued a report entitled,
"Human Rights and the World Community: A Call for U.S.
Leadership," which outlined various ways of combining
humanitarian concerns and other foreign policy issues. Of
primary significance for this study was a recommendation
to the State Department that the policy-making apparatus
should be reorganized by creating an office for human
rights within the State Department, assigning human rights
officers to each regional bureau and appointing an
assistant legal advisor for human rights.23
Due to congressional pressure, the Kissinger State
Department reluctantly accepted all three recommendations,
most notably by establishing the Office of Coordinator for
Humanitarian Affairs and appointing a Deputy Director for
Human Rights Affairs. The Bureau of International
Organization Affairs gained a second human rights officer
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while similar individuals were appointed to other existing
bureaus concerned with policy planning, security assis¬
tance and developmental assistance (especially within the
Agency for International Development—AID). Regional
bureaus were also staffed with human rights officers,
especially those which received US aid.24
In actuality, most of the structural improvements
during this period were State Department window-dressing.
None of the human rights officers appointed was senior
enough to ensure that human rights would influence policy
planning. Moreover, human rights officers designated for
regional bureaus lacked training and commitment and,
according to one commentator, their "predominant concern
has been the protection of their foreign 'clients.'1,25 As
mentioned above, Kissinger's insistence that Ford not meet
with Alexander Solzhenitsyn because of Soviet objections
was symbolic of the shallowness of his commitment.
Indeed, Kissinger was far more concerned about making
headway in broader issues in American-Soviet relations and
since a meeting with Solzhenitsyn would not benefit
detente, but could actually generate animosity from the
Soviet leaders, Solzhenitsyn's meeting would have to be
sacrificed. For Kissinger, concrete political issues were
far more important than intangible humanitarian ones.
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When the Carter administration entered office in
January 1977, the skeleton of a joint executive-legisla¬
tive human rights "program" was already in place. A
memorandum circulated on 11 February 1977 by Carter's
Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, set out improvements in
existing human rights machinery. The Office of Coor¬
dinator for Humanitarian Affairs was replaced by a newly
created Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.
It supervised the Bureau of 30 individuals—10 involved in
human rights issues generally, while the remaining staff
were concerned with refugees, prisoners of war and
soldiers listed as "missing in action."
To enhance the role of human rights in foreign
policy-making and to coordinate this concern with all
relevant departments, an Interagency Committee on Human
Rights and Foreign Assistance was installed in the State
Department. This committee was staffed by deputy
assistant secretaries from regional and functional bureaus
and chaired by Deputy Secretary of State, Warren
Christopher who was given full authority to run the State
Department while Vance was abroad on foreign engage¬
ments.27
As a result of the 1976 Foreign Assistance Act, the
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was
required to present reports to Congress on human rights
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and foreign assistance.28 The role of human rights
officers in regional bureaus was re-emphasized so that
those individuals would became more active in collecting
information about human rights violations to present to
the Bureau. In addition, human rights officers were
assigned to US embassies abroad.
The State Department was also active in promoting the
CSCE process by preparing semi-annual reports describing
the progress of implementation in signatory countries to
the Helsinki Final Act. The reports were submitted to the
newly created Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (the "Helsinki Commission").29
The first attempt to define the term "human rights,"
as the Carter administration intended to use it, was made
during Cyrus Vance's first public appearance as Secretary
of State in which he outlined the following:
First, there is the ricrht to be free from
governmental violation of the integrity of the
person. Such violations include torture; cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. And they
include denial of fair public trial, and
invasion of the home.
Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of
such vital needs as food, shelter, health care,
and education. We recognize that the fulfill¬
ment of this right will depend, in part, upon
the stage of a nation's economic development.
But we also know that this right can be violated
by a Government's action or inaction—for
example, through corrupt official processes
which divert resources to an elite at the
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expense of the needy, or through indifference to
the plight of the poor.
Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and
political liberties—freedom of thought, of
religion, of assembly; freedom of speech;
freedom of the press; freedom of movement both
within and outside one's own country; freedom to
take part in government.30
According to Vance, the speech was intended to reveal:
the considerations we would take into account,
on a country-by-country basis, in deciding the
extent to which human rights concerns would
influence other aspects of our relations with a
particular country. I wanted to make clear the
shape and substance of our human rights policy
and the fact that it was universal in applica¬
tion, yet flexible enough to be adapted to
individual situations.3*
The three broad categories were based upon the Interna¬
tional Bill of Rights and supported by Patricia Derian,
head of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, in an attempt to display State Department unity
in implementation of a human rights program.32
Nearly one month later, Carter, speaking at the
University of Notre Dame, presented his foreign policy as
"democratic...based on fundamental values, and that uses
power and influence...for humane purposes."33 Exactly how
power and influence would figure into a long term strategy
remained ambiguous and eventually caused divisions within
the Executive.
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Controversy Over a Human Rights Strategy
The Carter administration operated for a year before
deciding upon the content and application of its human
rights policy. Presidential Directive 30 was the first
clear attempt to confront this necessity.34 The lack of
synthesis in the human rights strategy was surprising
given the controversial nature of the issue. Differences
between the Secretary of State and the National Security
Advisor were most responsible.
Brzezinski describes the alleged personal tension
between Vance and himself as a creation of the press
while, at the institutional level, he did notice "how much
pressure there is from one's own subordinates to engage in
conflict with one's principal peers."35 Issues of loyalty
and morale were at stake, especially in Vance's case
because of "far greater pressures from the much larger,
extraordinarily turf conscious, and more insecure State
Department bureaucracy."36 Additionally, the two men
differed in their approaches to foreign policy.
Brzezinski considered Vance's litigational approach to
foreign policy, due to his Georgia "gentleman lawyer"
background, inadequate compared to a foreign policy based
upon power and principle. He noted in his diary on 29
June 1978:
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The basic problem remains that our foreign
policy is being conducted essentially on a
contractual-legal basis, as if we were negoti¬
ating some contract. Unless we bring some
situations to a head, be it in Southern Africa
or in the Middle East, or even occasionally
through a confrontation with the Soviets, we
will not resolve the outstanding issues. After
all, at least to same, Gordian knots exist to be
cut.37
Vance did not agree with this approach because "neither
the president nor I wished to use human rights as an
ideological weapon, but rather as a basic element of our
foreign policy."38 He advocated "quiet diplomacy" as the
most sensible way to bring other nations into line, but
not through quiet diplomacy as practised by former
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger had given
the concept a negative connotation as he considered human
rights useless in projecting American influence and, in
reality, "appeared reluctant to advocate human rights
objectives in quiet diplomacy" let alone in public.39
Therefore, this method did not have a fair trial period
during the Nixon administration and subsequently, its
effectiveness could not be gauged with accuracy. Without
any systematic research into the effectiveness of quiet
diplomacy (consultations which may never be revealed to
the public), especially through non-governmental organiza¬
tions, the likelihood of improving human rights in this
fashion is open to debate.40
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Nevertheless, there are sound reasons for approaching
human rights violators in the private diplomatic channel
with the threat to "go public." Quiet diplomacy is not
necessarily silent diplomacy. Rather, it is a way of
influencing the actions of another government without
placing it in the public spotlight. With this more
private modus operandi representatives of the offending
government are not placed so severely on the defensive as
to resort to the claim that they are under ideological
attack. In contrast, Brzezinski's method of "constructive
global engagement," through which Soviet ideological
expansion would be countered by "a more affirmative
American posture on global human rights," aligned
humanitarian concerns with the broad ideological conflict
between the US and the USSR.41 This further "politicized"
human rights.42
In conclusion, Carter's two most influential advisors
were at odds in their human rights strategy such that, in
a case-by-case analysis, their individual input into human
rights policy was inconsistent. Brzezinski claims to have
deserved the predominant position because of the accuracy
of his grim assessments of Soviet global intentions and
because:
the Administration needed an articulate voice to
explain what it was trying to do [and] for all
his many gifts and personal qualities, [Vance]
370
was not an effective ccaranunicator, and the
President started encouraging me to speak up
more.43
Dissonance of opinion in human rights, as well as general
discord over foreign policy (especially in the case of
Iran), led Vance to resign on 21 April 1980.
A deeper probe into the relationship between human
rights and other matters of foreign policy will be useful
here. The following section describes specific instances
when the Administration was united and divided, in
conducting human rights diplomacy.
HUMAN RIGHTS AS ONLY ONE COMPONENT IN
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY
The Carter administration provides an excellent
example of the difficulties inherent in attempts to make
human rights a major consideration in foreign policy. To
initiate more "moral" criteria in relations with other
nations, Carter would need "the dexterity of a juggler,
the verbal sensitivity of a poet, and the patience of a
saint."44 Had Carter been able to implement his human
rights policy in a vacuum protected from other issues,
then the difficult task of defining "human rights" would
have been much easier. But American foreign policy has,
especially since the dawn of the nuclear era, touched upon
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nearly every region of the globe and in many geographical
areas, human rights have not been easy to define or to
mesh with other equally important issues. Joshua
Muravchik, former Executive Director of the Coalition for
a Democratic Majority has summarized Carter's "vexing
dilemmas" as follows:
In short, the Carter experience left in its wake
a consensus on two points: first, emphasizing
human rights in foreign policy is a good idea?
second, implementing this idea is difficult and
Carter's own efforts left much to be desired.
This difficulty has two chief sources. First,
too little is known about how to foment a
lasting improvement in observance of human
rights in societies where they are not widely
observed... .Second, even those who believe most
strongly that the United States should have a
human rights policy agree that it cannot be the
only goal of U.S. foreign policy. Sometimes the
pursuit of human rights may suggest actions that
would disserve other goals.45
While many dilemmas in policy formulation were evident,
this section will examine only three examples where
members of the Carter administration were faced with
equally pressing exigencies that could have potentially
outweighed emphasis on human rights. Ultimately, the
categories of national security, the Strategic Arms
Limitations Talks (SALT) and international trade relations
progressively overshadowed the ambitious pledges to
improve the human condition. Clarification of this
reality is important because representatives of the Reagan
administration later attempted to define the content and
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applicability of their human rights policy, drawing upon
the experiences of the previous administration.
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated
in early 1978 that "important as they are, human rights,
in the light of strategic needs, are not the single
overriding factor in decision-making.1,46 In other words,
certain nations, whose record on human rights abuse
warranted US criticism, actually received preferential
treatment because of US security interests.47 South Korea
(the Republic of Korea), the Philippines and Iran were
representative of this concern.
As early as October 1976, Vance noticed the special
problem posed by human rights abuse in South Korea due to
the security of Japan and because of the United States'
political and military position in East Asia. He writes:
While the situation in the south fell far short
of what most of us felt was desirable, we
constantly had to weigh the fact that only
thirty-five miles to the north of Seoul was a
nation in which control of the population was
absolute and freedom nonexistent. The contrast
could not be ignored, and although some critics
felt that we were not vigorous enough in
advocacy of human rights in South Korea, I felt
that a careful balance was essential, and made
sure that it was maintained.48
According to a report compiled by the State Department and
delivered to Congress on 8 February 1979, "the division of
the Korean Peninsula and the continuing threat of North
Korean aggression remain the pervasive factors in South
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Korea1s national life."49 Through a clause in South
Korea's 1972 Constitution, the President of the Republic
of Korea, General Park Chung Hee, curtailed civil and
political rights and allegedly resorted to torture and
general mistreatment of prisoners. The official State
Department position was that these actions were "contrary
to international human rights standards" and Carter,
during a trip to Seoul in June 1979, appealed to Park to
liberalise the emergency measures (Carter's appeals were
subsequently censored in the South Korean Press).50 A few
prisoners were released as a token symbol of improvement,
but Park was well aware of the advantageous position that
US security interests provided for his own country. In
fact, he openly complained about US pressures on human
rights.51
East Asia specialists in the State Department opposed
any punitive measures such as withdrawing US troops from
Korea. Actually, Carter had advocated a US military
withdrawal during the presidential campaign and throughout
1977. His general plan was to evacuate US soldiers within
a four or five year time period (by the end of his
term).52 Brzezinski opposed troop withdrawals because he
did not want to link military assistance to human rights
in such a sensitive region.53 In contrast, the Bureau of
Human Rights supported withholding American Development
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Bank loans as an alternative to withholding military
assistance loans. (This was done for a brief period in
1977.)54
In the end, Carter backed down on his plans to
withdraw a 6,000-man brigade in 1978 and compromised by a
scheduled withdrawal of one combat battalion of the three
in the brigade. Even this "compromise" was scrapped after
Central Intelligence Agency estimates of North Korean
military hardware proved to be 30 percent too low.
Moreover, after Park's assassination in October 1979, US
troop commitments were increased, rather than decreased.
The approaching 1988 Seoul summer Olympics has further
solidified the American presence in South Korea.
In December 1978, the United States signed an
agreement with the Philippine government to maintain
military bases at Clark Air Field and at the Subic Naval
Base. The agreement called for $500 million in military
and economic aid. While South Korea was faced with a
predominately external political-military threat in North
Korea, the Philippine government of Ferdinand E. Marcos
pointed to serious internal threats by Muslim insurgents
in Western Mindanao and in the Sulu Archipelago and also
to the presence of a large and militant communist party.
Allegedly, these internal threats necessitated restric¬
tions on the rights of citizens, including the use of
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military force to suppress insurrection and potential
opposition groups.
Whether or not the United States could influence the
behaviour of the Marcos' government regarding its domestic
situations was viewed as subordinate to the need for
"defensive" military bases there. Marcos initiated
limited reforms (such as permitting regional elections in
Muslim areas of the Philippines), but improvements were
"temporary facades [sic] to ensure continued U.S. Military
and economic support."55 The more significant issue was
whether or not the Carter administration was aware that
these improvements were only cosmetic, and deliberately
chose to ignore the actual state of affairs. In other
words, was the concern over national security more
important than human rights?
The previous paragraphs represent governmental
arguments to defend American security interests in the
Philippines, but a convincing argument, based on three
general considerations, has been made against the US
military presence.56 Firstly, Philippine armed forces
were engaged in "provocative actions in potentially oil-
rich areas of the South China Sea claimed by Beijing,
Taipei and Hanoi."57 American military aid would support
these activities leading to further instability in the
region, rather than enhancing security. Secondly, a host
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of alternative military sites were available. Among these
were a relatively unused number of bases made available by
the Japanese Government; the former American World War II
bases in the Marianas Islands, north of Guam; Guam itself;
or even enlarged use of American bases in Singapore.58 A
move to any of these alternate sites would have added to
increasing military expenditure, but the political gains
provided justification (although an evacuation of the
Philippines could possibly have resulted in less influence
on the human rights practices of that government).
Finally, national security and promotion of human rights
are not mutually exclusive. The Philippines set a
negative precedent for American relations with regional
nations who are vital links in the "geostrategic" network
of the United States. A weak stance on the Marcos regime
created human rights timebombs in a host of other "allied"
nations (especially those receiving US aid) in Central
America (El Salvador, Guatemala) and Africa (Central
African Empire, Guinea). Ultimately, the final chapter of
the regime of Ferdinand Marcos was completed in February
1986. By that time, internal opposition to the corruption
and brutality of the government was manifested through
broad electoral support for Corazon Aquino, wife of the
slain Philippine opposition leader.59 From January 1986
spokespersons for the Reagan administration had openly
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criticized Marcos for failing to initiate political and
economic reforms and for purposely deceiving the
Philippine and American public about his service record in
World War II. Marcos' attempts to manipulate the 1986
elections were exposed and he ultimately abdicated from
his self-professed presidency aboard a US Air Force plane
in late February.60
American policy-makers and statesmen were forced to
reverse their positions on Marcos. Complaints about the
violations of basic human rights were so severe and desta¬
bilizing that it was best to encourage the removal of
Marcos and to accentuate humanitarian aid over military
assistance.61 Carter had misjudged the former Philippine
President, but the impact of his misperception was not
revealed until well after the end of his administration.
The fall of Marcos and the potential dangers to American
security interests in the Pacific basin then revived the
debate over the exercise of American power and influence
in other nations.62
The probable effects of American support for
repressive regimes were clearly demonstrated in Iran in
1979. The Shah provided a source of regional stability in
the Persian Gulf for the American government. US military
aid to Iran in 1977 totaled $4 billion, one-half of the
United States world military aid (which was increased to
378
$10 billion on the Shah's 1978 arms shopping list). In
that year, the Shah bought 160 advanced F-16 fighter
aircraft plus 7 airborne warning and control aircraft
(AWACS) with a request of 140 more F-16's and a number of
F-18 fighters. In return, the Shah refused to participate
in OPEC price increases. (He had refused to join the 1973
Arab oil embargo.)63 But his attempts to enlarge Iran's
military capacity without reciprocal oil price increases
strained the economy and further accentuated the inequal¬
ities in his country and led to popular discontent.
The tenuous balance between human rights and security
interests in Iran was described by Vance:
It was clear that it would be hard to maintain
public support for our strategic relations with
Iran if the Shah failed to pay more attention to
human rights....Neither the president nor I ,
however, believed that the maintenance of a
stable relationship with Iran precluded
encouragement of improvement in its human rights
policy and the development of a practical method
of identifying the meeting its military needs.64
The State Department openly admitted that "government
security forces used some extreme violence in attempting
to control unarmed demonstrators."65 Subsequently, in May
1977, Carter issued Presidential Decision Memorandum 13
(PD-13) which categorized arms transfers as an exceptional
instrument of US foreign policy. Through PD-13, sales of
crowd control equipment to the Iranian internal security
force SAVAK, were curtailed. When the Shah traveled to
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Washington in November 1977, Carter emphasized the growing
accusations of human rights abuse in Iran by religious
leaders, the middle class and students in Iran and
overseas.66 The Shah's response was that suppression was
necessary against the limited elements of subversion in
his country and that no flexibility was possible. On 8
September 1978, he declared martial law in Iran.
If a "revolution" in Iran was the inevitable
culmination of the Shah's government, which did not allow
a broad base of political participation, then the United
States should have played a more assertive role in the
early stages (the first months of 1977). But Vance and
Brzezinski disagreed on how to achieve a political
solution in Iran. Brzezinski favoured the establishment
of a military regime as a last ditch attempt to create
stability. This could be enhanced by the deployment of US
troops in southern Iran with the objective of protecting
the Iranian oil fields.67 Vance, Christopher and Vice
President Walter Mondale opposed a military solution
because of the possibility that this would lead to a
bloodbath. They proposed a more lenient approach which
would allow the political activists to have more influence
on the government.68 Faced with a moral-political crisis,
the divided Administration was unable to support the Shah.
On 16 January 1979, the Shah fled from Iran.
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US support of the Shah's repressive regime, in the
interest of national security, discounted the increasing
internal discontent over human rights abuse. South Korea,
the Philippines as well as Iran, provide examples of the
need to reconcile national security and human rights
issues. In essence, representatives of the administration
had created a dilemma. They were determined to apply a
universal standard of human rights (ambiguously defined)
in their foreign relations which constrained both their
efforts to weigh other foreign policy concerns and their
attempts to consider the long-term welfare of citizens
over the short-term reactions of other allies and the
media. The policy was most likely to be successful when
members of the administration, especially Brzezinski,
could point to Soviet ambitions altering the balance of
power in various regions. This could have been portrayed
as an immediate and future threat to Western democratic
ideals. But when governments friendly to the US came
under fire from their own citizens, the Carter administra¬
tion appeared incompetent or hypocritical for failing to
apply its stated standards to some of the worst human
rights violators. At the same time, because Carter was
increasingly forced to target precisely the aforementioned
governments for verbal or economic sanctions, US national
security interests were always in danger of neglect.
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Finally, it must be noted that Carter's human rights
policy ignored the peculiarities of the Soviet political
and economic system such as its authoritarian political
tradition and resistence to foreign ideologies. Predic¬
tably, the policy also discounted the uniqueness of
nations that were allies of the United States and it did
not recognize that major changes in those countries would
have to come from within to be truly legitimate. The
administration also needed observers who were talented
enough, and a policy that was flexible enough, to
recognize when friendly leaders had lost their foundation
of political support. Within the CSCE, the administration
would always have the luxury of concentrating on the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with the support of allies
whose records in the category of human rights were largely
above reproach. Outside that limited forum, the admin¬
istration's policy was not universally flexible.
The Strategic Arms t.imitation Talks (SALT)
If the human rights policy was not easily adaptable
to other general concerns, such as national security, then
perhaps it was possible at least to link it to specific
foreign policy issues at critical times, such as arms
control. In fact, President Carter's determination to
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reach an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union
(and eventually, an arms reduction agreement) placed his
human rights policy in a precarious position. The Soviet
leaders resented American criticism of the persecution of
dissidents, but they were especially incensed over
Carter's attempts to link this issue to arms control. In
an attempt to de-emphasize the linkage, Carter wrote to
Brezhnev on 14 February 1977 and commented in his diary
for that day:
It's important that he understand the commitment
I have to human rights first of all, and that it
is not an antagonistic attitude of mine toward
the Soviet Union—and that I 'm very sincere
about my desire to reduce nuclear armaments. If
he's willing to cooperate, we'll get something
done before four years go by.69
Carter's initial optimism about achieving a SALT agreement
and improving the Soviet human rights record was stifled
during Foreign Minister A. Gromyko's visit to Washington
on 22 September 1977. Carter mentioned how the trials of
Soviet dissidents Anatoly Shcharansky and Alexsander
Ginzburg caused concern in the United States.70 Gromyko
responded that Shcharansky was "a microscopic dot who is
of no consequence to anyone."71 This was an early
indication that the human rights issue and a SALT
agreement would became linked throughout the negotiations.
Linkage between human rights and arms agreements has
been described as a conflict between human liberty and
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human survival.72 Liberty was at stake because the trials
of Shcharansky and Ginzburg were signs of the fate of all
human rights advocates in the USSR. Survival was at stake
due to the destructive power of the nuclear weapons
arsenals of each nation. Curing the Nixon and Ford
administrations, nuclear disarmament was the predominant
concern at the expense of human rights, such that the US
became uncharacteristically quiet on repression in the
Soviet Union. According to The Times, the Soviet
government returned the favour and "actively joined
President Nixon's campaign to keep himself in office and
discredited his adversaries, including, especially, the
American Press."73 Naturally, the lack of visible
attention to human rights led to severe criticism in the
press. Carter attempted to reverse this trend and treat
disarmament and human rights as mutually desirable objec¬
tives.
Soviet involvement in arming Ethiopia, transporting
Cubans to Angola and clandestinely intervening in the Horn
of Africa and the Middle East was also "linked" to the
ongoing SALT negotiations. Brzezinski warned that these
activities violated the code of detente and could threaten
the chances of an arms limitation agreement, while
Congress was sure to restrict severely any trade with the
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Soviet Union until it tempered its foreign and domestic
behaviour.74
Thus, early on in the negotiations, a "human rights
dialogue" was established between the US and USSR. Vance,
whose preference was to exercise quiet diplomacy during
the SALT talks, noted his meeting with Brezhnev on 27
March 1977:
Brezhnev immediately launched into a diatribe in
which he catalogued alleged human rights abuses
in the United States. I responded sharply to
his charges and stressed the importance of
making progress in our talks. We needed
concrete progress, not polemics.75
Vance met with Gromyko in July 1978 in Geneva to continue
SALT negotiations. This meeting followed the cancellation
of a trip to Moscow (on 30 May 1978) by Joseph Califano,
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, because of the
harsh sentence dealt out to the founder of the Moscow
Helsinki Monitoring Group, Yuri Orlov. Most signifi¬
cantly, the negotiating process continued alongside the
human rights dialogue.
Carter's success in achieving both objectives simul¬
taneously was represented in the US-Soviet prisoner
exchange in April 1979 in which five Soviet dissidents
were flown to New York in return for two imprisoned Soviet
spies (although the dangers of exchanging spies for
dissident will be discussed in the following chapter) .76
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Two months later (June 1979), Carter and Brezhnev met in
Vienna to sign a SALT II agreement.77
During the Vienna summit Brezhnev told Carter: "I
want to talk about peace, and how to improve Soviet-
American relations, but human rights is a sensitive
subject for us and is not a legitimate ground for
discussion between you and me."78 In response, Carter
stated that the subject of human rights was important in
shaping US attitudes toward the USSR and that the recent
liberalization of emigration and the prisoner exchange
were progressive signs.79 He then called for the release
of Anatoly Shcharansky and other dissidents.80 The
temporary conclusion of the SALT negotiations took away an
important human rights lever for the Carter administra¬
tion. In fact, the summer of 1979 was the peak of
Carter's human rights effectiveness because, as Brezhnev's
statements indicated, the Soviet leaders were about to
tighten their control.
In conclusion, Carter efforts to enhance liberty and
survival through the SALT process achieved limited
progress. He had imported the conditions of at least a
handful of human rights advocates in the USSR during the
talks themselves. In retrospect, Carter stated:
Throughout the SALT negotiations, in my personal
meetings with President Brezhnev, Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin,
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and other Soviet leaders, and during other times
of serious discussion between our two countries,
I cannot recall any instance when the human
rights issue was the direct cause of failure in
working with the Soviets on matter of common
interest.81
In this way Carter claimed not only that the human rights
issue did not damage the arms limitations talks, but also
that the Soviet leaders had accepted that human rights
were a legitimate issue for negotiation.
Human Rights and International Trade Relations
A third dilemma encountered by Carter's human rights
diplomacy involved the formulation of a consistent policy
of trade restraint with human rights violators. Congress
had initiated foreign assistance legislation on this
matter in 1961, legislation which the executive was to
incorporate into interstate relations. One of the Carter
administration's primary spokespersons stated quite
explicitly:
We have indicated many times by our vote in
international financial institutions our view
that human rights violations by countries should
affect the flow of resources to them.82
But as exemplified in the previous section, other foreign
policy concerns frequently intrude into the criteria used
to determine the advisability of military or economic
assistance to a particular nation. In some cases, the
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international community can work against, and subsequently
neutralize, American efforts to punish human rights
violators in this way. Finally, in at least one case,
Carter's actions in foreign assistance were emphatically
contradictory to humanitarian interests.
Congressional action to limit trade relations with
certain nations was the end result of a campaign by
numerous non-governmental organizations to encourage the
United States to use its leading role in world affairs as
leverage in the cause of human rights. According to one
commentator, "the underlying premise is that if the US
government were simply to cease certain activities and
programs, this in itself would accomplish significant
desired change."83 The weakness of this assumption was
that it discounted the possibility that other nations
could fill the vacancies created by cancelled programs.
Furthermore, American sanctions could lead to the total
severance of diplomatic relations with a nation, thus
undermining any efforts to maintain a productive and
positive relationship.
The first sign of congressional activism in this
regard was through the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which
restricted economic and military assistance to governments
who imprisoned their citizens for political reasons.84 In
1974, an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (Section
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502B) directed the President to "formulate and conduct
international security assistance programs of the United
States in a manner which will promote and advance human
rights" and deny security assistance to nations engaging
in "a consistent pattern of gross violations of interna¬
tionally recognized human rights.1,85 The Department of
State was instructed to submit human rights reports on
individual countries receiving US development assis¬
tance.86 Aid was discontinued to violators unless such
aid directly benefited needy people. However, methods of
assessing if the aid actually reached the needy were never
well formulated. If it was determined that the aid was
"intercepted" in part, a total sanction would simply hurt
the needy even more.
A similar restriction was added to the 1977 Interna¬
tional Financial Institution Bill through the Harkin
Amendment.87 This bill instructed US directors in
international financial institutions (IFI's) to vote
against aid for the aforementioned reasons. In specific
cases, the 1978 Young Amendment blocked aid to Angola,
Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, Mozambique, Uganda, and Vietnam.
The Carter administration opposed the Young Amendment
arguing that more flexibility was needed for a human
rights policy and that Congress was forcing the Admin¬
istration's hand. After a letter by Carter to the House
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Foreign Relations Subcommittee a compromise was struck in
which US representatives to IFI's could abstain from
voting for multilateral assistance to human rights
violators (rather than having to vote against). In
return, Carter promised to vote against loans to seven
countries throughout 1978.88 But Congress and the
Executive did not work together harmoniously on this
issue, perhaps because of the post-Watergate desire of the
legislative branch to exert its authority over such
matters. While the Interagency Group on Human Rights and
Foreign Assistance (headed by Deputy Secretary of State
Warren Christopher) voted "no" to 11 loans and abstained
on 21 others between May 1977 and May 1978, these
cancelled loans were geared more to left-wing Latin
American governments and less to strategic allies such as
South Korea, the Philippines and Iran.89
A second serious problem with foreign assistance
restrictions is the need for cooperation from the interna¬
tional financial community. Two cases in point involve
Argentina and Chile. Military aid to Argentina (as well
as Guatemala, El Salvador and Brazil) was severely reduced
in 1977 because of human rights violations. Yet, the
World Bank offered the Argentines $105 million in
credits.90 Similarly, after the imposition of a ceiling
on military and economic aid to Chile in 1975, the
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International Monetary Fund offered them credits up to
$300 million.91
To exacerbate these difficulties, the Administration
itself was divided on the issue of international economic
sanctions. As a general rule, the Department of State,
Treasury and Commerce opposed the use of economic
sanctions while the Bureau of Human Rights was strongly in
favour of them. Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, was
"alarmed over the loss of American export business through
human rights vetoes and environmental considerations"
which amounted to nearly $10 billion annually.92 By the
end of his term, Carter had lost support from the business
community as a whole because of his position on economic
sanctions.93
Finally, Carter's commitment to human rights did not
warrant his decision to impose a grain embargo on the
Soviet Union (4 January 1980) as punishment for the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. According to an
amendment to the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954:
No agreement may be entered into under this
title to finance the sale of agricultural
commodities to the government of any country
which engages in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human
rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged
detention without charges, or other flagrant
denial of the right to life, liberty and the
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security of the person, unless such agreement
will directly benefit the needy people in such
country.94 femphasis added!
The amendment implies on one level that supporting the
agricultural sector of an inhumane government to allow it
greater profits should not be permissible. On another
plane of reasoning, the amendment hints that the increase
in productivity and revenue may be a necessary evil in
same cases for the truly needy to receive a more nutri¬
tious diet. Overall, the Act is basically humanitarian
for it stipulates that, most importantly, resources should
flow to the indigent.
Also relevant in this regard is Article 25 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which states
that "[ejveryone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family, including food...."95 Both citations suggest
that agricultural equipment and produce usually lie
outside the realm of justifiable economic sanctions. The
rationale behind these provisions is that deliberately
applying such sanctions, when it is clear that the
citizens of a target country will suffer far more than the
government, could actually lead to a more inhuman
condition for the population than existed previously. In
a theoretical sense, there is a serious ethical problem
for a leader using agricultural equipment and produce to
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modify the behaviour of a government, especially when
there are so many cases of starvation in lesser developed
regions of the world. This general action could subject
the initiator of such a policy to criticism from represen¬
tatives of these nations and others.
The decision to impose a grain embargo on the Soviet
Union was opposed by only one of the President's advisors,
Vice President Walter Mondale. Mondale's concern was
essentially domestic—that an embargo would have negative
political influences on the Iowa Primary (a large grain-
producing state) .96 At least Mondale recognized that an
embargo might damage the American farmers as much as the
Soviet population. But the embargo did not curtail all
grain shipments, only those over the minimum agreed level
of 8 million tons annually. This was sufficient because,
as Brzezinski has noted:
the suspension of additional U.S. grain
deliveries to the Soviet Union had a negative
impact on Soviet stock feed, disrupted Soviet
shipping arrangements, and caused some reduc¬
tions in Soviet meat consumption and in
livestock inventories.97
Furthermore, the Department of Agriculture was certain
that no other country could replace the United States as a
major exporter of grain to the USSR (Argentina, Australia
and Canada proved this belief incorrect).98 Therefore, a
blemish in the Carter administration's human rights policy
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was the willingness to restrict access to food in order to
punish the Soviet government. Whether or not this attempt
was successful, it made Carter's humanitarian concerns
appear hypocritical and directed more at the Soviet Union
than at other serious violators of human rights. The
action could also have given ammunition to the Soviet
argument that Carter ignored the most basic social and
economic rights of people. In any case, since the value
of trade sanctions to alter the domestic behaviour of a
government is questionable, actions such as the trade
embargo are not worth the potential political fallout.
THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION-
TENSION OVER HUMAN RIGHTS
Carter' s human rights diplomacy was not aimed
specifically, let alone exclusively, at the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. If this is true, then why, after only
three months in office, did Carter appear to set the
United States against the Soviet Union on this issue?
First, Carter's handling of the Sakharov affair left the
Soviet leaders with no clear alternative except to counter
condemnations of them with criticism of the US. Second,
Carter inherited the Helsinki process, an extension of the
1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
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(CSCE) and the forum for a biennial East-West war of
words. This kept recriminations of human rights viola¬
tions alive. Finally, Carter's attempts to vary his
treatment of East European countries, or in the words of
Brzezinski, to encourage "polycentrism" were in sharp
contrast to the declaration of martial law in Poland (13
December 1981) and Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (25
December 1979). These events increased the atmosphere of
tension between the US and USSR and demonstrated the
futility of "polycentrism," or of attempting to influence
the Soviet leaders through the CSCE follow-up conferences.
Other options, however, were open to Carter such as making
contact with prominent spokespersons within the Soviet
Union who campaigned for human rights. No one was as
internationally recognized and respected as Andrei
Sakharov.
The Sakharov Affair
Andrei Sakharov had written to candidate Carter as
early as 11 October 1976 expressing hope that "the
commitment to advance human rights throughout the world
will occupy an even greater place in US policy."99 This
was followed by a letter to President Carter on 21 January
1977 in which Sakharov described religious persecution and
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named desperate political prisoners in the USSR.100 This
evoked a response from Carter on 5 February in the form of
a letter delivered by hand to Sakharov which stated:
Human rights is a central concern of my
administration... .We shall use our good offices
to seek the release of prisoners of conscience,
and we will continue our efforts to shape a
world responsive to human aspirations in which
nations of differing cultures and histories live
side by side in peace and justice.101
Same critics in the West categorized the letter as "an
unprecedented move that threatens to increase the
American-Soviet conflict over human rights in the Soviet
Union."102 As mentioned above, there was concern that
Carter was jeopardizing chances for an arms control
agreement.103 Carter's reply to Sakharov was complemen¬
tary to critical statements by Vance about human rights
abuse in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Cuba.104
After less than one month in office the administra¬
tion had launched a public attack on the Soviet Govern¬
ment, an assault that was interpreted in Moscow as an
attempt to undermine the Soviet system.105 Obviously no
serious effort at "private diplomacy" was initiated with
Soviet representatives to assess the likelihood of
progress through this less embarrassing method.
Brzezinski, who drafted the letter to Sakharov along with
Vance, saw no alternative:
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The letter arrived shortly after the inaugural.
Sakharov congratulated the new President on his
commitment to human rights and drew attention to
the human-rights [sic] problems in the Soviet
Union. We all felt that the President had to
reply. The prestige of the author was such that
failing to do so would invite adverse com¬
parisons with the widely criticized refusal by
President Ford to meet with Solzhenitsyn—not to
speak of the fact that it would have been
cowardly to ignore Sakharov's letter.106
But Brzezinski does admit that the Sakharov letter and a
White House visit by the exiled Soviet dissident Vladiitiir
Bukovsky (February 1977), were diplomatic mistakes in the
long term. As early as 18 February 1977, he feared that
"the relationship between us and the Soviets might in fact
suffer if this keeps up."107
The human rights issue did became more a point of
contention in American-Soviet relations in the months
following, especially during the CSCE follow-up meeting in
Belgrade. The Carter administration's handling of the
Sakharov affair, and ancillary criticism in the first
months of 1977, contributed to a conflict over this issue.
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:
The Helsinki Final Act Follow-up Procedure
President Jimmy Carter inherited the CSCE from the
Nixon and Ford administrations which had participated in
over three years of negotiation leading to the completion
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of the Helsinki Final Act. As noted in Chapter Two,
President Ford actually signed the accord, along with the
senior representatives of 34 other nations, on 1 August
1975.
The main domestic method of monitoring compliance
with the Final Act was through the Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (the "Helsinki commission")
created by a United States Congressional Bill in June
1976. Carter enhanced this process by instructing the
State Department to compile semi-annual reports to monitor
the implementation of the document by the signatories.
These reports isolated the countries of Eastern Europe,
especially the Soviet Union, for criticism of "repression
against human rights activists of all sorts."108 They
have also served as background information for the
numerous hearings dealing with dissidents in the Soviet
Union.109
Compliance with the standards established in the
Final Act are also monitored by a section of the document
which calls for a follow-up conference every two years.
Carter considered these conferences essential to preserve
the vitality of the Helsinki process. Before the first
review conference in Belgrade in 1977, Carter summoned
Secretary of State Vance to compile a report on US
compliance. Vance reported that the US was in accordance
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except for travel restrictions to Cuba, North Korea,
Vietnam and Cambodia. In response, Carter lifted these
restrictions on 1 May 1977.110
Carter's commitment to the Helsinki review process
was reflected in his selection of Arthur Goldberg as chief
of the US delegation at Belgrade. Goldberg was most
knowledgeable about Middle East affairs and had been an
instrumental figure in the creation of United Nations
Resolution 242 (the "right to exist" clause for
Israel).111
Belgrade became a human rights battleground between
the USSR and the US. If, as one commentator has stated,
human rights is a pro-NATO strategy, it was most evident
in this case.112 The chief Soviet delegate, Yuli
Voronstov, warned that the conference would not continue
without acceptance of the agenda proposed by the Soviet
delegation. That agenda placed all subjects under a
single heading and discounted scrutiny of adherence to
specific provisions and reiterated the same proposal made
in 1975.113 By contrast, the EEC and NATO countries were
firm in their insistence that Basket III should be
considered and evaluated separately, but they were not
willing to go as far as Carter.114 In fact, representa¬
tives of some Western nations were displeased over the
"tough statements about human rights in the Communist
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world" uttered by Carter, in contrast to the more reserved
approach of the US delegation in attendance in
Belgrade.115 Perhaps the fact that President Carter was
so far away from the negotiations caused him to have a
much more idealistic and unrealistic view of what could be
accomplished there.
The negotiations of the follow-up conference took
place in closed session, but the vague wording of the
concluding document (which requests the participants to
"ensure respect for human rights and fundamental free-
dams") represented a success for the Soviet delegation.116
An article appeared in Pravda on 18 March 1978 which did,
in fact, claim this victory:
The Soviet Union notes with satisfaction that at
the Belgrade Meeting the Final Act was defended
against all attempts to review it or change its
context and meaning and that attempts to
legalize interference in states internal affairs
were rebuffed.117
Indeed, the Soviet leadership was successful in maintain¬
ing its own interpretation of the Helsinki Final Act
regardless of American efforts to dictate a Western
democratic translation.
In conclusion, Carter improved the machinery to
monitor compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. He also
made an effort to bring the US into line as well. However,
the US (and the majority of the NATO countries) and the
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USSR (and the majority of the Warsaw Pact countries) stuck
to their long-standing differences of opinion regarding
the contents of the Final Act. Carter's attempts to
increase verbal criticism of human rights abuses in the
Soviet Union put that delegation on the defensive even
more in Belgrade. If the Soviet delegates were to
compromise and concede to the charges levelled by Carter,
they would have been subjected to further public accusa¬
tions. But a second policy was also in operation and this
was to distinguish between the Soviet Union and its East
European allies, and to encourage the latter to formulate
independent human rights strategies on the American model.
Polvcentrism for Eastern Europe
During a Policy Review Committee meeting in April
1977, an attempt was made to outline the Carter admin¬
istration's general approach to Eastern Europe.118 The
meeting was centered on PRM-9 (Presidential Review
Memorandum) which outlined four broad options: the US
could differentiate more sharply between nations that were
more independent from Moscow and those that appeared less
so (favouring Romania over Czechoslovakia, for example);
the US could maintain closer relations with nations that
were more liberal internally (Poland); ancillary to the
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second option, the US could curb contacts with nations
that did not display a liberal tendency internally;
finally, the US could expand all contacts with Eastern
Europe.
As described earlier, Brzezinski was Carter's most
influential advisor on East European affairs. For this
reason, a fusion of the first two options dominated East
European policy since Brzezinski felt that it "recognized
the American interest in encouraging 'polycentrism1 and
pluralism in the region."119 An example of the implemen¬
tation of this approach was Vance's trip to Budapest, in
which he returned to Hungary the Crown of St. Stephen,
which had been in US possession since the end of World War
II. His trip paved the way for a bilateral trade
agreement with the Hungarians in March 1978, which granted
them Most Favored Nation status.120 Subsequently, the US
favourably reviewed the Hungarian human rights record.121
Poland's liberal internal tendencies were "rewarded"
in 1979 by direct Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
credits amounting to $400 million and administered by the
Department of Agriculture. In 1980 the credits were
increased to $670 million.122 Since the Soviet Union has
tended to place most emphasis on Basket II of the Final
Act (economic and cultural exchange), these actions were
intended not only to reward relatively "independent" East
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European nations, but also to force the Soviet authorities
into line in their human rights performance. Yet the
fundamental problem with this approach was the assumption
that the Soviet Union and the East European nations were
willing to pay such a high price (major ideological
revisions) to receive trade and credits. Clearly, this
has not been the case. American policymakers have often
overestimated the feebleness of the Soviet economy
(especially the CIA123), while they have underestimated
the Soviet desire to search for internal material and
systemic solutions to problems of slow economic growth.
Broader trade is important to the Soviet leaders, but they
will not allow themselves to become dependent upon it.124
Brzezinski concluded that, along with differentiation
in economic relations, the US should provide more support
for Radio Free Europe (RFE). While the State Department
restricted RFE (conducive to Vance's preference for
private diplomacy), Brzezinski provided for larger
financial support coupled with less political control:
While the Radio should not be used to foment
insurrections in the East, it should, in my
judgment, serve as an instrument for the
deliberate encouragement of political change.
This meant that the broadcasts had to be
addressed to the internal problems of the
Communist systems and offer a genuine alterna¬
tive to Cammtunist policies.125
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On the other hand, the West German Chancellor, Helmut
Schmidt, wanted RFE out of West Germany because its activ¬
ities were contrary to detente. The Soviet view has been
that Western radio broadcasts violate the "Helsinki
Spirit" and that jamming is a legitimate response. The
number of East Europeans listening to these broadcasts is
substantial enough to worry the Soviet representatives
into defending radio jamming techniques at the Helsinki
follow-up conferences.126 But the use of RFE to elicit
political change certainly amounts to an attempt to
subvert the Soviet system. Therefore, their function
should be narrowly defined to presenting Western inter¬
pretations of international events along with condemna¬
tions of human rights abuse. Attempts to effect political
change in Eastern Europe by encouraging actions "from
below" may lead to even more repression of human rights
advocates because they may inaccurately be labelled as
opposition groups bent on destroying that State. As
Valery Chalidze has remarked, dissent is not opposition—
dissenters, in the Soviet and East European sense, are
most often campaigning for strict adherence to the laws of
their country and not for the destruction of them.127
A foreign policy for Eastern Europe based on poly-
centrism runs the risk of actually increasing Soviet
domination in the region. The Soviet leaders may invoke
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the Brezhnev Doctrine, used to justify military interven¬
tion in Czechoslovakia in 1968, when fellow socialist
countries need a reinforcement of communist ideals.
Similarly, had the Soviet Union intervened militarily in
Poland, and it appeared that they would in December 1981,
the same justification would apply. Therefore, a
concerted effort to isolate the Soviet Union from Eastern
Europe must consider the reaction this would cause within
the Soviet leadership. Polycentrism, if applied through
positive incentives such as increased trade relations, may
encourage a slightly more independent attitude among the
East European nations, but its chances of encouraging a
more liberal human rights policy are extremely suspect.
CONCLUSION
The Carter administration provided a brief experiment
in human rights diplomacy, perhaps too brief to determine
the feasibility of incorporating humanitarian concerns
into foreign policy. But at least one outstanding
achievement emerged—Carter presented the violations of
human dignity to a responsive international community. In
other words, Carter was able to increase awareness to
growing human rights abuse.
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In less positive terms, the record of the Carter
administration also indicated the difficulties inherent in
articulating a consistent human rights policy within a
myriad of other foreign policy concerns. Without
outlining his human rights policy from the very beginning,
Carter was bound to appear selective in his criticisms.
In specific cases of human rights abuse, lack of unity
among Carter's foreign policy advisors led to further
inconsistencies. What appeared as the single most
consistent objective was to isolate the Soviet Union and
East European countries for criticism. By choosing the
humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act as the
foundation of his policy, Carter actually increased the
differences between the United States and the Soviet Union
over this subject.
The Helsinki Final Act did not provide a universal
definition of human rights. Rather, it was left in such
vague terms as to allow a variety of interpretations, and
President Carter's attempts to force his view on the
Soviet leadership were largely unsuccessful. While
Carter's policy to promote human rights suffered from
problems of definition and interpretation, it also raised
questions about intention.
Was President Carter simply attempting to establish a
foreign policy based upon morality? And was he most
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concerned with changing the internal behaviour of the
Soviet government or with protecting the interests of the
United States? In retrospect, it appears that Carter
wanted, in principle, to interject fundamental American
democratic values into foreign policy. But since it is
also apparent that he intended to modify the behaviour of
the Soviet leadership, his efforts suffered from three
major problems.128
Firstly, President Carter assumed that the moral
standards of the United States were supreme and should
have been adopted by the Soviet Union. In fact, he
believed that the Soviet leaders had already adopted these
moral standards in the Helsinki Final Act when, in
reality, they had not.
Secondly, as stated by George Kennan, it is only
natural for governments "to resent interference by outside
powers in affairs of this nature [and] we ourselves are
not above resenting and resisting it when we find
ourselves its object."129 The only defensible justifica¬
tion for judging the internal actions of another govern¬
ment is when it may injure the accusing government's
interests in same direct way. If the stated actions only
offend the sensitivities of the complaining government,
then the issue is an entirely political one.
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And finally, even though Carter's intentions appeared
entirely humanitarian in the beginning, his policy was too
concerned with criticizing the failings of others.
American objectives would have been better served by
concentrating on safeguarding the rights of American
citizens and leading by example. In fact, one prominent
Congressional advocate, Dante Fascell, had come to this
conclusion after the Belgrade follow-up conference. He
argued that the Helsinki Final Act should have been at the
centre of a debate on civil rights in the United
States.130 If the administration had followed this advice
and initiated an even more deliberate effort to apply the
Final Act domestically, Soviet claims of displaced
emphasis on their domestic political environment would
have been more difficult to maintain. This approach would
not have sacrificed the moral ideals of the United States
and would have made human rights more a competition for
improvement than an assault on failure. Future admin¬
istrations would be wise to direct their humanitarian
concerns inward rather than outward.
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THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT INTO THE GORBACHEV ERA
Since the signing festivities in Finlandia Hall in
Helsinki in August 1975, a plethora of issues has tested the
endurance of the Final Act, the stability of international
relations and the constancy of the Soviet-American relation¬
ship. In the span of 13 years, the citizens of the United
States have elected two presidents while the people of the
Soviet Union have been led by three general secretaries.
Throughout that period, the importance of the Final Act for
security and cooperation in Europe has been frequently
reiterated and the "Helsinki process" appears to have
exceptional vitality. In fact, because the content of the
Helsinki process has grown to the point of unmanagability,
current and future studies are likely to be limited to the
most specific of provisions contained within the Final Act.
By necessity, this chapter is confined to three sections
which pose questions that strike the author as most pertinent
the thesis that genuine accommodation (as opposed to
political posturing) between the superpowers in the area of
human rights is improbable. Firstly, has the Soviet
leadership shifted its emphasis on, or interpretations of,
the Final Act as the Helsinki process has grown since the
Belgrade Follow-up Meeting of 1980? Secondly, what visible
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differences are evident in Gorbachev's policy on human
rights, at the time of writing, from previous Soviet
positions? Finally what mistakes have tainted US policy in
pressing for changes in human rights in the Soviet Union?
Topics of human rights are still a major part of
Soviet-American relations and over a decade after the
completion of the Final Act, there are many more questions
concerning implementation than answers about the meaning of
its provisions. Thus, this chapter is only a cursory study
of some of the more pressing problems. It is not possible
here to examine all of the developments related to human
rights and the Final Act since 1980, but observations of some
of the more contentious issues, even in such a limited
context, will help to indicate that the author's pessimism
warrants further consideration, especially during the most
recent period of reform in Soviet domestic politics.
The second CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid lasted for
nearly three years (11 November 1980 - 9 September 1983)
before a concluding document was signed.1 The meeting was,
as in the case of the Belgrade follow-up conference,
dominated by controversies over Principle Seven and Basket
III, which many Western representatives regarded as the most
potentially significant provisions of the Final Act. At the
same time, many American representatives specifically
downplayed the longstanding Soviet assertion that the Final
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Act confirmed the post-war political and territorial
arrangement of Europe. For example, in a speech at the
Madrid meeting, the head of the US delegation, Max Kampelman,
referred to the post-war peace conferences, but argued that a
broad improvement in human rights was implicit in the peace
settlement. In other words, Kampelman merged the Soviet
emphasis on inviolability of frontiers with the Western
concern for human rights. He stated:
Historians frequently refer to the 'myth' of Yalta.
They say that to equate Yalta with spheres of
influence is to misread history. The Yalta
Agreement was based on the assumption that the
peoples of Eastern Europe were to be guaranteed
free elections so that they might choose their own
governments and those governments would then be
free to select their own alliances. That did not
take place. The partition of Europe along
predetermined lines cannot and should not became a
permanent part of our geopolitics. The myth of
Yalta, together with its concomitant so-called
'Brezhnev Doctrine' is a danger to peace. It
stands in the way of necessary peaceful change and
can only, if it remains, produce later upheavals
which will threaten our stability, in the East as
well as in the West. Change will came.2
George Shultz, Secretary of State for President Ronald Reagan
was even more emphatic when he told the delegates in Madrid
that:
The division of Europe is today, as it always was,
unnatural and inhuman. Therefore, the [Soviet]
attempt to keep Europe divided by raw power is
inevitably a source of instability. There can be
no lasting security or cooperation in Europe as
long as one government is afraid of its own people
and seeks reassurance in imposing a system of force
on its people—and on its neighbors.3
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Both Kampelman arid Shultz postulated that some major internal
political changes were necessary for the East European
nations to comply with the Final Act. This assertion,
certainly not new within the history of the CSCE, was
staunchly countered by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
who stated:
Our country consistently opposes the carrying over
of ideological disagreements into relations between
states....The course and results of the Madrid
meeting have shown once again, and in no uncertain
terms, that attempts to put pressure on the
socialist countries and to interfere in their
internal affairs are futile...if same people raise
their hands against our moral, social and civic
values, if in their hostility toward socialism they
deliberately whip up tension in the world, well,
actions of this sort have met with a fitting rebuff
and will continue to do so.4
By 1983 then, little had changed in the doctrinal arguments
emanating from the opposing corners of Europe. The future
of the CSCE was a larger question mark than ever before as
Soviet-American relations sunk to the lowest ebb since the
cold war era. Soviet officials criticized President Reagan's
alleged "'crusade' against communism,"5 while one American
specialist characterized the deterioration in relations as a
"march toward war."6
But a highly regarded result, at least from the Western
perspective, was the unanimous agreement by the participants
in Madrid to hold meetings of specialists in seven major
areas, three of which would focus on humanitarian issues
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(human rights, human contacts and cultural exchanges).
Ultimately these conferences were held in Ottawa (7 May to 17
June 1985), Budapest (15 October to 25 November 1985) and
Bern (15 April to 27 May 1986). Another full follow-up
meeting was approved for 4 November 1986 in Vienna.7
The decision to have specialized conferences was a
compromise based upon proposals from the neutral and non-
aligned nations intended to break costly and time-consuming
deadlocks at Madrid. The intent should not be scrutinized,
but the potential long-term consequences of subdividing the
follow-up procedure require same elaboration. Was the
decision to convene meetings of experts on specific issues in
the Final Act beneficial for the Helsinki process? While the
full effects of this decision will not be apparent for some
time, there are many negative aspects to the compromise.
For example, the original decision in 1972 to create
three baskets in the future Final Act allowed each of the
thirty-five participating nations to emphasize sections of
their choosing; despite the fact that the Final Act ultimate¬
ly became a single, unified document, this was not inevitable
in 1972. Once again, the most relevant example for this
study has been Soviet emphasis on the principles confirming
borders and political systems in Eastern Europe and coopera¬
tion through Basket II, while the US has accentuated
principles of human rights and improved contacts through
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Basket III. Even within Principle Seven itself, spokes¬
persons for the US Government have tended to emphasize some
aspects (such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)
over others (such as the Covenant on Social and Economic
Rights, which is more commonly cited by Soviet representa¬
tives) . The fact that the Final Act includes a variety of
provisions that satisfied thirty-five nations was described
by one former Soviet diplomat (during an informal discussion
at the Institute of Knowledge in Moscow in January 1988), as
its greatest strength. In reality, however, differences in
interpretation and emphasis have been incorporated into the
Final Act, thus making the document vague and weak.
Through the conferences of specialists, political
leaders have been able to play up the meetings that they
consider important and play down those that they view as
insignificant. This has been especially clear within the
Soviet Union where the greatest emphasis has been placed on
the Conference on Confidence and Security-building Measures
and Disarmament in Europe, initiated in Stockholm on 17
January 1984.8 In fact, this was a consistent action on the
part of Soviet officials who have, as noted previously,
presented freedom from concern about nuclear war and certain
death as the ultimate human right. Through a strictly state-
controlled media, Soviet commentators consistently downplayed
the significance of the meeting of experts in Ottawa because
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it focused on the Soviet record on human rights. Selective
reporting was thereby simplified through the subdivision of
the "Helsinki process." Some meetings were given much
greater attention by the media than others, depending upon
the main topics under discussion.9 Examination of delibera¬
tions in Ottawa indicate why the Soviet media were relatively
silent about events there.
As mandated by the Madrid Concluding Document, delegates
from thirty-five nations met in Ottawa for five weeks during
the summer of 1985 (not counting the two week preparatory
conference from 6 March to 23 April). The discussion about
human rights proved to be the most extensive ever within the
CSCE, although it was held in closed session, and further
illustrated the great differences in ideology between the
governments of Western Europe and those of Eastern Europe.
It was made ever more clear that the Soviet leadership
considers the post-war territorial and ideological borders
permanent in Europe to be permanent.
The sessions did include lively debate over a number of
specific topics. The Soviet delegation began its discussion
with the longstanding assertion that each nation was to
discuss its own record on human rights only.10 This claim
was rejected outright by the majority of other nations and
the debate began, with the head of the Soviet delegation,
Vsevolod Sofinsky, upholding what Soviet commentators have
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presented since the early 197O's as the ultimate human right-
-the right to life in peace.11 Emphasizing this allegedly
paramount right, Sofinsky claimed that the overriding
objective was to secure a positive political environment in
Europe which would offer greater opportunities for citizens
to enjoy their rights. In other words, it was up to the West
European nations to initiate conciliatory policies (i.e. in
arms control) which would improve human rights in the Soviet
Union. Since the argument was not new, a more refined
counter-argument could have been expected. This was
presented by Richard Schifter, head of the US delegation. He
responded:
let it be clearly understood.. .that in our view
respect for human rights in individual states
contributes to the improvement of international
relations. By the same token, disrespect for human
rights contributes to the deterioration of
international relations... .When we use the term
'human rights,' we describe the relationship
between a government and its own citizens. Does
it stand to reason that if foreign countries
establish friendly relations with a particular
government that government, in turn will—so to
speak—reward the foreign countries by dealing
kindly with its own citizens? And does it further
stand to reason that if international relations are
tense, the foreign countries will be punished by
the government in question through the adoption of
repressive measures against its own citizens?
Would this not mean that a government holds its own
people hostage, treating them well or poorly
depending on the way other countries treat it in
international affairs?12
Shifter then set the history of Soviet-American relations
into a context which illustrated that Soviet domestic reform
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typically preceded improvements in relations between the two
nations.
This claim may be taken seriously by the present Soviet
leadership which, as will be discussed later in this chapter,
has gone to great lengths to present itself to other world
leaders as dynamic and in the forefront of domestic reform.13
Shifter presented an interesting, but less than definitive
argument about Principle Seven, which does state that human
rights and fundamental freedoms are an "essential factor" for
peace. The debate over which should came first, internation¬
al reconciliation or domestic reform, or whether they should
more properly run in tandem, still rages. It is not simply a
problem of interstate relations, for as presented in Chapter
Four, many Soviet dissidents assume that a relaxed interna¬
tional climate logically connotes leniency at home. Since
this has not always held true, the Soviet argument, even when
accepted in its entirety, does not mean that human rights
will be applied within the Soviet Union in a way that Western
leaders apparently desire, as witnessed with the treatment of
Helsinki Monitors in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the only way
that Western policy-makers could be certain of the desired
domestic change would be to require and witness it before
making international agreements. The Soviet leaders may be
closer to adopting the Western point of view as articulated
in a new® conference during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in
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Reykjavik in October 1986 when Soviet officials stated that
changes in domestic affairs were consistent with adaptation
in foreign policy.14
Sofinsky did not remain silent when the Soviet human
rights record was attacked. One week into the meeting in
Ottawa, a heated debate took place among representatives of
Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet
Union. British delegate Anthony Williams asserted that the
Soviet record of compliance with the Final Act was extremely
poor, specifically in the area of civil and political
rights.15 This incited Sofinsky to launch into a diatribe
against British social and economic problems including
unemployment illiteracy and inadequate maternity leave. He
also attacked official British policy toward the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) and, for the greater part of his
thirty-seven minute speech compared former IRA leader, Bobby
Sands (who died while on a hunger strike in prison in 1981)
to Andrei Sakharov, suggesting that Sands was potentially one
of the most famous figures of the 20th century.16 Williams
responded that Sands was a convicted terrorist and that no
leader in the West criticized the Soviet government for
executing three Armenians who had formerly placed a bomb in a
Moscow metro station.17 Continuing their debate, Williams
complained of discrimination against Soviet Jews, while the
national rights of Scots and Welsh preoccupied Sofinsky.18
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Either in an attempt to soften perceptions of the Soviet
secret police or to present a defiant attitude on the role of
other nations in Soviet domestic politics, Sofinsky brought a
general of the KGB, Sergei Kbndrashev, to refute allegations
of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and to assert that there
was full freedom of religion there.19 Ultimately, the Soviet
representatives claimed that their nation was in full
conformity with the Final Act while the record of Western
nations allegedly fell far short.
The US representative, Richard Shifter, addressed a
number of the Soviet complaints. The crux of his argument
was that the distinction between political and economic
rights was an artificial one, and he emphasized that the
changes which Americans most desired did not require a new
political system in the Soviet Union.20 His comments were
not entirely accurate though, because he called for unlimited
freedom of expression with corresponding restrictions on the
role of officials of the Soviet state in the lives of Soviet
citizens.
In one of the most extensive sessions of self-criticism
from any diplomat in Ottawa, Shifter outlined the problems of
unemployment and homelessness in the United States.21 But
his explanation for the US refusal to ratify the UN Covenants
on Human Rights was not persuasive. He based the decision on
the illogical argument that, since other nations that were
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partners to the agreement had violated it, Poland specifical¬
ly, it was worthless.22 And in a broad comparison of the
qualities of life in the Soviet Union and United States (and
taking into account Soviet hardships since 1917), Shifter
concluded that the actual Soviet performance in guaranteeing
social and economic rights was poor in the areas of consumer
goods, agriculture, women's rights, medical care and in equal
access to a host of goods that are more commonly available to
the Soviet elite.23
Emphasizing the major differences which still existed
between the East and West European delegations, two drafts of
the final report of the Ottawa meeting were submitted.
Ottawa Meeting of Experts 47 (QME 47) was presented by 17
Western delegations including the members of the Atlantic
Alliance and European Economic Community.24 It was a much
more extensive document than GME 48, submitted by representa¬
tives of the Warsaw Pact.25 One major Soviet objection was
centred on a sentence which noted "grave concern...at serious
violations of human rights in some participating States,"26
because that phrase was aimed at the East European govern¬
ments. A compromise proposal, OME 49, was submitted by the
neutral and non-aligned nations, but the Soviet delegation
would not accept its call for a further meeting of special¬
ists on human rights.27 The Ottawa meeting thus ended
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without a final document, but not without strong final
impressions.
"The Nineteenth Semiannual Report by the President to
the Commission of Security and Cooperation in Europe (1 April
to 1 October 1985)" noted that "Soviet-bloc intransigence"
prevented the creation of a final document.28 But the report
claimed that the meeting was productive in five ways: it
allowed the Western delegations to single-out East European
violations of the Final Act contrary to the latter's desire
to relegate such matters to their own internal political
systems; Western unity was further enhanced when seventeen
nations tabled a collective final draft; representatives of
the neutral and non-aligned nations again had joined the
other West Europeans in condemning all violations of human
rights; delegates from nations outside of Eastern Europe
agreed that it was best to have no final document than one
which ignored the major differences expressed during the
meeting; and finally, the West Europeans left Ottawa with
unity that would strengthen their position in Vienna during
the next follow-up conference.29
The official Soviet summation of the conference in
Ottawa was written by the chief Soviet delegate Sofinsky for
Izvestiia. He wrote:
It became clear at the very beginning of the
conference that not all delegations had come to
Ottawa intending to discuss the issues specified by
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the Madrid mandate in a businesslike and construc¬
tive manner. From the outset, the delegations of
the NATO countries, and above all the representa¬
tives of the US, exhibited a desire to turn the
conference into a noisy 'show.'30
Sofinsky continued:
Why was the conference unable to adopt a final
document? The problem does not lie simply in the
different approaches to the same concepts—
approaches that are due to the fact that the
countries represented at the conference belong to
different social and economic systems—nor in the
special features of their historical development.
The chief reason is something else. The Western
countries' delegations were well aware that it
would be impossible in a final document to ignore
the flagrant and massive violations of human rights
in their countries.31
Sofinsky's tone was condemnatory, but in one of the most
optimistic final assessments by a Soviet representative on a
conference concerned with human rights, Sofinsky wrote that
the Ottawa meeting did not end in failure. Rather, he
claimed, "the mere fact that representatives of the thirty-
five countries that signed the Final Act in Helsinki could
come together and discuss the human rights situation is
good."32 He also argued though that world public attention
was drawn to the abuses of human rights in Western countries
and the need to eliminate them.33 And finally, Sofinsky
pointed to the entirely positive desire of all the par¬
ticipants to continue the dialogue begun in 1972.34 With
Ottawa as a precedent, meetings in Bern and Budapest
followed.
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The primary goal for the US representatives at the Bern
Human Contacts Experts Meeting was "to achieve better
compliance on existing commitments."35 This objective was
central to the US negotiating position, not only from the
beginning, but also at the very end of the meeting when the
head of the US delegation, Michael Novak, was the only
representative not to agree to a final text (effectively
vetoing the concluding document) because it contained, in the
view of the American leadership, too many loopholes and
qualifications on top of the original commitments outlined in
the Final Act.36 The second major goal for the US delegation
was "to examine how the human contacts provisions of Helsinki
and Madrid had been implemented thus far."37 Of special
interest were problems of reunification of families,
marriages between citizens of different states, travel for
personal and professional purposes, trade union rights,
tourism, youth and sport exchanges, postal, telephone and
radio communications and a host of other issues involving the
rights of religious groups and national minorities. The US
and other West European delegations considered the free flow
of people among all the nations of Europe the overriding
theme of the meeting in Bern. According to Novak, the
"discussion of problems was direct, and the Soviet response
to criticism was not as confrontational as at previous
meetings."38 Severe attacks on the Soviet performance in the
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areas above probably would not have been warranted anyway
since the period leading up to the Bern meeting witnessed a
dramatic growth in emigration from the Soviet Union, largely
for the purposes of reuniting families.39 The most famous
figure permitted to emigrate was Shcharansky. The cir¬
cumstances of his release are discussed later in this
chapter.
Perhaps the Soviet leaders calculated that this timely
period of leniency would deflect criticism from them at Bern.
If so, they must have been disappointed, for in reality it
justified further meetings through the Helsinki process where
more unresolved cases could be raised. It is more likely
that the Soviet leaders have came to the conclusion that such
issues as the reunification of families and even emigration
in some cases, are not matters that need be set in an
ideological context. In other words, they have such "low-
risk" potential for destabilizing domestic politics that
refusing emigration is a greater nuisance (due to Western
criticism) than completing the appropriate paperwork.
Emigration will be discussed throughout this chapter, but
here it is sufficient to note that there is much room for
deflecting Western criticism, and Soviet policy-makers are
increasingly realizing this.
As for the official Soviet reaction to the meeting, one
commentator noted with displeasure that:
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a number of Western delegations are stubbornly-
trying to turn the discussion in Bern into a kind
of propaganda show. Some of them are constantly-
trying to teach us 'humanism'... [efforts are] made
by the representatives of a state [the US] in which
unemployment, surveillance, persecution of
dissidents, racial discrimination and genocide
against Indians have became standard fare.40
This attempt to shift emphasis away from the Soviet record on
human rights was assisted by the controversy over a final
document for the Bern meeting. As in Ottawa, the neutral and
non-aligned nations submitted a compromise known as the Bern
Meeting of Experts 49 (BME 49). The compromise contained
elements of both the earlier East and West European propo¬
sals. The US delegation had seemingly accepted it, but at
9:30 in the evening of the last day of the meeting, Novak
informed the delegates that "after very careful review, imy
government cannot give its consent."41 Soviet indignation
was made apparent by one Soviet journalist who stated that:
The United States said 'no.' Utilizing procedural
rules [vote by consensus] and disregarding the
Europeans' desire to preserve detente and the
spirit of Helsinki, it imposed its diktat on the
Bern meeting's participants. It is hard to
remember an instance in the history of Helsinki
forums when countries of both the West and the East
have appealed jointly to the US to accept a
compromise, to refrain from destroying an agreement
reached with such difficulty... .42
Soviet authorities then published a copy of the draft in the
journal, International Affairs.43 Reactions in the Western
press ranged from condemnation for the unilateral US action
to praise for the success of the US delegation in defending
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the ideals of the Final Act.44 In any case, major differen¬
ces between the Soviet and American delegations on the
methods to expand human contacts were still apparent.
Of the three post-Madrid meetings on human rights, the
Cultural Forum, held in Budapest in October and November
1986, was the most successful and the most unique. The
sessions did begin with major differences on the agenda, with
West European delegations proposing a three part agenda to
consider: the dissemination of culture, international
cooperation in the arts and flourishing of the creative
process.45 The Soviet representatives proposed consideration
of broad topics of culture excluding the subject of "cultural
freedom."46 The final agenda created four categories for
consideration. There were labelled "applied arts," "perform¬
ing arts," "literature," and "mutual cultural knowledge."47
The more specific agenda, with a final category related to
cultural freedom, was a victory for the Western representa¬
tives. But an even larger success took place in a debate
over the appropriate participants in the conference. By the
beginning of the meeting, the East European delegates
accepted the proposal that the delegations should include
preeminent writers, performers and other artists as well as
state bureaucrats and party officials.48 This assured that
political issues would not dominate the conference.
Moreover, the largely apolitical nature of cultural exchanges
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prevented the Budapest meeting from becotiing a forum of
ideological rhetoric rather than a platform for the projec¬
tion and reconsideration of cultural achievements.
But there were still limits on how open a forum the
Hungarian officials would permit. For example, they denied
access to the meeting to non-governmental organizations,
especially the US Helsinki Watch Committee and the Interna¬
tional Helsinki Federation for Human Rights.49 They were
forced to hold their own cultural forum in Budapest despite
the fact that, at least the spirit, if not the word of the
Madrid document protected their right to be there. But the
Western delegates learned much from this action for when
Soviet spokespersons called for an international human
rights conference in Moscow, they argued that access by non¬
governmental organizations of all kinds would have to be
guaranteed which assured that they would continue to play an
influential role in the Helsinki process, despite Soviet and
East European suspicions about their objectives.50
The fact that many East Europeans still questioned the
real intent behind Western appeals for broader cultural
exchanges, especially freer flows of information (which could
allegedly became "psychological warfare") was evidenced in a
question and answer exchange between East German art
historian Lothar Bisky and the chairman of Boston public










What is meant by "free flow of
information"?
Literally, just what it says, the
U.S. believes that greater under¬
standing among peoples can only be
achieved when there is the maximum
possible freedom for the citizens of
all countries to obtain the
information they happen to want—
whether it is in the form of books,
newspapers, magazines, technical
journals, films, poems, religious
tracts, radio and television
broadcasts, or anything else,
whether its source is domestic or
foreign and whether or not the
information is agreeable to those
who govern the country in which the
citizens live.
Does not every country have the
right to choose its own flow of
information?
We believe that every citizen of
every country has the right and that
no government should impose on any
citizen any limit on information he
may seek. It is the right of the
individual we support, not the right
of the government.
If there were free flow of informa¬
tion, would this not lead to
"intellectual imperialism,"
presumably because there would be a
greater flow if information in one
direction than in another?
That is entirely a question of what
the individuals in any country
happen to want. If citizens from a
country want more information from
outside their borders, that is their
free choice. If not, it is also
their free choice.
What information would flow back
from the GDR to the US?
Again, it is up to the free choice
of individuals. Whatever they want









Is the information to be used to
impose on our country your ideals?
By no means. It is to be used only
as each individual from your country
wants to use it. Our goal is only
freedom of individual choice.
Are you denouncing our form of
communication?
Only if and to the extent that the
individual in your country is not
free to choose the information he
wants. If he is free to choose,
then we think his understanding will
be advanced. If he is not, then his
understanding will be more dif¬
ficult.
Is this free flow only a way to
expand the American market for
information?
That choice is to be made by
individual decision. If the
individual wants more information
from the U.S. he should be allowed
to obtain it. If he wants less,
that is entirely his business.
And last, are you not just bandying
about the words "free flow of
information"?
Most emphatically not. Freedom of
speech, freedom of though [sic],
freedom of information—and their
corollaries—absence of censorship,
absence of restrictions, absence of
any official orthodoxy—are
absolutely basic to our American
ideals and we are convinced that
all men in any part of the world
also want such freedoms, and that
when these freedoms are available to
all, understanding among all peoples
will be within our reach.51
Despite those lingering suspicions, the head of the Soviet
delegation, G.A. Ivanov, noted in one of the most positive
assessments of any meeting held under the auspices of the
8. [Bisky]:
Answer[Ives]:
Helsinki follow-up procedure that:
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the discussion of the forum was held in a business¬
like and serious atmosphere, on the whole. It is
perfectly natural that its participants held
differing ideological and creative views. The
joint interest in resolving major, real problems
predetermined the cultural forum's positive
results.52
The American summary of the meeting was much more negative
and accused the Soviet Union of, amongst other things:
creating procedural roadblocks; boasting about cultural
achievements; limiting artistic accomplishments to those
which allegedly promoted peace; and attempting to isolate the
US from Europe by referring to a "European cultural unity."53
These actions did not prevent the head of the US delegation,
Walter Stoessel, Jr., from presenting a largely favourable
report to Congress which accentuated the ultimate broad range
of discussion at the meeting and the advantages of having
prominent personalities attend to diffuse potential political
haranguing.54 Although a final document was not agreed upon,
the number of cultural exchanges throughout 1986 and 1987
were unparalled since the early 197O's (although many of the
cultural exchanges were negotiated during the Reagan-
Gorbachev summit in Geneva in November 1985).55 The most
famous of these was the return of Soviet-born pianist
Vladimir Horowitz to Moscow for a series of concerts in the
spring of 1986.56
What conclusions may be drawn from the meetings of
specialists after the Madrid follow-up conference? First of
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all, the conferences in Bern and Budapest were the most
successful largely because they were less controversial from
an ideological perspective. East and West European leaders
could improve cooperation in these areas without major
changes in political or legal principles. In some cases,
such as in the performing arts, expansion could serve to
highlight the intellectual and artistic achievements not only
of a nation, but also of its political system. This
competition for acceptance and praise may be the single most
beneficial aspect of the Helsinki process. But this is not
to say that there has been political accommodation among the
political and economic governments of Eastern and Western
Europe.
Second, the meeting in Ottawa must be regarded as the
least profitable for all the participants. That conference
dealt with ideological issues of human rights and revived the
debate over what the concept "human rights" means and which
government in Europe is most humane. The Soviet delegates
did respond in kind to the specific complaints directed
against them, thus creating a healthier dialogue, but
ultimately they once again relied on the Final Act's
guarantee of non-interference in internal affairs.
Finally, during the writing of this thesis, the second
phase of the Vienna follow-up meeting had just concluded and
a similar dialogue was perpetuated.57 But even the prelimi-
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nary meetings in Vienna had reinforced the fact that, for
general improvement of human rights in Eastern Europe,
especially of the type requested by Western delegations at
Ottawa, changes will have to occur in the Soviet system.
Soviet leaders have long indicated that any such change is an
internal affair and would have to be initiated under the
guidance of the CPSU without external meddling.
Much optimism of such an internal reform has been
generated by Gorbachev since 1985 and increased significantly
after the January Plenum of the Central Committee in 1987 and
the 19th Party Conference in June 1988.58 The following
section explores only briefly some indicators that this
optimism may be premature and that the potential changes
will not alter the established Soviet stance in the Helsinki
process.
GORBACHEV AND HUMAN RIGHTS
While it is difficult to assess the full scope and
impact of Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership of the CPSU, a few
preliminary indications on his approach to the Helsinki Final
Act and human rights are possible. The full range of issues
that encompass perestroika and crlasnost', as discussed by
Gorbachev and by individuals in the Soviet press, cannot be
446
represented here. Rather the focus in this section is on
the relevance of these new concepts to the more specific
problems in the area of human rights between the Soviet Union
and the United States.
First and foremost, Gorbachev has supported the Helsinki
process in a number of statements. His assertions of the
permanence of the borders of post-war Europe have been
emphatic, and he has maintained that the recognition of this
reality would provide a more secure basis for cooperation
through the Helsinki process. Certainly, Gorbachev perceived
the decision by NATO representatives, made in December 1979,
to station cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe as a threat
to the territorial permanence of central and eastern Europe.
His willingness to sign the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF)
treaty, which reduces substantially the number of nuclear
missiles in Europe represents, in part, the continuing Soviet
desire to maintain territorial and strategic stability in
Europe which had been enhanced through detente and the CSCE.
Second, Gorbachev has not avoided other topics included
in the Helsinki process. In the humanitarian sphere, he has
concentrated most on cultural exchanges and the reunification
of families. These appear as areas where the greatest amount
of "accommodation" seems possible because they are not
overtly political in nature and involve relatively few
people.59 He has not, however, been willing to discuss
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issues of political freedom in the Soviet Union with foreign
leaders who demand changes allegedly dictated by the Final
Act.
It must be asked here what perestroika and qlasnost'
mean for human rights in the Soviet Union? The Soviet
leadership has used these terms more narrowly than is often
recognized in the West. Recognition of this fact will answer
many questions about human rights and the "Helsinki process."
Glasnost' can be translated as "publicity" or "open¬
ness." Through it, Soviet leaders hope to generate broader
discussion about the inefficiencies in the Soviet system.
Allegedly, a more open discussion about many problems of
organization and performance will lead to essential political
and economic restructuring, especially at the level of
management (including both Party and non-Party supervisors).
It is hoped that ultimately this will make the Soviet system
function more efficiently or so it is hoped. Izvestiia
commentator A. Druzenko has claimed that readers of the
newspaper "correctly see it [qlasnost11 as an effective
instrument of public control and primarily of control over
the activities of officials...."60 Thus, in the long-term,
qlasnost' is synonymous with effectivenost1 (effectiveness).
Underpinning the adoption of qlasnost' is the assumption
that inadequate communication on all levels of Soviet society
has stifled Soviet economic performance. In some cases, lack
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of information is apparently due to incompetence, while in
other instances it is due to deliberate obstruction ranging
from examples of petty greed to incidents of corruption and
cover up.61 Well before Gorbachev became the General
Secretary, he argued that profound transformations in the
economy were absolutely vital for the future of the Soviet
Union. In a meeting in December 1984 entitled, The All-Union
Scientific and Practical Conference on the Improvement of
Developed Socialism and the Party's Ideological Work, he
stated:
The course aimed at intensification is dictated by
objective conditions and by the entire course of
the country's development. There is no alternative
to it. Only an intensive economy developing on the
basis of the latest scientific and technical
achievements can serve as a dependable material
base for improving the working people's well being,
ensure the strengthening of the country's positions
in the international arena and allow it to worthily
enter the new millennium as a great and prospering
power.62
And in an address on French television in September 1985,
Gorbachev stressed that "the amount of work to be done in
industry alone in the forthcoming fifteen years is equal to
that which we have done over the almost seven decades of
Soviet power.1,63 Gorbachev's call for greater productivity
was due in part to his desire to improve the standard of
living of Soviet citizens. He reiterated a longstanding
Soviet argument—the path to greater civil and political
rights was through the expansion of the Soviet economy. But
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in his speech to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU,
Gorbachev did not argue that economic rights preclude
political rights, rather he claimed:
Expanding public openness is a fundamental question
for us. This is a political question. Without
public openness, there is not and cannot be any
democracy, political creativity by the masses or
their participation in management.64
This exemplified a shift in emphasis from the previous Soviet
leaders who more frequently argued that the firm economic and
social foundations of developed socialism would eventually
enable a broader realization of political and civil rights
for the Soviet population. For Gorbachev, the political and
economic spheres are too interrelated to separate in this
manner. He elaborated upon this further in October 1985 in a
speech during the drafting of guidelines for the economic and
social development of the Soviet Union to the year 2000. He
stated:
I want to forcefully emphasize that without the
all-out broadening and deepening of socialist
democracy—i.e., without creating conditions for
the daily, active and effective participation of
all the working people and their collectives and
organizations in resolving questions of state and
public life—we will not be able to advance
successfully....The development of genuine people's
rule is acquiring even greater importance today.
[This will be done by] expanding public openness,
strengthening control from below and deepening
democratic principles....65
But Gorbachev continued:
We must instil the ideal of Marxism-Leninism in
people, instil them by truthful words and actual
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deeds, combining political education and ideologi¬
cal influence with the ever-expanding participation
of the working people....66
From the rationale used in these speeches, and many other
commentaries, it is possible to draw two conclusions which
may potentially influence the debate over human rights.
First, effectivenost' in the Soviet system will be ac¬
complished within an ideological strait-jacket even if
broader debate is permitted. Moreover, the party leadership
will determine its proper parameters. Second, the ideologi¬
cal constraints imposed by Marxism-Leninism are even more
necessary if the CPSU is to distance itself from the
capitalist and social democratic political parties of Western
Europe. The "new way of thinking" initiated by the Soviet
leadership is not synonymous with Western democratic notions
of political and economic liberties.
In order to assure the continuation of long-standing
ideological rules, the new generation of Soviet leaders has
accentuated the role of the CPSU. Curing the Twenty-Seventh
Party Congress, Gorbachev discussed methods for enhancing
social justice in the Soviet Union. While he did see room
for reform in the CPSU, he defended its guiding role:
The Party is the leading force and chief guarantor
of the development of socialist self-government.
In performing its leadership role in society, the
Party is itself the highest form of a self-
governing sociopolitical organization. By
developing inner-Party democracy and increasing the
activeness of Communists working in all segments of
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the political system, the CPSU gives the proper
direction to the process of deepening the people's
socialist self-government and expanding the
participation of the masses and of every person in
the country's affairs.67
And he argued further that more effective self-government was
being accomplished within the existing socio-political system
with the ultimate objective of "enriching the content of
democratic centralism and strengthening its socialist
nature."68 If Western observers are still unconvinced that
crlasnost' does not provide unrestricted political freedom for
citizens in their relationship to the state, Gorbachev
offered still further evidence of constraints when he argued
emphatically:
The entire arsenal of the Soviet person's social,
political and personal rights and liberties should
serve the tasks of the expansion and further
development of socialist democracy. The Party and
State regard the deepening of these rights and
liberties and the strengthening of their guarantees
as a primary duty. But the essence of socialism is
such that citizens' rights do not exist and cannot
exist without their duties, just as there are no
duties without rights.69
Gorbachev was referring to a wide range of duties included in
the 1977 Constitution (which are discussed in Chapter Three
and have not been altered). More recently, he outlined in
the draft Party programme of October 1985 (and reiterated in
the Twenty-seventh Party Congress in July 1986) that citizens
are obligated to "struggle against manifestations of alien
ideology and morality."70 During the Nineteenth Party
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Conference in July 1988, Gorbachev restated the important
role of the individual in perestroika and the building of
socialism.71 In fact, an extraordinarily important aspect of
openness has been the continuing necessity of distinguishing
the fundamentals of the Soviet system from those of Western
democratic countries, lest Soviet citizens misinterpret
crlasnost' as "westernization."
Writing as recently as 1987, Professor Spartak Beglov
has argued that the fundamental social contradiction of the
century is still between socialism and capitalism and that it
is impossible to "stop the battle of ideas or the competition
between the two ways of life."72 Officially sanctioned
proclamations note that during the period of intensified
socialist construction, the competition between capitalism
and socialism is likely to increase, even though the world
situation dictates that the two systems should cooperate when
it is mutually beneficial. Gorbachev has forcefully argued:
Posing as champions of humanism and human rights,
capitalist ideologists are trying to impose on the
socialist world norms and standards of a way of
life which is alien to us and to undermine the
lofty humanistic ideals without which man's work
and life itself would be meaningless. They would
like to cultivate among us customs and tastes
predominant in bourgeois society, 'to soften up'
the people's minds, and make them susceptible to
petty bourgeoise ideas and petty, hollow tempta¬
tions, to individualism, philistine fortune-
hunting, ideological and cultural amnivorousness.73
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In this way, Gorbachev has called for political vigilance
against such counter-ideological assaults while simultaneous¬
ly campaigning for creativeness, experimentation and
efficiency within the Soviet system. The Soviet leadership
is certainly concerned about the potential appeal of Western
democratic notions of openness to Soviet citizens and the
ways that they may apply foreign ideological concepts to
their own situations. A case in point has been the issue of
"pluralism" in Soviet politics. Pravda contributor E.
Kuzmin attempted to dispel any inclinations towards a
multiparty system in the Soviet Union when he stated that
"all appraisals of the political system of the society of
real socialism from positions of the so-called 'pluralistic'
concept...are scientifically and politically untenable."74
Kuzmin argued that such a development would lead to destruc¬
tive faultfinding and would represent a great leap backwards.
If glasnost1 does not signal accommodation with
capitalist ideology, then how do human rights specialists
interpret this period of discussion in the Soviet Union?
This question is ever more important since Gorbachev himself
has claimed that Soviet foreign policy "is an organic and
logical extension of our domestic policy."75 Because the
greatest emphasis here is on Soviet-American disagreements,
it will be most useful to examine some selective official
responses from representatives in the US Government.
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One such reaction was provided by Richard Shifter, US
Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
and former head of the US delegation to the Ottawa Human
Rights Experts Meeting. In an address entitled, "The Promise
and the Limits of Glasnost'" to a group in Washington, DC in
October 1987, Shifter set out his understanding of the
changes in the Soviet Union. He expressed his support of
more public criticism in the Soviet Union but concluded that:
it would be equally wrong to say that Soviet
society under Gorbachev remains unchanged or,
conversely, to suggest that "demokratizatsiya'
under Gorbachev really mans democratization, as we
know it....Demokratizatsiva1. as the term is used
today, means allowing citizens some say in the
government, but most assuredly not allowing them to
influence the policies adopted by the top leader¬
ship of the party... .My point is that the basic
system of repression remains in place. The
shackles have been loosened, in same respects
substantially so. But they remain in place. They
can be tightened again at the will of the Soviet
leadership.76
While he welcomed Gorbachev's efforts, Shifter did not agree
with the editors of Time magazine who selected Gorbachev as
their "Man of the Year for 1987" because, according to that
publication, he was "a symbol of hope of a new kind of Soviet
Union: more open, more concerned with the welfare of its
citizens and less with the spread of its ideology and system
abroad."77 This latter assessment neglects the very essence
of glasnost' which is to strengthen the economic and
political power of the Soviet Union in preparation for
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further competition with the alleged imperialistic policies
of capitalist nations. Glasnost', despite its reformist
slant, is intended to ultimately increase Soviet power, not
to dilute it.
But what do the policies of the new general secretary
signal for the Helsinki process specifically? Gorbachev has
steadfastly defended the Helsinki process calling it "a life-
giving source sustaining the trends toward mutual understand¬
ing and cooperation in Europe and beyond,"78 "the most
important political document of the post-war period,"79 "a
common asset of the peoples of Europe"80 and one of the
"constructive foundations in international life."81
Thus it is clear that Gorbachev intends to support the
Helsinki follow-up meetings. His desire to maintain a
consistent policy was exemplified in part by his decision in
May 1986 to support the appointment of Yuri Dubinin, former
chief Soviet delegate at the Madrid follow-up meeting and
former Ambassador to the United Nations, to the position of
Soviet Ambassador to the United States.82 With the addition¬
al return of former ambassadors Dobrynin (US) and Yakovlev
(Canada) to Moscow, Gorbachev has experienced advisors to
guide his internal and external policies on human rights.
Numerous more recent official Soviet statements have
reiterated long-standing Soviet positions in the CSCE such as
the priority of enhancing East-West economic, scientific and
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technological ties to normalise the political climate in
Europe (thus enhancing human rights).83 During the opening
session of the Vienna follow-up meeting, Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevarnadze also argued against exclusive emphasis
on Basket III, attempts to impose antithetical political
ideals on participating nations, and contacts between people
that do not serve humanism and peace and interference in the
internal affairs of other nations.84 Nevertheless, it is
undeniable that Soviet representatives are currently more
willing to discuss issues of human rights than in the recent
past.
For example, when Gorbachev was interviewed on French
television in September 1985, he was asked why he had not
initiated substantial change in Soviet policies on human
rights since they were so damaging to the reputation of the
Soviet Union abroad. His answer was direct, but uncharac¬
teristically responsive. He replied:
I could put it as follows: let us in the Soviet
Union manage our affairs ourselves and you in
France manage yours [Indeed, this has been the most
common Soviet response]. But I will nevertheless
answer your question. The issue of human rights is
no problem to us. and we are ready to debate it
anywhere, in any audience, and with any representa¬
tives [emphasis added]. We have plenty to say on
this issue which is now being played up artificial¬
ly by Western propaganda and exploited to poison
relations between nations and states.85
Indeed, Soviet representatives have, since 1985, been more
willing to debate and to boast about their track-record in
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human rights, but this does not mean that they have adopted
Western perspectives. Western observers most, for the sake
of accuracy, acknowledge a number of interesting develop¬
ments. The US State Department, one of the most adamant
critics of the Soviet record in adhering to the Final Act,
actually has had praise for "some specific improvements in
the U.S.S.R. in the field of human rights and human con¬
tacts."86 In particular, the report applauded the expansion
of permissible topics discussed in the domestic Soviet press
and broader freedoms for intellectuals. It positively
appraised decisions by the Supreme Soviet in February 1987 to
release and pardon a number of prisoners convicted under
"political" articles and same minor improvements for
religious activists.87 These "improvements" did not,
however, prevent an overall negative assessment by the
representatives of the US State Department. They concluded
that "Soviet conduct continued to fall short of the standards
of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding docu¬
ment."88 The US Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe has also accentuated Soviet non-compliance with the
Final Act and international standards of human rights.
But the single Soviet action that generated the most
optimism in the West was the release from exile of Andrei
Sakharov in December 1986. After numerous public denuncia¬
tions of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Sakharov and his
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wife Elena Bonner were arrested in May 1984 and sent to live
in the city of Gorky without being sentenced or put on trial.
According to the predictable rationale applied by the Soviet
leadership, Gorky effectively isolated Sakharov from contacts
with the Western media, or even with other Soviet citizens.
Nevertheless, on 17 December 1986, Gorbachev telephoned
Sakharov to inform him that he was released from exile and
could return to Moscow.89 A formal announcement was made on
19 December by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky
(clearly for a foreign audience) and the news was broadcast
that evening on the Soviet television program, Vremia
(targeted for domestic consumption).90 Since Sakharov had
been the preeminent dissident in the Soviet Union since at
least 1968, there was much conjecture that his release
signalled a major change in official Soviet policy on
dissidence.91 And Sakharov was in poor health such that
Gorbachev's action was humanitarian in at least a limited
sense. But did this decision on the part of the Soviet
leadership signal a new definition of dissidence in the
Soviet Union which one could equate with Gorbachev's strong
proclamations about openness? While this conclusion was
tantalizing to some Western analysts, it was unwarranted
given the numerous political advantages in ending Sakharov's
exile. The ultimate decision was based more on a strict
cost-benefit assessment for domestic and foreign policy than
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on a predetermined decision to make a truly unprecedented
change in the content of debate and the process of decision¬
making in the Soviet Union. There are a number of reasons,
which have been largely overlooked by journalists and
specialists alike, why the political benefits of releasing
Sakharov outweighed the costs and why Sakharov's "freedom"
did not threaten the CPSU's control of ideology.
First of all, Sakharov's relationship with the Soviet
authorities was very much influenced by the deteriorating
health of his wife Elena Bonner. By October 1985, Bonner
was in desperate need of medical attention for ailing heart
and eye problems (thrombophlebitis) that could be treated
only in the West. Sakharov took the dramatic step (although
not unprecedented for him) of writing to the Soviet Academy
of Sciences with a statement of resignation unless Bonner
received permission to travel to the US on medical grounds,
with a corresponding guarantee that she be permitted to
return to the USSR.92 Bonner received a visa in October
1985, just before the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, most likely
because this action portrayed the Soviet leaders as humani¬
tarian. It also prevented Sakharov from resigning from the
Soviet Academy of Sciences which otherwise might have
incited scientists in Western Europe and the United States to
advocate limits on scientific and technological exchange
potentially damaging to Gorbachev's efforts at perestroika.
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And the "concession" established a precedent of voluntarily
curtailed freedom because Bonner agreed that she would not
talk to Western journalists during her travel.93 The
potential problems that Bonner could have caused for
Gorbachev, especially with such adamant support from
Sakharov, were diffused in the most efficient way possible.
A second reason for releasing Sakharov may have been due
to the successful precedent established in Bonner's case by
the Soviet authorities. It was widely rumoured in Moscow
that Sakharov had written a letter to Gorbachev in July 1985
in which he pledged to discontinue all public activities in
return for permission to return to his scientific work.94
Given Sakharov's prolonged and resolute stand against such a
compromise, it seems implausible that he would initiate a
dramatic change in principle, but this would not have
prevented the Soviet secret police and the upper echelons of
the CPSU from fuelling rumours to undercut Sakharov's
following both within and outside of the Soviet Union. In
fact, upon his release, Sakharov did have to answer suspi¬
cions that he had arranged a compromise with Gorbachev.
Reached by telephone on 20 December 1985, Sakharov stated
that, "I am going to live as I lived before my exile, and
resume all of my activities."95 When asked about the
telephone call from Gorbachev, Sakharov claimed, "He told me
to work for the public good—that is the formula he used."96
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Even though Sakharov denied that he pledged to refrain from
political criticism, and he did reaffirm his dissent on such
issues as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the
incarceration of political prisoners, Sakharov's public
support for Gorbachev soon fed speculation that the two men
did come to a compromise. In any case, in one of the most
unpredictable political developments, Sakharov has been put
somewhat on the defensive by the Western media. It can be
expected that in a relatively short period of time,
Sakharov's case will became a less newsworthy item and that
his role as a leader against human rights abuse in the Soviet
Union will gradually diminish.
A third rationale used by the Soviet leaders for
releasing Sakharov may very well have had to do with
political timing. December 1986 was a particularly opportune
time to make the announcement. The first stage of the Vienna
follow-up meeting was underway and the objective of the new
policy toward Sakharov may have been to soften verbal
assaults on the Soviet delegation there (in actuality, it did
not lessen criticism of Soviet conduct). Soviet anxiety may
have been particularly high after former Moscow Helsinki
Monitor, Anatoly Marchenko, died in prison during a hunger
strike on 8 December.97 Marchenko had been successful in
smuggling a letter out of the Soviet Union to Vienna where it
became a source of great tension between the Soviet delega-
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tion and those from Western Europe.98 In fact, it is not
outside the realm of possibility that Marchenko died from
beatings received by his jailers after the letter was
produced in Vienna. The Soviet leaders must have recognized
that a letter from Sakharcsv could have reached Vienna just as
easily. After all, Sakharov had been able to send a letter
to representatives attending the Stockholm Conference on
Confidence and Security-Building Measures in January 1984.99
Even worse, the forced exile and isolation was hard on
Sakharov physically (he apparently suffered a stroke during
a hunger strike in May 1985). The death of Sakharov, in
addition to Marchenko, would have been devastating to the
international image of the Soviet Union. The death of Bonner
would have been equally damaging. That image, especially in
the category of human rights, was being improved not only by
Gorbachev's public relations, but also due to the much
publicized decisions of fifty Soviet emigres to return to the
Soviet Union from the United States because of various
complaints about American lifestyles.100 This mass emigra¬
tion from the United States seemed to confirm Soviet
arguments about the superior humanitarian "way of life"
guaranteed by socialist democracy. Perhaps it was hoped that
Sakharov's complaints would appear hollow to many Soviet
citizens and, in any case, the recollections of repatriated
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Soviet citizens would overshadow most anything that Sakharov
wished to say in Moscow.
A fourth factor relevant to Sakharov's release, was
that Sakharov could not be silenced altogether. He was
repetitively successful in exporting his comments to other
nations for publication and then potentially for underground
recirculation in the Soviet Union. For instance, even during
his exile and strict confinement in Gorky, he was able to
smuggle out an advance copy of his autobiography and also
letters detailing his ordeal with the RGB during his
exile.101 In other words, Sakharov was not silenced in Gorky
and, when he was able to communicate to a Western audience,
it was a major media event and a serious embarrassment for
Soviet authorities whose fabrications about Sakharov and the
mistreatment of political prisoners were exposed. Thus,
Sakharov's continued confinement in Gorky only heightened
awareness of political dissent in the Soviet Union and it did
not enhance the image of Gorbachev inside or outside of the
Soviet Union.
Thus, a final advantage gained by the return of Sakharov
to public life was the positive international reaction toward
Gorbachev who has striven to present himself as a true
humanitarian reformer as opposed to the alleged hypocritical
capitalist human rights activists in the West. As repre¬
sented in the Soviet press, a "humanitarian decision was
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taken with respect to Academician Sakharov.1,102 But it was
also implied, in both the official press and in Sakharov's
statements, that on his return to a research institute he
could potentially assist the new generation of Soviet leaders
in their technological restructuring of the Soviet Union.
For the domestic audience, Gorbachev may have been seen as
both generous and practical. An even more interesting
possibility is that Gorbachev wanted to send an unprecedented
and emphatic signal to individuals in the CPSU and bureau¬
cracy on the seriousness of his reforms. While the release
of Sakharov did not threaten the ideological foundations of
the Soviet system, it had the potential to intimidate those
persons who most resisted crlasnost1 and perestroika. What
was presented as a humanitarian gesture may have been equally
important as a demonstration of political authority as well.
In conclusion, the decision to end Sakharov's exile
should not be viewed as a concession under pressure from
foreign governments or citizens about human rights. Rather,
partial reconciliation with Sakharov, the most respected
dissident in the Soviet Union, has effectively undercut the
unofficial reform "movement," while it has accentuated the
guiding role of Gorbachev and the CPSU in improving the
efficiency of the Soviet system. The Sakharov case illus¬
trates that the Soviet leaders have developed much more
complex and reasoned policies to contend with dissidence.
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The following section gives further examples of this
relatively new sophistication and of the errors recently made
by the Reagan administration and American human rights
specialists in interpreting Soviet human rights policies in
procedural change.
EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION RECONSIDERED
Of all the issues which generate controversy in the
humanitarian sphere of Soviet-American relations, none is
more regularly topical than emigration from the Soviet Union.
The right to leave the Soviet Union, temporarily or per¬
manently, has became the most important subject in bilateral
relations to many American citizens (after arms control), who
also see it as the most significant aspect of the "Helsinki
process." But the Final Act does not even mention emigration
per se. Rather, in the subsection entitled, "Human Contacts"
in Basket III, the signatories pledged to create better
conditions for members of divided families either to visit
one another or to reunify their families (including persons
recently married or planning to marry). They also agreed to
facilitate travel for a host of personal or professional
reasons. This is the rather narrow context in which
emigration is mentioned in the Final Act. Perhaps the
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greatest cause of the growing misconception that the Final
Act is a guarantor of unlimited emigration was the meeting of
experts on human contacts in Bern where the issue was thrust
to the forefront in the discussions. The crux of US
Ambassador Novak's complaints in Bern was that the Soviet
leaders had failed miserably to follow through on previous
pledges to increase emigration. As stated above, the US was
criticized by many delegates for being the only nation to
veto the concluding document in Bern, but in the long-term
the controversy created greater awareness about the section
on human contacts. Unwittingly, US officials contributed to
the perception that the most important provisions of the
Final Act, if not the only ones that are concerned with human
rights, fall into the category of human contacts, and
emigration specifically.
Since the early 1970's, the degree of emigration has, at
least to many American citizens, served as a barometer of the
state of Soviet-American relations. Overwhelmingly, the most
attention has been on Jewish emigration with other religious
and national groups receiving only a fraction of the
attention.103 In the 1980's, these trends have continued
through ongoing attempts to link emigration (and other issues
of human rights) to a variety of other important topics
negotiated by representatives of the two governments. For
example, in June 1985, US State Department spokesperson,
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Bernard Kalb argued that official Soviet policy toward Jews
was "tragic and needless" and would prevent an improvement in
the relationship between the two countries.104 Richard
Shifter, head of the US delegation to the human rights
conference in Ottawa, warned his Soviet counterparts that
arms control and human rights were linked and he submitted a
list of names of individuals who wanted, for various reasons,
to leave the Soviet Union.105 Two months before the
superpower summit in Geneva (19-20 November 1985), all 100
members of the US Senate signed a letter addressed to
President Reagan which urged him to make human rights an
issue in the upcoming meeting and their greatest concern was
Jewish emigration.106 Senator Robert Dole specifically
linked trade relations to Jewish emigration when he asked his
colleagues to reconsider ways to use Most-Favored-Nation
trade privileges to modify official Soviet treatment of those
who had applied to leave the Soviet Union.107 Even US
Secretary of State, George Shultz, who has usually rejected
the notion of "linkage," stated soon after the summit in
Reykjavik (where Jewish emigration was a major topic) that
arms control would not be possible without "substantial
Soviet progress" in the area of human rights, especially
since the US Senate would not ratify an arms treaty without
evidence of "improvement."108 And representatives from non¬
governmental organizations, such as the National Conference
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on Soviet Jewry, have pressed for linkage between Jewish
emigration and other issues (especially arms control and
trade).109
Efforts to create interconnections have been vigorous
despite responses from Gorbachev that "Attempts to use trade
as a tool for interfering in our domestic affairs are
futile. We do not need such trade. We can do without
it. ••110 such statements are common and reflect Soviet
determination to reassert their national sovereignty and to
resolve any controversial cases through whatever methods are
available through internal institutional guidelines.111 But
this does not mean that the Soviet leaders have not learned
from past experience when contending with demands for
increases in emigration. In fact, while outwardly maintain¬
ing their principled position on emigration, they have
apparently realized that of all the contentious humanitarian
issues in East-West relations, emigration is the one which
carries few implications for ideology. When Soviet citizens
have relatives in the West, their motivation for reunifica¬
tion is far less for political than family reasons. The
Soviet leaders can therefore make concessions without
threatening democratic centralism, socialist democracy or the
guiding role of the CPSU.
The only potential drawback, and one that must cause
some concern, is that many emigres in the West join organiza-
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tions or begin activities that could be perceived as "anti-
Soviet" from the Soviet perspective. An increase in the
number of emigres in the West who present a negative
characterization of the Soviet Union would not be a positive
development for propagandists in Moscow. When Anatoly
Shcharansky arrived in Israel, he stated to numerous
representatives from Western news agencies that thirteen
million people were suffering from inappropriate institution¬
al confinement in the Soviet Union and between ten and twenty
thousand of those individuals were political prisoners.112
Statements such as Shcharansky1 s, even if true, could lead
the Soviet authorities to decrease emigration. Should
Western leaders desire to relieve Soviet anxieties, they
could present those like Shcharansky as "cultural figures"
while discouraging them from making blatant political
accusations against the Soviet Union. This could very likely
shift the focus on emigration to the category of cultural
exchange, which is not so ideologically threatening to the
Soviet leaders. When Shcharansky's case was discussed during
the cultural forum in Budapest, this new approach of placing
human rights in the context of culture, was in fact uninten¬
tionally attempted.112
For representatives of Western governments, the
resolution of individual cases of would-be emigration are
often a cause for celebration and, as the numbers of persons
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coming to the West increases, the image of the Soviet Union
often improves in the West. In one recent case, even the
ultra-conservative National Conference for Soviet Jewry
claimed that the Soviet leaders should be "rewarded" for
increasing emigration in 1986 by a reduction in trade
sanctions formerly imposed by US authorities.114 But there
are many other possible objectives underlying Soviet policies
on emigration and since this has became the predominant issue
of human rights in the United States, it will be useful here
to ask why the Soviet leadership, under the guidance of
Gorbachev, has been so willing to increase the flow of
emigrants. There are a number of factors which have been
neglected by Western protagonists which shed new light on the
multi-dimensional nature of this issue.
First of all, assessing Soviet compliance with the Final
Act by monitoring the number of Soviet emigrants not only
places undue emphasis on one sub-section of the Final Act,
but it also tempts the Soviet authorities to adjust the
figures to suit their own purposes. One method they have
used is to time announcements of large spurts of emigration
(especially when highly publicized cases can be resolved)
just before superpower summits or other international
gatherings.115 Since US representatives often tie improve¬
ments in emigration to greater cooperation in other areas,
they are often put in the position of "balancing the ledger"
471
on other issues of more specific concern to the Soviet Union.
Soviet leaders appear to have developed a much better sense
of timing in this regard. Similarly, many announcements are
made regarding emigration, such as the Soviet pledge at the
meeting of specialists on human contacts in Bern to resolve
cases of divided families involving 240 persons. However,
after summits or conferences, the majority of cases is not in
fact resolved. There is no longer any pressure to process
the applications since the Soviet authorities have already
derived the desired political benefits from the original
announcement made before or during the conference.
Another reason why the issue of emigration is so
multifaceted is because of the difficulty in determining just
how many citizens actually wish to emigrate from the Soviet
Union. Indisputable figures are not available in the West.
While Soviet leaders have not permitted large increases in
emigration desired by Western leaders, it should be recog¬
nized that the enthusiastic efforts of crlasnost' and
perestroika could very well reduce the number of those
wishing to emigrate. Many would-be emigrants are intellec¬
tuals who are frustrated with the lack of political or
economic advancement in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev has
claimed that those individuals will now have the opportunity
to play greater participatory roles in precisely those
areas.116 Perhaps the release from exile of Andrei Sakharov
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accentuated these new possibilities. Consequently, the
number applying to emigrate could be reduced giving the
false impression that an official crackdown on emigration was
underway. Soviet spokespersons have contended that the
number of applicants has decreased (a claim that cannot be
dismissed outright) although Gorbachev's assertion that, "We
have now let everyone wishing to emigrate to do so," appears
incredulous.117 Certainly, at some point the number of
applicants will decline, but it will be very difficult for
Western analysts to recognize if this development is due to
positive changes in Soviet society or to restrictions and
intimidation from the Soviet authorities.
With Western concern for Jewish emigration at such a
continually high pitch, a new law on emigration was pro¬
claimed in the Soviet Union.118 The new guidelines were
issued in November 1986 during the first round of negotia¬
tions in the Vienna follow-up conference and were to take
effect on 1 January 1987. Allegedly, the rewritten standards
made emigration easier for Soviet citizens because most
applications would be processed within one month if they
involved the reunification of families, meetings with close
relatives, visits with seriously ill relatives, marriage or
other valid reasons. But there were many causes for the
denial of an exit visa which generated a very negative
impression among Western observers who believed that,
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ultimately, the law made emigration more difficult.119
Nevertheless, the new law allowed the Soviet authorities to
announce a "restructuring" of the policy on emigration which
allegedly reflected heightened concern for this dimension of
human rights. In reality, it is too early to gauge with
accuracy the impact of the new provisions.
Should there be a substantial increase in emigration, it
is entirely possible that Western societies will not be able
to absorb the larger number of immigrants. In February 1987,
many organizations that resettle new American citizens issued
a warning that if the number of immigrants topped a predicted
figure of 7,000, they would not have the resources to help
them.120 Such services are already inadequate for assisting
immigrants in the difficult, sometimes traumatic experiences
that they encounter in their new environment. The fact that
fifty Soviet emigres returned to their homeland in December
1986 should serve as a warning of the consequences of
inadequate planning or resources in this area. And if more
individuals return to the Soviet Union, the complaints about
unnecessary restrictions on Soviet citizens issued by Western
governmental and nongovernmental spokespersons could begin to
sound very hollow.
Finally, there is an especially dark side to the issue
of emigration. When the number of citizens leaving the
Soviet Union increases, there is a danger that more espionage
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agents will enter Western societies. The most recent
instance of mixing East European agents within groups of
emigrants occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany where
officials arrested a number of operatives from the German
Democratic Republic who were posing as political refugees.121
West European governments may not have the resources to
monitor and prevent these occurrences which are a negative
and frequently overlooked aspect of emigration from Eastern
Europe. This is not to say that all political officials in
the governments of Eastern Europe condone these tactics.
Indeed, they may be practised entirely by the relevant
"security agencies," but this does not lessen the ongoing
threat or the assault on the sovereignty of the nations that
are targeted. The following section continues the discussion
of this particular problem because, once their espionage
agents have been exposed, the Soviet and East European
authorities do attempt to retrieve their agents and they have
devised a method which preys upon the Western preoccupation
with human rights.
SPY-DISSIDENT EXCHANGES—A DANGEROUS TREND
As outlined in the previous section, the extraordinary
emphasis which some individuals in the West place on
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emigration from the Soviet Union does not necessarily help a
great number of would-be emigres, nor circumvent the Soviet
definition of human rights. Indeed, one of the potential by¬
products of an increase in emigration is an attendant larger
influx of East European spies into the societies of the West.
When the number of emigres does not continually rise, Western
political leaders have felt pressured to resolve humanitarian
cases in other ways, especially if the individuals in
question have became popular in the Western media, which
almost guarantees that they will became pariahs in their own
societies. When the individual attains international
prominence, there is often even greater pressure to negotiate
for their release.
Under these conditions, Western leaders have searched
for alternatives to confronting the Soviet authorities with
Western democratic notions of virtually unrestricted freedom
of movement of citizens. The most dangerous of these
possibilities is the practice of exchanging captured Soviet
and East European spies for dissidents. At first glance,
this option may appear beneficial to both sides. The Western
negotiators would attain a victory on humanitarian grounds,
while freeing a prominent dissident who could increase
awareness in his or her new country on the conditions of
others in their former society. Of course, representatives
of the Soviet government would retrieve exposed intelligence
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agents. Trading spies for dissidents appears to avoid the
ideological differences which impinge upon efforts to resolve
contentious human rights cases in such fora as the "Helsinki
process." In reality, however, use of this option reflects
misunderstanding over the Soviet view of dissent and can only
have short-term success for it actually justifies the
controversial definitions of human rights by the Soviet
authorities.
The first major spy-dissident exchange took place during
the Carter administration. On 28 April 1979, President
Carter completed a prisoner exchange which sent Alexsander
Ginzburg, Georgii Vins (and his wife and five children),
Valentin Moroz, Eduard Kuznetsov and Mark Dymshits to the
United States. Additionally, the Soviet Union agreed not to
execute a captured American spy in return for an American
promise to commute the sentences of two Soviet spies from its
mission at the United Nations.122
A second public exchange occurred during the Reagan
Administration. In this case, five Soviet and East European
spies were traded for three accused NATO spies. This aspect
of the exchange was relatively uncontroversial, but vrtien
Soviet dissident Anatoly Shchanransky was included, the
dominant feature of the event was that a prominent dissident,
accused of delivering military secrets to the West, was
traded for convicted espionage agents.123 The Soviet
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intention was probably to reaffirm their claim that dis-
sidence is by definition anti-Soviet and treachery.
Through the completion of the Shcharansky exchange, the
precedent for equating espionage with dissidence was
solidified. This was even more apparent in September 1986
when, as part of the settlement returning American journalist
Nicholas Daniloff to the United States and Soviet diplomat
Gennadii Zakharov to the Soviet Union, Soviet dissident and
founder of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group, Yuri Orlov
was permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union. Both
Daniloff and Zakharov were accused of spying while Orlov was
convicted for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." The
exchange went yet another step toward equating dissidence
with treachery and has left Soviet dissidents open to future
manipulation of this kind.124
The practice of trading spies for dissidents better
serves Soviet objectives. Since dissidents in the Soviet
Union are labelled by the Soviet leaders as "traitors," these
exchanges go a long way in legitimizing their claim.125
While same Western analysts assert that this is irrelevant as
long as the dissidents are allowed to leave, the more
significant issue of what longer term effects this will have
on the majority of dissidents still in the Soviet Union is
entirely overlooked. Not only are the remaining dissidents
endangered, but also the Soviet leadership may very will
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intend to deport gradually the most prominent dissidents in
this fashion so that the lesser known dissidents in the
Soviet Union no longer have an internationally recognized
spokesperson. Also, if Gorbachev intends truly to broaden
the public discussion of political and economic matters in
the Soviet Union, it may be better to have well-known
dissidents in the West than at home where they may have the
opportunity to influence more persons into their ideas which
Party ideologues or government officials do not acknowledge
as legitimate for debate, however broadly it is expanded.
Whatever the purpose, it is entirely inappropriate to refer
to Shcharansky as "the man who beat the KGB."126
Another potential problem with the exchanges is that
they may encourage Soviet officials to include even more
spies with the groups of emigrants that are permitted to
travel to Western Europe or Israel. Those spies who were
captured could became trade items for dissidents anyway.
This would be an unfortunate cyclical scenario vdiich Western
leaders would be partially responsible for generating. And,
in any case, the exchanges violate the spirit of the Helsinki
process for the rights of dissidents are not as important as
their value as bargaining chips.
Efforts to trade spies for dissidents do not circumvent
the differences in the area of human rights between the
Soviet Union and the United States. Since the latest
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exchange took place under the guidance of General Secretary
Gorbachev, one can conclude that he favours treating major
Soviet dissidents in this manner.
CONCLUSION
The "Helsinki process" has entered its second decade at
the same time that much optimism has been generated over the
new Soviet leadership's policies on human rights. In
reality, Gorbachev's willingness to adopt "Western" percep¬
tions of human rights is overestimated by political observers
in the West. This chapter has examined three central
questions which illustrate that differences over human rights
are still impediments to US-Soviet co-operation through the
Final Act. In the first instance, the Soviet leaders have
not shifted their emphasis in the Final Act from the
provisions solidifying the territorial and ideological status
quo. While the follow-up conferences and meetings of
specialists have resulted in some "compromises," these have
been in areas that are the least "ideological" such as
cultural exchanges and reunification of families. In Ottawa,
where human contacts and human rights were discussed at the
greatest length, no major breakthroughs occurred.
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Secondly, Gorbachev's policies up to late 1988 have been
consistent with Soviet statements of the past. Specific
efforts to broaden socialist democracy are still within the
ideological framework established by the Party. Gorbachev is
more concerned with open discussion to improve Soviet
economic performance than he is with theoretical debate on
the origins of human rights. Gorbachev has re-emphasized the
interrelationship between rights and duties in the Soviet
system. In his handling of Andrei Sakharov, Gorbachev has
tried to deflect international criticism about human rights
and to minimize the popularity of major dissidents in the
Soviet Union.
The final issue considered here regards the mistakes
made by official representatives of the US as they have
attempted to circumvent ideological differences over human
rights between the superpowers. Emigration, especially
Jewish emigration, is an inaccurate barometer of US-Soviet
relations and it is an inappropriate issue to place in the
forefront of the Helsinki process. If American representa¬
tives continue to press for increases in emigration from the
Soviet Union, they must become more sensitive to the problem
of relocating immigrants in the United States and to the
possibility of Soviet emigres returning to the Soviet Union
with negative impressions of American life. There is also
the danger that some emigres may be in the clandestine
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employment of the Soviet government to gather information for
military purposes. This latter hazard will be increased if
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has shown that after more than a decade
of follow-up conferences and discussion, representatives
of the Soviet and American governments still disagree on
the substance and exercise of human rights as presented in
the Helsinki Final Act and its accompanying documents.
Disagreements on the purpose and content of the Final Act
stretch back to 1954 when the first Soviet call for a
conference was delivered by Soviet Foreign Minister
Vyacheslav Molotov. The lack of consensus on the reason
for holding the CSCE has been an inherent weakness in the
Helsinki process.
An understanding of the long-term differences between
Soviet and American representatives regarding the Helsinki
process may limit unexpected confrontations over human
rights, which could ultimately affect other issues of
foreign policy, or discourage premeditated assaults on
Soviet representatives. While a grandiose international
accommodation on human rights is unlikely, further studies
of the CSCE may improve the quality and reduce the
intensity of the debate over human rights. The analysis
of official documents, written personal accounts and
interviews conducted here is a first step towards a deeper
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understanding of the Helsinki process; much more work must
still be done, especially regarding the views in behaviour
of representatives of smaller nations participating in the
Helsinki process. As diplomats, interpreters and reporters
write more about their experiences during the closed
sessions of the CSCE and the follow-up conferences, it may
be possible to assemble a clearer picture of the events in
Geneva, Helsinki, Belgrade, Madrid, Ottawa and elsewhere.
More information will enhance the potential for political
scientists to utilize better the Helsinki process in their
efforts to understand many aspects of international
relations.
A crucial and recurrent issue in the Helsinki process
has been the sovereignty of the participating nations and
their entitlement to apply the provisions on human rights
to their own political and legal systems without outside
interference. The Carter administration's attempts to
force an American interpretation on Soviet domestic
policy-makers failed and the paramount right of sover¬
eignty was upheld. Even though unofficial groups in the
Soviet Union adopted a more "Western" interpretation of
Principle Seven and Basket III and fuelled international
debate over the Final Act, the Soviet leaders relied on
the principle of sovereignty and did not sanction the
involvement of the CSCE participants in Soviet law or
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politics. Soviet commentators still reject emphatically
the notion of international citizenship and they will not
accept a broad European passport system of the type
recently initiated by the governments participating in the
European Economic Community.
But what is the relationship between ongoing Soviet
interpretations of the Final Act and Gorbachev's commit¬
ment to perestroika and crlasnost' ? While definitive
judgements cannot be made, it is possible to make a number
of observations related to the Helsinki process and the
debate over human rights. First, despite the hyperbole in
the Western media over crlasnost'. Gorbachev does not seem
poised to redefine human rights in the follow-up conferen¬
ces of the Helsinki process or within the Soviet political
system. Despite recent administrative and procedural
changes, and not withstanding earlier modifications in the
Constitution, the official Soviet view of human rights has
remained consistent. Even if Gorbachev proclaims new
"rights" or "privileges," observation and interpretation
must centre more on implementation than on the declaration
of such changes. More statements on this topic may be
forthcoming from Gorbachev, but it is too early to
determine the impact of Gorbachev's attempts to increase
"openness" in the Soviet political and economic system.
Should any new policy statements emanate from CSCE
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follow-up meetings, verification will be even more
difficult to achieve based on past experience with the
Final Act.
Second, comfortable that the territorial and
ideological status quo has been confirmed in Europe,
Gorbachev and future Soviet leaders are likely to
accentuate this "new" reality through further agreements
within the Helsinki process. Negotiations are continuing
in Stockholm on confidence and security-building measures
and the recent treaty between the United States and Soviet
Union reducing intermediate nuclear forces in Europe,
although outside the Helsinki process, reinforces further
the permanence of borders in Central and Eastern Europe.
Many other conferences have grown out of the Final Act's
follow-up procedure (discussed in detail in Chapter Six)
which have allowed official Soviet representatives to
emphasize both their interpretation of the Final Act and
their perception of the future of the Helsinki process.
Observers of the new policy of glasnost' should consider
if it is intended to lead to more open discussion about
foreign policy or debate about the differences and
similarities between Soviet and West European societies.
Certainly Soviet leaders have not called for a conference
on human rights in Moscow to proclaim their adoption of
West European interpretations of human rights. It is more
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likely that they desire a conference to solidify and
further justify the differences.
Third, if indeed the superpowers are bound to further
competition, then arms limitations or reductions agree¬
ments are critical for they shift the rivalry to the
ideological or economic sphere rather than to the more
dangerous and expensive realm of the military. Even
though he recognizes the symbiotic relationship between
ideological and military competition, Gorbachev does seem
more concerned with internal systemic reform than with the
expansion of Soviet military and political influence
abroad. While the United States may be the pre-eminent
military adversary for the Soviet leadership, other
nations, such as China, have became models of political
and economic reform that challenge even further the wisdom
and authority of the Marxist-Leninist ideologues in
Moscow. Gorbachev's emphasis on restructuring represents
his desire to explore the potential for improvement in the
Soviet system and to regain the status for the Soviet
Union as a leading nation in progressive socialist
development. A central aspect of the "Helsinki process"
is also to lead by example rather than to merely accen¬
tuate the failings of others.
Fourth, to demonstrate that the Soviet Union is at a
minimum in compliance with the Final Act, Gorbachev has
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used a number of very practical policies which, although
of questionable value for human rights in the long-term,
provide the appearance of humanitarianism. The use of
spy/dissident exchanges, the manipulation of emigration
figures, granting of broader "freedoms" for Andrei
Sakharov, more open criticism of the past and increases in
cultural exchanges all enhance Gorbachev's image as a
leader who is more sensitive to the individual rights of
Soviet citizens but, as discussed in the previous chapter,
that perception is still premature.
Finally, the Helsinki Final Act has initiated a broad
debate about the role of human rights in international
relations. While Soviet and American representatives have
most recently reiterated their commitment to the Helsinki
process, they have not initiated major doctrinal revisions
that would make their respective interpretations of the
humanitarian provisions compatible. The controversial and
public debate that has taken place since 1972 must be
regarded as a healthy aspect of superpower competition,
but it must also be realized that the tendency to link
human rights with other issues has not, on the whole,
improved the lives of the peoples of Europe or North
America. There are no short-term solutions to the
disagreements over human rights in the Final Act. For the
future, the most astute participants and observers of the
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Helsinki process would benefit from studying the long-term
disagreements and they would best demonstrate the
"Helsinki spirit" by examining their cwn record in living
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